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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al., ] 
Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants, 
vs• 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ] 
et al., ] 
Defendants/Appellants• 
. Appeal No- 91-0242 
Priority No. 11 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann- § 59-1-608 (1987), section 5 of Article VIII of 
the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1991 
Supp.), and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE 1. The District Court erred in defining 
Plaintiff Class. The Class is overbroad to the extent that it 
includes persons receiving federal retirement benefits for the 
year 1984; it includes persons who failed to pay under protest 
for the years 1985 through 1987; it includes persons barred by 
the six month statute of limitation; and it includes military 
retirees who do not receive pension income. 
Standard of Reviews This Court will reverse a 
trial court decision on class certification "when it is shown 
-1-
that the trial court misapplied the law or abused its discretion. 
. • . " Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). 
ISSUE 2. The District Court erred in denying 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies; It further erred in granting 
injunctive relief without findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and in violation of the Tax Injunction Act. 
Standard of Rexriewz Dismissal. The standard of 
review is correction of error. The ruling by a trial court on 
"the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law . . . 
the trial court's ruling [is given] no deference and [the court 
will] review it under a correctness standard." St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
The reviewing court must construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff and resolve all inferences in its 
favor in reviewing the ruling on a motion to dismiss. Arrow 
Indus, v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935f 936 (Utah 
19 88). Injunction. The reviewing Court reviews the District 
Court's decision in granting the injunction to determine if it 
has abused its discretion, or if its judgment is clearly against 
the weight of the evidence. See Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 
669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983) (citing John v. Ward, 451 P.2d 182, 
188 (Okla. 1976)). 
ISSUE 3. The District Court erred in granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and ruling, without 
precedent, that State and Federal law mandate income tax refunds 
for all members of the class for the years 1985 through 1988. 
-2-
Standard of Reviewz When reviewing a ruling on 
motion for summary judgment, the Court should determine "whether 
there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if there is not, 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law* . • ." Arrow Indus, v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 
935, 937 (Utah 1988). The reviewing Court should view the facts 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the lowing party. Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 7 95 P.2d 
1133 (Utah 1990) . 
ISSUE 4. The District Court erred in crafting a remedy 
that is overbroad and overinclusive. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 
759 (Utah 1990). 
ISSUE 5. The District Court erred in not allowing 
Defendants the prescribed time to file objections to Plaintiffs' 
Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Partial Summary 
Judgment and by making findings when ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment that are unsupported by the record. 
Standard of Re\rle*rz Time for Objection. This is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Ld. Findings. The 
reviewing court views the evidence in a "light most favorable to 
the losing party and affirms only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact . . . " D & L Supply v. 
Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE 6. The District Court erred in awarding 
Plaintiffs attorney fees and reimbursement for tax return 
preparation. 
-3-
Standard of Revievz Attorney Fees. "[W]here 
attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party on summary 
judgment, the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a 
matter of law, (1) the parties are entitled to the award and (2) 
the amount awarded is reasonable. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted). 
Costs. Whether Plaintiffs should have received reimbursement for 
tax return preparation and court costs is a conclusion of law. 
Conclusions of law are given no deference, but are reviewed for 
correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1990) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 (1987). 
3. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(2). 
4. Utah Rule Civ. P. 54. 
5. Utah Rule Civ. P. 52. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-704 (1987). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (Supp. 1991 and 
1987) . 
8. 4 U.S.C. § 111. 
-4-
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a District Court order. (R. 1119-
20.) On November 7, 1991, this Court found that the District 
Court order was not final, but accepted the case as an 
interlocutory appeal- The order grants summary judgment for 
Plaintiffs in a tax refund action pursuant to state law, and 
denies summary judgment for the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' tax 
refund action is based on 4 U.S.C. § 111. (R. 1156 tr. 6.) 
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), the Supreme 
Court held that the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental 
tax immunity embodied in 4 U.S.C. § 111 required that the State 
of Michigan treat federal and state retirement income the same 
for state income tax purposes. Prior to this decision, Michigan, 
and many other states, allowed a tax exemption for state 
retirement pensions but not for federal retirement pensions. 
The Supreme Court did not decide the question of 
retroactive application of its Davis decision because the State 
of Michigan had conceded that a tax refund would be provided to 
Mr. Davis* 
On June 9, 1989, a number of Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") 
filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, against the Utah State Tax Commission and 
various named officers of the Tax Commission ("Defendants"), 
-5-
seeking a refund for all taxes paid on retirement benefits 
received from federal sources for tax years 1984-1988- The 
complaint alleged that the Defendants were in violation of a 
variety of federal and state statutes and court decisions. 
On November 8, 19 89, the case was reassigned to the 
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge of the Tax Division of 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
On October 10, 1989, Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants argued (1) lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies; (3) governmental immunity; and (4) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
On January 29, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
certify a class consisting of all living persons and estates of 
deceased persons who had paid Utah state income tax on federal 
retirement pensions for tax years 1984-1988. 
On February 20, 1990, the District Court entered an 
order denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss except as it related 
to Plaintiffs' claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (R. 
250.) The grounds stated for denying the motion were that the 
Court had jurisdiction for the years in question, that Plaintiffs 
were not required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, and that the Utah State Tax 
Commission had no procedure for dealing with a class action suit. 
-6-
On March 12, 1990f Defendants filed a petition for 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order with the Utah 
Supreme Court, (Case 90-0109), seeking review of the District 
Court's denial of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss- Permission to 
prosecute that appeal was denied. 
On March 23, 1990, the District Court entered an order 
certifying a class consisting of all federal retirees and estates 
of deceased persons who had paid Utah state income tax on federal 
pensions. (R. 289.) 
Further, On March 23, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a motion 
to enjoin the Utah State Tax Commission from considering appeals 
filed by members of the Plaintiff Class. (R. 292.) 
On June 8, 199 0, the District Court entered an order 
against the Utah State Tax Commission enjoining it from 
considering appeals filed by members of the Plaintiff Class. 
(R.367.) 
On September 5, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against the Tax Commission for refund of income 
taxes. (R. 395.) On October 15, 1990, Defendants filed a Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 616.) 
On November 15, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to 
Strike certain of the affidavits submitted by Defendants in 
support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
803.) On December 27, 1990, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike 
one of Plaintiffs' affidavits, (R. 946.) 
-7-
On March 4, 1991, a hearing was held on both 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and the respective Motions to Strike. 
(R. 1156. ) At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Young ruled 
from the bench, and granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment- (R. 1156 tr. 73.) Judge Young denied Defendants' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id,, tr. 74.) 
At the hearing on March 4, 1991, Judge Young granted 
Defendants' Motion to Strike from the bench. Judge Young, also 
from the bench, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike on relevancy 
grounds as it related to the affidavits of Mr. Knowlton, Mr. 
Christensen, and Mr. Memmott. (_Id. tr. 75.) However, Judge 
Young subsequently entered an order striking not only the three 
affidavits mentioned in the bench ruling as irrelevant, but all 
of Defendants' affidavits that were requested stricken by 
Plaintiffs. (R. 1113.) 
On April 3, 1991, Defendants filed with the District 
Court objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 1087.) 
Among the matters contested was that the proposed Order exceeded 
the bench ruling made by Judge Young. (R. 1113.) 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs submitted amended proposed 
findings and conclusions. On April 15, 1991, Judge Young made a 
minute entry providing that "[t]he court has reviewed the Amended 
Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgement as 
-8-
submitted. The same are approved to be the final order of the 
court. The Defendants' objections thereto are thus denied. . . 
• " (R. 1110.) 
On April 16, 1991, Judge Young signed Plaintiffs' 
Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Amended Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary 
Judgment were filed with the court clerk on the same day. At 
this time, Defendants had pot had the opportunity to file 
objections to Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions, 
and Partial Summary Judgment. Defendants' Objections to 
Plaintiffs Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial 
Summary Judgment were protectively filed on April 18, 1991. (R. 
1143.) 
On May 10, 1991, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in 
the Tax Division of the Third District Court. (R. 1147.) 
On November 7, 19 91, this Court determined that the 
District Court's order was not appealable pursuant to rule 54(b), 
Utah R. Civ. P. However, the case was accepted as an 
interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to 1989, Utah law provided that retirement 
benefits received from the state retirement fund by former state 
and local government employees were exempt from state individual 
income taxes, while retirement benefits received by all others, 
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including former employees of the federal government, were not 
exempt. (See predecessors to current Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-608.) 
Prior to March 1989, the legality of this exemption had never 
been contested in a Utah administrative or court proceeding. (R. 
701, 707, 713-14, 717, 1031, 1054-55. ) 
The Utah State Tax Commission believed that it was 
acting lawfully in taxing federal retirement income based upon 
the laws existing at that time. (R. 713.) 
The State of Utah relied in good faith on the 
preferential treatment of state employees as part of a benefit 
program for state employees and part of a revenue raising program 
for the State. (R. 701, 707.) 
In 1984, Davis, a Michigan resident and former federal 
civil service employee, petitioned the Michigan Department of 
Treasury for a refund of state taxes paid on his federal 
retirement benefits. He argued that Michigan's inconsistent tax 
treatment of state and federal retirement benefits violated 4 
U.S.C. § 111 (Section 111). This petition was denied by the 
Michigan Department of Treasury. Davis brought suit in the 
Michigan Court of Claims; it denied relief. Davis, 489 U.S. at 
807. 
The case was appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. 
Asserting the longstanding view that retired federal workers are 
not employees of the United States, it ruled that Michigan's tax 
system did not contravene Section 111, holding that the statute 
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only applied to current federal employees. The Michigan Court 
also held that the tax did not discriminate against the federal 
government since the exemption was rationally related to the 
legitimate state objective of attracting and retaining qualified 
employees. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 408 N.W.2d 433 
(Mich. 1987). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 412 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1987). 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity 
embodied in Section 111 required Michigan to treat federal and 
state retirement income the same for state income tax purposes. 
Davis, 489 U.S. at 808-814. 
Prior to the decision in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 
803 (1989), the Utah Legislature had been advised by its legal 
counsel that state pension and taxation issues were issues of 
state's rights and not federal questions. (R. 720.) 
As a result of the decision in the Davis case, in the 
fall of 1989, the Governor of Utah called a special session of 
the legislature to amend both Utah's retirement act and the state 
individual income tax act dealing with state income tax basis and 
rates, and additions and subtractions to federal individual 
income tax. The legislature met in special session and passed 
legislation bringing Utah's laws into compliance with the Davis 
decision. (R, 701, 707.) 
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All federal, state, local, and private retirement 
income is now treated identically, except as provided under IRS 
regulations and/or federal statutes. (R. 713.) 
Prior to the special session, a complaint was filed by 
a number of named Plaintiffs ("Named Plaintiffs") in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, against the 
Utah State Tax Commission and various named officers of the Tax 
Commission ("Defendants"), seeking a refund for all taxes paid on 
federal retirement benefits received from federal sources for tax 
years 1984 through 1988. This complaint alleged that the 
Defendants were in violation of a variety of federal and state 
statutes and court decisions. 
At the time the action was filed, it was estimated that 
if Plaintiffs prevailed, approximately $99,944,000 in taxes paid 
and $37,206,000 in accumulated interest, totalling $137,150,000, 
must be refunded to U.S. Government and military retirees. (R. 
724.) Interest on the potential income tax refund accumulates at 
approximately $750,000 a month. (R. 724.) Plaintiffs stipulated 
below that they could not prevail on any cause of action for the 
1984 year. (R. 1156 tr. 8.) The potential refund is now 
estimated to be approximately $104 million. (R. 725.) This is 
in contrast to $8.3 million, which is the "best estimate benefit" 
received by state retirees for the years 1985-1988. (R. 1059.) 
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The relief requested in this case could seriously 
impact the state's budget, requiring program reductions, tax 
increases, or both- (R. 702, 708.) 
State revenue projections have been characterized in 
the following manner. 
Revenue forecasts for the next five years 
indicate that the state revenues will not 
keep pace with the state's budgetary needs 
due to tax policy changes, expenditures for 
federally-mandated human services, and 
critical law enforcement and educational 
needs. . . . 
(R. 702, 708.) The extraordinary relief sought by Plaintiffs 
could cause great financial harm to the state and its citizens. 
(R. 702, 708.) The current services expenditure approach 
developed by the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst shows 
that the state will incur budget deficits in each year from 1992 
through 1996. (R. 728.) The combined deficit for the years 1992 
through 1996 is projected to be $196 million. Id. 
The taxes paid by federal retirees for tax years 1985-
19 88 have been expended by the state in appropriations and are no 
longer available for refunds. (R. 702, 708.) Under the current 
taxing system, the relief sought will result in insufficient 
funds for the state's budgeted needs. (R. 702, 708.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Iv The District Court erred in defining Plaintiff 
Class- Plaintiff Class, as defined by the District Court, is 
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overbroad. First, Plaintiffs have conceded that they cannot 
prevail under any theory for the year 1984. Notwithstanding, the 
class presently includes persons who received federal benefits or 
annuities for 1984. Second, included in Plaintiff Class are 
persons who have failed to pay under protest for the tax years 
1985-1987. Because payment under protest is mandatory under Utah 
law for a suit for refund in District Court, these persons were 
improperly included within Plaintiff Class. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989). Third, the class improperly includes 
individuals barred by the applicable six month statute of 
limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 (1987). Finally, the 
class includes federal military retirees who do not receive 
pension income. They receive current compensation for reduced 
services. Accordingly, Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) 
does not speak to that group. For the these reasons, this Court 
should remand this case to the District Court for a narrower 
class definition. 
2. The District Court erred in denying the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in granting injunctive relief. 
Because Plaintiff Class failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
as required by Utah law, the District Court improperly denied 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs introduced no evidence 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit. At a 
minimum, this Court should find concurrent jurisdiction between 
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the Tax Court and the Tax Commission, Under concurrent 
jurisdiction, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies 
requiring initial agency review. 
The District Court erred in entering an order enjoining 
the Tax Commission from proceeding administratively on refund 
claims filed by individual class members. First, the Court is 
without jurisdiction to enjoin the Commission from hearing tax 
refund cases pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act. Second, the 
District Court failed to make the requisite findings supporting 
its injunction. Hence, the Court's order should be remanded for 
such findings. 
3. Neither Utah nor Federal law mandate refunds to 
Plaintiff Class. The District Court could not have concluded 
from state statutes or cases prior to the Davis decision that 
Utah's taxing scheme was illegal or unconstitutional. In fact, 
no Utah case law had ever addressed those issues involved in 
Davis. Accordingly, in the absence of any state statutory or 
precedential guidance on the issue, the District Court erred by 
not turning to and applying appropriate federal law. 
Further, federal law does not require refunds. The 
Davis decision did not mandate refunds; it only required equal 
treatment. Furthermore, the seminal case in determining whether 
a Supreme Court decision has retroactive application is Chevron 
Oil Co, v, Huson, 404 U,S. 97 (1971). That case requires that 
Davis be applied prospectively only. In Chevron, the Supreme 
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Court set forth three factors to be considered in determining 
whether a judicial decision should operate prospectively only. A 
decision will operate only prospectively: 
(1) if it establishes a new principle of law by 
overruling clear past precedent by deciding an issue of 
first impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed; 
(2) if prospective only application will not retard 
the operation of the rule in question; and 
(3) if retroactive application would result in 
inequity, injustice or hardship. 
Davis clearly established a new principle of law. 
Application of the Davis rule prospectively will not retard the 
operation of the rule that federal employees' pensions receive 
equal tax treatment. Retroactive application of the Davis 
decision will result in inequity, injustice, and hardship to the 
state. Therefore the decision should be applied prospectively 
only. 
Further, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in 
American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2335 (1990) 
"the prospective application of a new principle of law begins on 
the date of the decision announcing the principle." Accordingly, 
because the Davis Decision has prospective application from March 
27, 1989, Plaintiffs' relief is barred for the years 1985-1988. 
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4, The District Court's remedy is overbroad and 
overinclusive. Davis did not mandate refunds for taxes paid by 
federal retirees; rather, that case only required equal treatment 
of federal and state retirement income for state income tax 
purposes. Accordingly, Utah complied with the Davis decision 
when it revised its income tax statute to provide for identical 
treatment of state and federal pensioners. 
In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 
110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990), the Supreme Court set out the minimum 
procedural standards that a state remedy must provide to satisfy 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. Utah has satisfied these 
minimum Due Process requirements by providing both predeprivation 
and postdeprivation remedies for those taxpayers contesting 
payment of taxes. Moreover, despite precedential direction to 
the contrary, the District Court failed to balance equities in 
crafting its remedy. Hence, the District Court's refund remedy 
was inequitable and should be reversed. 
5. The District Court erred in not allowing 
Defendants the prescribed time to object to the proposed final 
order and by making findings unsupported by the record. 
Defendants' prescribed period of time in which to file 
objections to Plaintiffs' proposed final order had not lapsed 
prior to entry of the order. Therefore, by signing and entering 
the order, the Court deprived Defendants of their right to object 
under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
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Because the Defendants were denied their right to object, the 
Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment must 
be set aside. 
Further, the District Court erred in making findings of 
material facts in ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment that are completely unsupported by the record. Because 
the findings were unsupported and therefore technically in 
dispute, logically they could not be the basis for the Court's 
granting summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court must remand 
for findings consistent with the record. 
6- The District Court erred in awarding Plaintiffs' 
attorney fees and court costs and in granting reimbursement to 
Plaintiffs for the costs of preparing amended tax returns* In 
order to justify the award of attorney fees, this Court has ruled 
that a claim or defense be without merit or not brought in good 
faith. There is no evidence whatsoever that Defendants actions 
or defenses are without merit and not brought in good faith. 
Because this threshold requirement is not satisfied, attorney 
fees assessed against Defendants are not justified. 
Similarly, the District Court erred in granting costs 
to Plaintiffs for preparing amended returns and court costs. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54 directs that "costs against the state of Utah 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law." The 
District Court failed to articulate any basis in law for 





THE DISTRICT COURT'S CLASS DEFINITION IS OVERBROAD, 
Over Defendants' objections, and without an evidentiary 
hearing, the District Court certified the class as: 
All persons and the estates of deceased 
persons who received federal retirement 
benefits or annuities and who have paid Utah 
state income tax on their federal retirement 
benefits for the 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 
and/or the 1988 tax years, 
(R.289.) 
As defined by the District Court, the class is 
overbroad, (R. 281-) There was no finding by the District Court 
that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. The 
class includes persons having claims for 1984. Plaintiffs have 
admitted these persons could not prevail under any theory. The 
class includes Plaintiffs who have not paid under protest and 
therefore have no proper jurisdictional basis for their claims. 
At the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, 
they included former full-time military personnel who do not 
receive pension income. These individuals receive current 
compensation for reduced services. The class should have been 
limited to those persons who paid their taxes under protest and 
therefore brought a timely action in District Court. (R. 225.) 
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It is for those persons only that the District Court has 
jurisdiction. 
•A; The Class Definition Is Overbroad Because 
Plaintiffs Have Admitted They Cannot Prevail Under 
Any Theory For The-1984 Year. 
Plaintiffs conceded below that they could not prevail 
for the 1984 year under any theory. (R. 1156 tr. 7-8.) As the 
class is now defined, all persons receiving federal benefits or 
annuities for .1984 are included in the class. However, there is 
no theory under which this 1984 group could be included in the 
class. Therefore, this case must be remanded so that the 
Plaintiff class can be correctly defined. 
B. The District Court Erred In Including Within The 
Class The Tax Years 1985 Through 1987 Because 
There Is No Evidence In The Record Showing Payment 
Of Tax Under Protest For Those Years. 
Plaintiffs conceded below that, M[i]f a class is not 
certified, only the named Plaintiffs will have met the six month 
statute of limitations to pursue a claim of payment under 
protest." (R. 216.) Plaintiffs also conceded, "[w]e did not 
protest '87, '86, '85, '84 taxes." (R. 1158 tr. 27.) The 
District Court found that "all of the 1988 participants in this 
action, which includes the entire class, shall be deemed to have 
paid "under protest" . . . " (R. 1156 tr. 74.) This finding was 
made even though contrary evidence was in the record. (R. 561.) 
(Charles L. Miller stated in his affidavit in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: "I protested the 
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collection of Utah State income tax on my 1988 federal retirement 
income by not paying my 19 88 Utah State income tax." (Emphasis 
added)). Plaintiff Class claims for years 1985-1987 are 
therefore barred, inasmuch as the record is devoid of evidence 
showing that Plaintiffs have paid their tax under protest and 
brought a suit within the six month limitation period for years 
1985-1987. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989)1 sets forth the 
requirement of payment under protest: 
In all cases of lew of taxes, licenses, or 
other demands for public revenue which is 
deemed unlawful by the party whose property 
is taxed, or from whom the tax or license is 
demanded or enforced, that party may pay 
under protest the tax or license, or any part 
deemed unlawful, to the officers designated 
and authorized by law to collect the tax or 
license; and then the party so paying or a 
legal representative may bring an action in 
the tax division of the appropriate district 
court against the officer to whom the tax or 
1
 This statute first appeared on the books in Utah in 1898. 
See R.S. § 2684 (1898)- It was placed among the miscellaneous 
taxation provisions, thus making it applicable to all types of 
taxes. This is evidenced by the expansiveness of its language. 
During the next 80 years, it remained among the miscellaneous 
provisions. See C.L. § 2684 (1907); C.L. § 6094 (1917); R.S. § 80-
11-11(1933); Utah Code Ann. § 80-11-11(1943). Id. at § 59-11-
11(1977). Then in 1987, as part of a property tax recodification 
effort, it was renumbered and placed within the property tax 
chapter. See 1987 Utah Laws Ch. 4 § 260. It is important to 
recognize that the legislative debate accompanying this change gave 
no indication that any substantive change had occurred in the 
statute. See transcript of S.B. 71, January 16, 1987. (R. 783.) 
Thus, by renumbering the statute, the legislature did not intend 
substantive changes in it. A court should look to the intent of 
the legislature at the time of a statute's enactment and not infer 
substantive changes in it, when it is merely moved from one 
location in the code to another. See Atlas Corp. v. Tax Comm'n 415 
P. 2d 208, 209 (Utah 1966) (it was incorrect for the Tax Commission 
to conclude that delinquent occupation taxes for mining could be 
collected using tax warrants where the occupation tax provisions 
had been moved from their original place in the code and placed 
among provisions regarding the assessment of property that allowed 
collection by warrant). 
In 1988, the section was reenacted and again moved to its 
current place in the miscellaneous chapter. See 1988 Utah Laws, 
Ch. 3, § 88. The foregoing legislative history makes clear that § 
59-1-301 was in existence during the tax years in question, and was 
applicable to income tax. 
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license was paid, or against the state, 
county, municipality, or other taxing entity 
on whose behalf it was collected, to recover 
the tax or license or any portion of the tax 
or license paid under protest, 
(Emphasis added,) 
In order for Plaintiffs to receive a refund through an 
original action in District Court for allegedly illegal taxes, 
they must have first paid these taxes under protest. The 
requirements of this statute are mandatory. 
The Supreme Court made this clear in State v. District 
Court, 102 Utah 290, 115 P.2d 913 (Utah 1941) (overturned on 
other grounds in State v. District Court, 102 Utah 2d 57, 128 
P.2d 471 (1942) (hereinafter "District Court II" n. 2 In 
District Court, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the State of 
Utah in a tax refund action where state taxes had been paid under 
protest and were later declared unconstitutional. The Court 
found: "payment under protest is a condition precedent to the 
recovery of taxes paid to the state." District Court, 115 P.2d 
at 915. 
The Utah Supreme Court also addressed this issue in 
Shea v. Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941). Shea 
On rehearing, the Utah Supreme Court in District Court 
11/ 128 P. 2d 471 (Utah 1942), reviewed and overturned State v. 
District Court, 115 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1941). However, only on the 
procedural issue regarding service of summons was the decision 
overturned. 
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involved a refund action by a freight line for fuel taxes; the 
tax was not paid under protest, and the tax was later declared 
unconstitutional by the Court, Id. at 274-75. The Court 
rejected the taxpayer's refund argument and found that taxes 
alleged to be illegal must be paid under protest to be 
recoverable: 
In cases in which legality or illegality of 
tax sought to be recovered by taxpayer 
necessarily involves determination of 
questions of law calling for exercise of 
strictly judicial functions, payments under 
protest and compliance with other provisions 
of the statutes afford the exclusive remedy, 
• . . We are fortified in this position 
because there has been upon the statute books 
for over forty years a provision similar to 
Section 80-11-11, R.S.U. 1933 rthe forerunner 
of § 59-1-301] , providing "In all cases of 
levy of taxes, licenses or other demands for 
public revenue which is deemed unlawful" it 
may be paid under protest and suit brought to 
recover. 
Id. at 275 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiffs must have paid all 
contested taxes under protest as a prerequisite to a refund suit. 
This has not been done. Therefore, the relief they seek must be 
denied. 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that 
payment under protest was made, except by isolated individuals 
for tax year 1988. No payment under protest and suits for refund 
were made until after the Davis decision was handed down in 1989. 
As discussed above, protest after payment is not provided for 
under Utah law. Thus, the case must be remanded to the District 
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Court with instructions to redefine the class to exclude any 
taxpayers who did not pay under protest. 
C. The District Court Erred In Not Barring All 
Plaintiff Class Claims For Years 1985-1987 
Pursuant To The Statute Of Limitations-
The limitations period for suits for refund of state 
taxes that have been paid under protest is governed by Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-12-31 (1987).3 It provides: 
3
 This statute has been in force since 1888, See C.L. § 
3147.198 (1888), The legislature has renumbered the statute; 
however, it has never changed the statute so as to affect the Utah 
Supreme Court's interpretation of it in State v. District Court, 
102 Utah 290, 115 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1941) (discussed supra) . Thus, it 
should be presumed that this interpretation is consistent with the 
intent of the legislature: 
Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, 
leaving other portions unamended, or re-enacts a portion 
without change, absent substantial evidence to the 
contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been 
satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the 
unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted 
those constructions as consistent with its own intent, 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984); see 
also Black Bull Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 547 P.2d 1334, 1335-36 
(Utah 1976) . 
Thus, under the American Coal Co. rule of statutory 
construction, it is presumed that the legislature intended the 
six-month limitations period to apply to refund actions against 
the state. This was made clear with the Utah Supreme Court's 
judicial construction of the statute in District Court, supra. 
See also Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 
(Utah 1941) (diesel taxes not paid under protest to the State are 
subject to six-month limitations period); State v. District 
Court, 102 Utah 290, 115 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1941) (taxes paid under 
protest to the State are subject to 6 month limitations period); 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Matson, 64 Utah 214 (1924) (illegal 
taxes paid to the Secretary of State in his official capacity are 
subject to the six-month limitations provision)• 
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Within six months: 
an action against an officer . . •: 
• • • 
(2) for money paid to any such officer under 
protest, or seized by such officer in 
his official capacity, as a collector of 
taxes, and which, it is claimed, ought 
to be refunded. 
Payment of taxes falls within the scope of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-31(2) (1987). The Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
scope of this statute in Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. 
Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987). 
In Ponderosa,, the Plaintiff paid a sewer service charge 
under protest. Ld. at 636. Nine months later it sought a 
refund. JEd.. The sanitary district argued the six-month 
limitations period as a defense. Ld. The Court rejected that 
argument, holding that the sewer service was not a tax and thus a 
different limitations period was applicable. JId. at 637. 
However, in reaching that decision, the Court declared that tax 
actions properly fall within the six-month period. Jkk at 638. 
As previously stated, Plaintiffs conceded below that 
"if a class is not certified, only the named Plaintiffs will have 
met the six month statute of limitations to pursue a claim of 
payment under protest." (R. 216.) Plaintiffs also conceded 
"[W]e did not protest '87, '86, '85, '84 taxes." (R. 1158 tr. 
27.) Plaintiffs have attempted to use payment under protest by a 
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few individuals as a basis for jurisdiction for many individuals 
who do not have claims: 
It is axiomatic that no class action may 
proceed on behalf of class members whose 
claims are barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations. If F,R.Civ,P,23 were 
otherwise, it would give the class action 
method of litigation the ability to revive 
stale claims that could not otherwise be 
brought on an individual basis. Viewed in 
this light, the applicable statute of 
limitations marks the outer boundary for 
class membership", 
Schmidt v. Interstate Fed, Savings and Loan Ass'n, 74 F.R.D. 423, 
428 (U.S.D.C., D.C. 1977). 
Hence, the class must be limited to those persons 
paying their 1988 taxes under protest and bringing an action in 
District Court within six months, 
D. Payment Under Protest And A Short Statute of 
Limitations for an Alleged Illegal Tax Meet 
Federal Due Process Requirements. 
In McKesson Corp, v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages, 110 
S. Ct, 2238 (1990), the Supreme Court validated a payment under 
protest and short limitations period for the purpose of denying a 
refund for a tax later held to be unconstitutional: 
[I]n the future, States may avail themselves 
of a variety of procedural protections 
against any disruptive effects of a tax 
scheme's invalidation, such as providing by 
statute that refunds will be available to 
only those taxpayers paying under protest, or 
enforcing relatively short statutes of 
limitation applicable to refund actions. See 
supra, at 2254, Such procedural measures 
would sufficiently protect States' fiscal 
security when weighed against their 
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obligation to provide meaningful relief for 
their unconstitutional taxation. 
Id, at 2257 (emphasis added) (In McKesson,, the Court "assume[d] 
for present purposes that petitioner satisfied whatever protest 
requirements might exist," Jd. at 2243-44, n.4.). Therefore, 
payment under protest and the six-month statute of limitations 
meet federal constitutional concerns, 
E. The Rule In Davis Does Not Apply To Federal 
Military Retirees; Hence, They Should Not Be 
Included In The Class. 
The Court in Davis declared the Michigan statute to be 
in conflict with federal law because it treated federal civilian 
retirees less favorably than state and local retirees when there 
was no significant difference between the Michigan state and 
local government retirees sufficient to justify the different 
treatment. The Utah Public Employee's Retirement Act, like most 
retirement programs, provides for regular retirement at 65 years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-2-103(6) (1989 and Supp. 1990). The federal 
Civil Service Retirement Act (5 U.S.C. § 8331, et seq.) is 
similar, providing for regular retirement at age 62 or 60, 
depending on the years of service, and early retirement at age 55 
with 30 years of service. 
However, the retirement system for regular United 
States military personnel is entirely different; rather than 
providing deferred compensation, it provides current compensation 
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for reduced services/ United States v. Tyler, 105 U. S. 244 
(1882). In Costello v. United States, 587 F. 2d 424 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) , the court held that a 
change in plaintiff's pay after retirement did not offend Due 
Process, because military retirement pay was pay for continuing 
military service, not deferred compensation; and in Watson v. 
Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976), the court held that 
retired military pay is remuneration for employment and subject 
to garnishment the same as active duty pay. Most service 
personnel may retire after 20 years of service, regardless of 
age, which means that many are retired before the age of 40. 
See, eg., 10 U.S.C. § 1293; 10 U.S.C. § 3911; 10 U.S.C. § 6323. 
In return, retired military personnel remain subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. § 802) and must be 
prepared for recall at any time (10 U.S.C. § 688). 
Because military retirement pay is current 
compensation, it is fundamentally different from the Utah State 
and local government pensions which were exempted from Utah 
In determining whether military retirees are includable 
under the Davis ruling, this court must apply federal law. See 
ATA, 110 S.Ct. at 2330 ("whether a constitutional decision of this 
Court is retroactive . . . is a matter of federal law.") "[T]he 
antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule 
at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or 
otherwise." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 
2439, 2443 (1991) (Souter, J. Lead opinion). Hence, the Utah Court 
of Appeal's dictum in Greene v. Greene, 751 P. 2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (quoting Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 1988)) that military retirement is 
"deferred compensation" should not be considered. 
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income tax during the taxable years in question. There is no 
comparable class of state retirees who have received current pay 
for reduced services. Individuals receiving military retirement 
pay, current pay for reduced services, should not be included in 
the class with federal civil service retirees receiving current 
pay for past services. 
This case should be remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to issue a narrower class definition on four 
grounds: (1) the class cannot include persons receiving federal 
retirement benefits or annuities for the 1984 tax year; (2) the 
class cannot include persons who failed to pay their tax under 
protest; (3) the class cannot include those persons barred by a 
six month statute of limitations; and (4) finally, the class 
should not include federal military retirees. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
K. Even If the District Court Had Jurisdiction, 
Plaintiffs Must First Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. 
Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that 
Plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. The 
District Court found that "requiring the Plaintiffs to exhaust 
administrative remedies would result in irreparable harm 
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disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion." (R. 251. ) 5 
The policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine are 
well articulated in Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 P.2d 
462 (Wash. 1988): 
[T]o (1) insure against premature 
interruption of the administrative process, 
(2) allow the agency to develop the necessary 
factual background on which to base a 
decision, (3) aljLow the exercise of agency 
expertise, (4) provide a more efficient 
process and allow the agency to correct its 
own mistakes, and (5) insure that individuals 
are not encouraged to ignore administrative 
procedures by resort to the courts. 
Id. at 467 (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash.2d 441, 456-
57, 693 P.2d 1369 (Wash. 1985)). 
The Utah legislature has provided a means whereby the 
underlying purpose of the exhaustion doctrine can be met. This 
Court has affirmed the exhaustion doctrine. The administrative 
remedies provided at Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-531 through 535 are 
complete, adequate, and speedy. Plaintiffs failed to show that 
"irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit" would 
result in requiring adherence to the exhaustion doctrine. 
Allowing Plaintiffs to circumvent the statutory and common law 
requirements of exhaustion in this case will set a dangerous 
precedent. 
3
 See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (i ) (no 
exhaustion required where it could result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit). 
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The District Court also held that there was no need to 
exhaust administrative remedies because there was no means to 
certify a class before the Commission, (R. 251.) However, no 
class was needed for a plain and speedy resolution of the case. 
Declaratory relief was available through the Commission pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-21 (1989) and Utah Admin, R, 861-1-
5A(Q). The Commission could have considered the issues in this 
case and made a declaratory ruling on the facts before it, (R. 
1158 tr, 8.) This ruling would then have applied to all 
similarly situated persons, thus avoiding the costly and 
cumbersome class litigation now before the Court, 
Finally, the District Court found that Plaintiffs need 
not exhaust administrative remedies because "of indications that 
the Utah State Tax Commission has preliminarily decided that 
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 109 S. Ct, 1500 (1989) does 
not mandate refunds in Utah,"6 (R. 252,) The only decision 
6
 In fact, it appears that a premature decision was made by 
the District Court, The District Court, prior to any legal 
arguments on the application of the Davis decision, stated: 
It seems to me when a case comes down that 
shows that there has been an interpretation 
different than the Tax Commission thought 
should be applied to, in this case, retirement 
funds, and that now makes it likely that the 
State Tax Commission should take a different 
view and take a different position than it has 
previously, it seems to me that the State Tax 
Commission, or that the government, ought to 
step forward and be the first to say, we've 
misunderstood this, we're willing now to apply 
it consistent with the decision of the United 
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that had been made was made by the Auditing Division of the Tax 
Commission. (R. 1158 tr. 25.) However, the Tax Commissioners 
had never heard the case. Only they could render a decision on 
behalf of the Tax Commission. No such determination had in fact 
been made as Plaintiffs implied. 
The policy and legal requirements underlying the 
exhaustion doctrine require Plaintiffs to first utilize the 
administrative process. 
B. Even If the District Court had Jurisdiction, It 
Was Concurrent Jurisdiction. Hence, The Doctrine 
of Primary Jurisdiction Vests Jurisdiction in the 
Commission. 
The Commission does not concede that it shares 
jurisdiction with the District Court over this matter. However, 
if this Court finds that the District Court had jurisdiction, it 
should find that there is concurrent jurisdiction between the 
District Court and the Tax Commission. Where both an 
administrative agency and the court have concurrent jurisdiction 
States Supreme Court, and this is the way we 
think we'll interpret this decision, and apply 
it. Then there's a beginning point for 
everybody to look at. 
(R. 1158 tr. 9.) 
Why should all of these, potentially 34,000 
people, be put in a position that they have to 
continue to jump through hoops that may not be 
necessary? It seems to me that the government 
is playing an ignoble role and the government 
should not be playing that. 
(R. 1158 tr. 7.) 
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over the same matter, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
applies. This doctrine provides: "[I]n cases raising issues of 
fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases 
requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, the agencies 
created by the legislative branch for regulating the subject 
matter should first be heard." Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. 
Structural Steel & Forge Co., 344 P.2d 157, 158 (Utah 1959). The 
underlying rationale for this doctrine is "uniformity in 
decisions" and "expertise of the agencies." Id. 
The state constitution and statutes specifically 
empower the Commission to hear income tax matters, with the 
declared intent to promote consistency in tax treatment. See 
Utah Const, art. XIII § 11; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-10-102, 
501 to 548 (1987). This is in accord with the uniformity 
rationale of Structural Steel & Forge Co./ supra. 
Before any refunds may be given, the Commission must 
make a factual determination on whether taxes were paid to the 
state by class members, whether payment was made under protest, 
whether proper refund procedures were followed, and whether this 
was done within the statutory time limits. The Commission and 
its staff possess the requisite skill and expertise to fairly and 
efficiently determine these factual matters. 
Further, tax assessment questions are under the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. "The Commission shall make the 
inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . • • 
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[and chapters that impose] income taxes." Utah Code Ann. § 59-
10-527 (1987). This would include a determination by the 
Commission of how taxes should be assessed for the tax years 
involved in this case. 
Further, the Commission has been granted discretion in 
examining records of taxpayers to ascertain "the correctness of 
any return." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 (1987). This would 
include the correctness cf a petition for refund. Because the 
Commission has been granted discretion over these matters, the 
Court should find that the Commission has jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs argued below that no issues may go before 
the Commission because it "cannot rule that the laws of the state 
of Utah are illegal or unconstitutional." (R. 299.) This Court 
in Johnson v. Retirement Bd., 621 P.2d 1234, 1237-8 (Utah 1980) 
found: "the mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not 
obviate the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies. As 
stated in Public Utilities Comm, v. U.S., 355 U.S. 534, 539-40, 
78 S. Ct. at 450, 'if . . . an administrative proceeding might 
leave no remnant of the constitutional question, the 
administrative remedy plainly should be pursued.'" 
The Commission could avoid the constitutional question 
by finding that the statute of limitations has expired or that 
Davis does not apply retroactively. These findings would not 
exceed the Commission's authority or expertise. Hence, the 
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Commission should not be enjoined from exercising its 
jurisdiction. 
C. There Is No Basis For An Extraordinary Writ In 
This Case. 
The District Court erroneously relied on writ of 
mandamus as a basis for jurisdiction. (R. 1126.) This Court in 
Oqden City Corp. v. Adam, 635 P.2d 70, 71-2 (Utah 1981), stated 
that an extraordinary writ will issue only where no other plain, 
speedy, or adequate remedy exists. Such a remedy exists: 
Plaintiffs were free to seek refund through the Tax Commission 
for refund of taxes. 
D. Before The District Court Could Issue Declaratory 
Relief It Must Have Had Jurisdiction. 
The District Court erred in holding that it had 
jurisdiction pursuant to the authority to issue declaratory 
judgments. (R. 1125.) Utah Code Ann. § 68-33-1 (1987) sets 
forth the power of District Courts to issue a declaratory 
judgment: 
The District Courts within their respective 
jurisdiction shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, 
whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be 
open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. 
The declaration may be either affirmative or 
negative in form and effect; and such 
declaration shall have the force and effect 
of a final judgment or decree. 
Hence, for a District Court to issue a declaratory judgment, the 
rights, status, and other legal relations must be within its 
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respective jurisdiction. As set forth above, the District Court 
was without jurisdiction to address rights of any of the parties 
except for the limited number that had paid their 1988 taxes 
under protest. 
E. The District Court Erred In Entering An Order 
Enjoining The Utah State Tax Commission From 
Proceeding Administratively In Adjudicating 
Petitions Filed By Individual Class Members. 
1. The District Court Erred In Not Making 
Findings Or Conclusions Supporting Its 
Injunction Order. 
The District Court failed to make findings supporting 
the order enjoining the Utah State Tax Commission from 
considering appeals filed by members of the Plaintiff Class. 
This Court should remand that decision for the requisite 
findings. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
The District Court failed to enter oral or written 
findings as the basis for its decision to enjoin the Tax 
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Commission from hearings involving the Plaintiff Class or any 
members* (R. 367-368.) Consequently, Defendants are without 
articulable grounds to seek review of the District Court's 
decision. This Court should remand with instructions to make 
findings to support the District Court's order. 
2* The Tax Injunction Act Bars The District 
Court From Enjoining Commission Proceedings. 
The District Court is without jurisdiction to enjoin 
the Commission from hearing a tax refund case. Where a 
legislative declaration clearly and unequivocally deprives a 
court of jurisdiction, it may not adjudicate although it would 
normally have jurisdiction. See Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt 
Lake City, 444 P.2d 461, 463 (Utah 1968). Utah Code Annotated 
§ 59-1-704 (1987) provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Parts 5, 
6, and 7 of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 6, 7, 
10, and 12 and the rules promulgated 
thereunder, no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of 
any tax, penalty, or interest imposed under 
Chapter 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, or 12 may be 
maintained in any court by any person, 
whether or not such person is the person 
against whom such tax was assessed. 
(2) No suit may be maintained in any court 
for the purpose of restraining the assessment 
or collection of the amount of the state tax 
liability, of a transferee or of a fiduciary 
of property of a taxpayer. 
None of the exceptions in Chapter 10 apply to this 
proceeding. Chapter 10 mentioned in this statute governs 
individual income tax. That is the subject of this proceeding. 
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Further, the determination of taxes and tax refunds is an 
integral part of the tax assessment and collection process. 
Plaintiffs' complaint admits that this action involves tax 
assessment and collections. See Amended Complaint at II 25, 31, 
37, 54, 58, and 67. (R. 81-102.) This statute specifically 
enjoins the Court from restricting the Commission from exercising 
jurisdiction over this matter. 
POINT III 
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAW MANDATE REFUNDS-
The District Court Ruling. 
The Plaintiffs below argued at length that their cause 
of action was not based upon the Davis case, but was based upon a 
violation of the plain and unambiguous meaning of 4 U.S.C. § 111. 
(R. 1156 tr. 6.) The District Court in its bench ruling found 
that Plaintiffs were entitled to a refund under state law, (R. 
1156 tr. 73.) ("the Court finds that the Petitioners are entitled 
to a refund under state law. . . - " • ) • I n the proposed Findings, 
Conclusion, and Partial Summary Judgment, drafted by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, the bench ruling was stretched to include federal as 
well as state grounds, Defendants noted in their objections to 
the proposed Order that the District Court had expressly stated 
that its ruling was based on state grounds. (R. 1091, 1145.) 
The Court provided no rationale from the bench whatsoever that it 
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was considering any other basis for its ruling. (R. 1156 tr. 73-
4.) 
Yet in the Amended Order, the District Court found a 
violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 as well as a violation of the 
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity. (R. 1129.) Although the 
written ruling adopted by the District Court discusses the 
federal retroactivity analysis at length, it blithely suggests 
that even without Davis, it would find the State's actions 
unlawful and unconstitutional. (R. 1135.) 
The ruling then forges ahead to state that nonetheless, 
Davis must be accorded full retroactive effect, in spite of the 
fact that under the rubric adopted by the Supreme Court, 
prospectivity is appropriate. For the reasons set forth below, 
the District Court erred in its analysis of state and federal law 
regarding its interpretation of Section 111 and the effect of the 
Davis decision. 
A, Under a State Analysis, the Court Could Not Have 
Concluded the State's Taxing Scheme Was Illegal or 
Unconstitutional. 
1. State Law prior to Davis. 
The District Court could not have concluded from state 
statutes or cases prior to the Davis ruling that the State's 
taxing scheme was illegal or unconstitutional. In point of fact, 
no state or federal cases had ever construed Section 111 within 
the context of those issues raised in Davis. The interpretation 
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of this statute by the Davis Court was, therefore, a matter of 
first impression* 
The only law on the books prior to the Davis ruling was 
the heretofore unchallenged and presumptively valid taxing scheme 
now challenged by the Plaintiffs. This Court examined the Utah 
exemption in Christensen v. Tax Comm'n, 591 P.2d 445 (Utah 1979). 
Although not dealing with the issue of federal pensioners, the 
Court provided a strong basis for reliance under Utah law: 
The retirement income in issue here was paid 
from the Utah State Employees Retirement 
System. Sections 49-1-28 and 49-10-47 
specifically exempt this retirement income 
from any state, county, or municipal tax of 
the State of Utah. The correct construction 
of the statutes involved results in the 
following interpretation: Retirement 
benefits received by a state employee are 
exempt from taxation by virtue of the 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 49-1-28 and 49-
10-47, thus not subject to section 59-14A-13, 
and that the income is not reportable. 
Retirement benefits received by any 
individual through a pension plan other than 
the state retirement system are not exempt. 
When the tax reform act was first introduced 
to the legislature in 1971 (Senate Bill 108 
which was later passed as the 1973 Tax Reform 
Act), companion bills were also introduced to 
repeal the exemption provisions for state 
employees. The companion bills were 
defeated, and this indicates a strong intent 
on the part of the legislature to continue 
the preferential treatment afforded state 
employees over other recipients of retirement 
income. 
Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added). 
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Additionally, a significant body of law existed outside 
of the State which had considered the issue of federal/state and 
state/federal relations involving preferential or discriminatory 
treatment* As discussed above, none of these cases construed 
Section 111 in the same context as Davis, but all involved the 
issue of differential treatment. However, viewing these 
precedents, ample reason existed for the State to believe that it 
could adopt a preference for its employees. Far from "dictating" 
the result in Davis, the cases addressing retirement income had 
uniformly upheld the validity of exempting some pension benefits 
even though other pension benefits were taxed.7 Utah had every 
reason to rely on this longstanding, unchallenged, and widespread 
practice. 
In Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d. 837 (7th Circuit 
1982), the Court concluded that the disparate treatment of 
federal and state retirement provisions did not constitute 
discriminatory treatment. In that case, which considers a 
challenge to the federal statute providing a cost of living 
allowance to federal retirees, the court held that federal 
pensioners constituted a legitimate class of similarly situated 
7
 See, e.g., Huckaba v. Johnson, 573 P.2d 305 (Or. 1977) 
(state may discriminate in imposing state income tax on some 
federal pensions as opposed to other federal pensions and state 
pensions); Butzbach v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 3 N.J. Tax 462 
(N.J. Tax Ct. 1981) (state inheritance tax may be imposed on 
transfer of private annuity even though public employment annuity 
transfer is exempt from same tax); Gritzmacher v. Director, Div. of 
Taxation, 2 N.J. Tax 489 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1981) (same result). 
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persons distinct from state and private pensioners and to which 
"[tjhe United States . . . has special responsibilities and 
obligations . . . that it does not have to non-federal retirees." 
Id. at 841-42 • Should the State have concluded from Clark that 
only the Federal Government had special responsibilities and 
obligations to its employees, but the State did not? 
From the State's viewpoint, and apparently from the 
viewpoint of the Utah federal retirees, none of whom ever mounted 
a legal challenge to the Utah tax system prior to March 28, 1989, 
it appeared prior to Davis that, even if Section 111 applied to 
federal retirees, the validity of Utah's taxes under the 
discrimination component of Section 111 would be tested by the 
traditional equal protection standard: 
Where taxation is concerned and no specific 
federal right, apart from equal protection, 
is imperiled, the States have large leeway in 
making classifications and drawing lines 
which in their judgement produce reasonable 
systems of taxation. . . . 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 355, 359 (1973) 
(footnote omitted); see also Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 
301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937) (inequalities which result from singling 
out one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no 
constitutional limitations). Under traditional equal protection 
analysis, the Michigan tax would have been almost certainly 
upheld. Now the District Court, in hindsight, suggests that the 
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offending statute was plainly and unambiguously wrong and had 
been from its inception in 1947. (R. 1156 tr. 38.) 
In its ruling, the District Court suggests that it is 
free to examine Section 111 apart from the impact of Davis and 
that it may make its own independent analysis of that section. 
The illogical nature of this notion is evident. What if the 
District Court had concluded Utah's future imposition of the 
different tax treatment to be valid in the face of the Davis 
decision? Is the District Court so bold as to suggest that it is 
free of federal court precedent and may consider this issue in a 
vacuum? 
The District Court's striking of the affidavits which 
went to the heart of the federal analysis demonstrate clearly 
that it based its ruling on purely state, not federal grounds. 
On state grounds, there was no basis for the District Court's 
ruling. In the absence of any state statutory or precedential 
guidance on this issue, the District Court erred by not turning 
to and applying the appropriate federal law. 
2. Laches and Waiver. 
Under a state analysis, the District Court further 
erred in not finding Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches and 
waiver. (R. 275-6.) 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Leaver v. Gross, 610 
P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) that laches is contingent upon the 
establishment of two elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the 
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part of the Plaintiffs and (2) an injury to the Defendant owing 
to such lack of diligence. Id. at 1264. Moreover, this same 
Court held in Papanikolas Brothers Enter, v. Suqarhouse Shopping 
Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) that: 
[l]aches is not mere delay, but delay that 
works a disadvantage to another. To 
constitute laches, two elements must be 
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the 
part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. Although 
lapse of time is an essential part of laches, 
the length of time must depend on the 
circumstances of each case, for the propriety 
of refusing a claim is equally predicated 
upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by 
defendant and the length of plaintiff's 
delay. 
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted). 
In reliance on the above mentioned cases, the District 
Court should have dismissed Plaintiffs' action as barred by 
laches. The facts in the present action satisfy the laches 
requirements. First, if the statute was clear as held by the 
Court there has been a lack of diligence and/or unexplained delay 
in Plaintiffs' assertion of their claims. Plaintiffs below 
asserted that Utah's statute allowing for disparate treatment 
between state and federal retirees was a clear violation of 
4 U.S.C. § 111 on its face. (R. 1156 tr. 6.) Yet at the time 
Plaintiffs brought this action, this statute had been in place 
for over forty years. Prior to 1989, the statute was 
unchallenged. Below, Plaintiffs' repeatedly stated that they 
were cognizant of the inconsistent treatment. (R. 852.) If such 
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treatment was a "clear violation" of 4 U.S.C. 111 Plaintiffs were 
obliged to file an action challenging the statute within some 
reasonable time of the statute's enactment. Since they did not, 
laches is a bar to their claims now. 
Importantly, Plaintiffs' lack of diligence in asserting 
their claims has injured the State and its taxpayers. If 
Plaintiffs, based on their alleged knowledge of a violation of 
Section 111, had asserted their claims in the early years 
following the legislation, the statute now threatened by the 
Davis decision could have been reassessed at a much earlier date. 
The State and its taxpayers are now subject to a substantially 
greater financial injury than if this suit had been commenced 
years ago, or immediately following the statute's enactment. 
Moreover, laches effectuates a waiver of the claim 
against the state: "[t]he defense of laches is a form of waiver, 
or if not strictly waiver, conduct of the type which €>quity will 
deem sufficient to bar application of a remedy otherwise 
available." Packarski v. Smith, 147 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1958). 
Plaintiffs' delay in asserting their claim constitutes 
a waiver of that claim. In Hoffa v. Hough, 30 A. 2d 761 (Md. 
1943), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "[ejquity will 
not aid a claimant who has slept on his right for an unreasonable 
and unexplained length of time, thereby suffering his claim to 
become stale and causing prejudice to an adverse party, such 
manifest neglect constituting an implied waiver." Id. at 763 1 
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(empha sis added). 
For the same reasons, Plaintiffs now should be 
precluded from maintaining an action against Defendants. As 
previously stated, the statute was enacted over forty years ago, 
and Plaintiffs claim long-term cognizance of its illegality. It 
is fair to conclude that Plaintiffs have "slept on their rights" 
during this long period of time, and hence have impliedly waived 
the right to bring an action now that would surely prejudice 
Defendants, Accordingly, under state law analysis, Plaintiffs' 
claims should have been dismissed based on laches and waiver. 
B. Federal Analysis. 
The federal issue before this Court is whether there is 
an obligation by the State to provide retroactive relief for an 
alleged federal constitutional violation for years 1985-1988. 
ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2330-1 (1990). This requires the Court to 
determine whether the holding of Davis applies retroactively to 
mandate that the state provide a remedy for years 1985-1988. 
State courts are free to determine the retroactivity of their own 
decisions; however, state courts must adhere to Supreme Court 
retroactivity decisions when determining whether a decision of 
the Supreme Court is retroactive. ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2330. 
Retroactivity in civil cases is governed by a three-pronged test. 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
Only after it is decided that Davis applies 
retroactively using the three pronged test of Chevron must the 
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Court consider the constitutional remedial provisions for state 
tax refunds as set forth in McKesson, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990). 
1. Requirements of the Davis case. 
Defendants do not dispute that the Davis interpretation 
of 4 U.S.C. § 111 required re-examination of Utah's individual 
income tax. That re-examination has already been undertaken and 
completed by the Utah State Legislature. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-1-608 (Supp. 1991) (benefits of state retirees are subject 
to state income tax). Plaintiffs' claim for retroactive monetary 
relief is another matter entirely. At the outset, it must be 
remembered that the Supreme Court in Davis did not mandate 
refunds; it only mandated equal treatment. Davis held that under 
Section 111 a state's tax system cannot provide an exemption for 
state retirement income while not providing an exemption for 
federal retirement income. Davis, 489 U.S. at 810. Any system 
which does so may be corrected either by exempting both state and 
federal retirement income or by taxing both. _Ld. at 817-18. 
Neither Davis nor Section 111 grants former federal employees a 
cause of action for monetary relief.8 Accordingly, Utah, by 
amending its statute to provide equal treatment, has completely 
8
 The Supreme Court's decisions in Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co. , 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); Dellmoth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 
2308 (1989); and Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 
2304, 2308 (1989), uniformly hold that in order to subject states 
to retroactive monetary awards, Congress must manifest its 
intention through clear and unambiguous language on the face of the 
statute. 
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satisfied Section 111 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Davis. Federal law compels no further action by the State, 
2. The Chevron Test for Determining Whether a 
Court Ruling Operates Prospectively Only. 
In Chevron, supra, the Supreme Court set forth three 
factors to be considered in determining whether a judicial ruling 
should operate prospectively only, A decision will operate 
prospectively only: 
(1) if it establishes a new principle of law by 
overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; 
(2) if prospective only application will not retard the 
operation of the rule in question; and 
(3) if retroactive application would result in 
inequity, injustice or hardship. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-107. 
a, Davis Operates Prospectively Only Under the 
Chevron Factors. 
i. Davis Unquestionably Established a New 
Principle of Law. 
The first Chevron factor is straightforward. The 
judicial decision must establish a new rule of law either by 
overruling clear past precedent "or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. 
There can be no doubt that Davis satisfies this requirement. 
When a decision "disrupts a practice long accepted and widely 
-49-
relied upon,"9 it constitutes a new rule of law.10 At the time 
of the Davis decision at least twenty-three states, more than 
one-half of the states that impose an individual income tax, had 
statutes similar to the Michigan statute.11 The practice of 
exempting state pension income was widespread and in place for 
decades. Indeed, Utah's exemption was first enacted over forty 
years ago. See 1947 Utah Laws Ch. 131, § 13. 
Moreover, as the result "was not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time" of the decision, it is clearer still that a 
new rule of law has been announced. Teaque v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060, 1070 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in the original). 
9
 Milton v. Wainwriqht, 407 U.S. 371, 381-82 n.2 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., Dissenting) (quoted with approval in United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 552 (1982)). 
10
 See First of McAlester Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n., 7 09 
P.2d 1026, 1034 (Okl. 1985) (finding a tax might reasonably be 
assumed to be constitutional "based on the longstanding and 
widespread practice of various states to which the United States 
Supreme Court has not specifically spoken"). 
11
 See Ala. Code §§ 36-27-28 and 40-18-19 (Supp. 1988); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1022 (Supp. 1988); Ark. Code Ann. § 26-
51-3026; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-22-104(4)(f) and (g) (Supp. 1988); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 48-7-27^a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1988); Iowa Code Ann. § 
97A.12 (West 1984); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-4923(b) (1985); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 16.690 (Michie/Bobs-Merrill Supp. 1988); La. R.S. 
42545, 47:44.1 (Supp. 1989); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 206.30 
(1988); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 21-29-51 and 25-11-129 (1972); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 86.190 and 104.540 (1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 15-30-111(2) 
(1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-11-145 and 22-11-42 (1978); N.Y. Tax 
Law § 612(c)(3) (McKinney 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-9 (1988); 
Okla. Stat. § 68 2358 (1988); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 316.680(1)(c) and 
(d) (1987); S.C. Code § 12-7-435(a), (d) and (e) (Supp. 1988); Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-1-608 (1989); Va. Code § 58.1-322(C)(3) Supp. 1988); 
W.Va. Code § ll-21-12(c) (5) and (6) (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. § 
71.05(l)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
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With respect to Section lllf not a single case dealing with the 
issue had cast the slightest doubt on the state tax systems then 
in place. See supra Note 7. 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of 4 U.S.C. § 
111,12 likewise, could not have been reasonably anticipated. 
The Court's interpretation, and thus the ruling in Davis, rested 
upon three findings, none of which was foreshadowed, much less 
dictated the result in Davis. The Court found: 
(1) Section 111 applies not only to pay or compensation 
of current employees of the United States but also to pension 
benefits received by previous employees, 489 U.S. 808; 
(2) Congress intended that the immunity from 
discriminatory state taxation embodied in Section 111 be 
coextensive with the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental 
tax immunity, id. at 813; and 
(3) the proper standard for determining whether the 
state tax statute discriminates against federal retirees is a 
"significant difference" standard. JEd. at 815-16. 
Each of those findings constitute a departure from prior 
interpretations and hence, a new rule of law. 
12
 4 U.S.C. §111 provides in relevant part: 
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or 
compensation for personal service as an officer or 
employee of the United States . . . by a duly constituted 
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation 
does not discriminate against the officer or employee 
because of the source of the pay or compensation. 
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a) The holding that the "pay or compensation for 
personal service as a officer or employee of 
the United States" applies to pension 
benefits received by previous employees was a 
new rule of law. 
The Supreme Court determined that retirement benefits 
of former federal employees were within the language of Section 
111. The statute by its terms, applies only to compensation for 
service as a federal "employee". Because the petitioner in Davis 
was not a current employee, the statute appeared inapplicable on 
its face. Michigan argued that a federal retiree is no longer an 
"employee" of the United States and, therefore, is not covered by 
Section 111. The Supreme Court stated that because retirement 
benefits constitute "deferred compensation for past y€>ars of 
service rendered to the Government," Mr. Davis received the pay 
"as" a federal employee. . . . " Davis, 489 U.S. 808 (quotation 
marks in original). This statutory construction of Section 111 
was not based on precedent but constituted a new rule of law; 
indeed, this was the first time Section 111 had been construed in 
the context of those issues dealt with in Davis. The Supreme 
Court itself remarked that Congress could have used more precise 
language in Section 111. JId.. at 810. 
The Supreme Court cited three Federal Courts of Appeals 
decisions to support the conclusion that Section 111 applied 
because federal retirement income is a form of deferred 
compensation. Zucker v. United States, 758 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 
1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985); Kizas v. Webster, 707 
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F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); 
and Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1982).13 
None of these Circuit Court decisions relied upon by the Supreme 
Court dictated or clearly foreshadowed the outcome in Davis; 
indeed, those cases did not discuss Section 111. 
The decisions cited contain no analysis of whether 
retirement benefits constitute deferred compensation. In so 
holding in Davis, the Supreme Court established a new rule of 
law. The adoption of this new rule was a necessary prerequisite 
to the holding that federal retirees are included within the 
In Zucker, plaintiffs argued that because retirement 
benefits are deferred compensation they had a property interest in 
them which prohibited adjustments to the benefits. While the Court 
did not reach the issue, it remarked in dicta that "[t]he 
legislative history lends some support to the view that the basic 
annuity was intended as deferred compensation." Zucker, supra at 
639. 
In Kizas, federal employees argued that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations' "special preference" previously accorded its 
clerical and support employees when making appointments as Special 
Agents constituted deferred compensation and thus vested 
contractual rights. Without discussing the deferred compensation 
issue, Kizas merely held that federal employees' rights are 
determined by statutes and regulations rather than by ordinary 
contract principles. Kizas, supra at 535. 
In Clark, state and private pensioners challenged the 
constitutionality of a federal statute providing cost-of-living 
adjustments to federal retirees when state and private retirees 
received no such benefit from the federal government. The Seventh 
Circuit, without discussion, simply referred to the Civil Service 
Retirement system as "a deferred compensation plan." Clark, supra 
at 842. 
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class protected by Section 111 which led to the invalidation of 
Michigan' s statute.1A 
lA
 Plaintiffs below mistakenly relied on Fitzpatrick v. Tax 
Comm'n, 386 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1963) for the assertion that the Tax 
Commission has already taken the position that retirement income is 
deferred compensation, (R. 840-841). This case dealt with 
retirement benefits from a private contract. 386 P.2d 896, 897. 
That case was decided under ordinary contract principles: 
Insofar as we have been able to find from our 
research, the authorities uniformly hold that 
payments pursuant to a contract for personal 
services constitute income to the recipient; 
and that there is a presumption that 
additional payments provided for in such a 
contract are further compensaticn for services 
and are, therefore, income. 
Id. at 898 (footnote omitted)* 
However, that type of analysis does not apply to federal 
workers: 
[FJederal workers serve by appointment, and 
their rights are therefore a matter of "legal 
status even where compacts are made." In 
other words, their entitlement to pay and 
other benefits "must be determined by 
reference to the statutes and regulations 
governing [compensation], rather than to 
ordinary contract principles." 
Kizas, 707 F.2d at 535, footnotes omitted (relied on by the Supreme 
Court in its Davis decision). Hence, federal workers are governed 
by statutes and regulations, whereas private pensioners, under Utah 
law, are governed by ordinary contact principles. Thus, 
defendants' position in Fitzpatrick dealing with a private 
pensioner is not inconsistent with their treatment of federal 
retirees. 
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b) The holding that the Section 111 immunity 
from discriminatory taxation is coextensive 
with the constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity was a new rule 
of law. 
Under traditional Equal Protection analysis, the Utah 
statute would not have been threatened,15 
The Supreme Court in Davis supported its conclusion 
that Michigan's tax scheme should not be analyzed under 
established standards for determining whether a state tax is 
discriminatory on the basis of another preliminary finding- The 
finding by the Court that Congress intended that the scope of 
immunity embodied in Section 111 be coextensive with the 
protection afforded by the constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental immunity is a new rule of law. Nothing in the 
legislative history of Section 111 nor its background would have 
alerted Utah to this conclusion of the Supreme Court. 
The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity had its 
genesis in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 616, 4 L.Ed. 579 
(1819). After expanding the doctrine to bar federal taxation of 
state employees and state taxation of federal employees,16 the 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 
359 (1973) (footnote omitted); See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal 
Co. , 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937) (inequalities which result from 
singling out one particular class for taxation or exemption 
infringe no constitutional limitations). 
16
 See Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 78 U.S. 113 (1871); 
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 41 U.S. 435 
(1942). This expansion of the doctrine was based on the theory 
that, because a government employee receives his income under a 
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Supreme Court began to retreat from that interpretation. Thus, 
in Helverinq v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), the Supreme Court 
held that the federal government could tax the income of most 
state employees, and in Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keafe, 306 
U.S. 466 (1939), that the states could tax the income of federal 
employees. Although the legislative history of Section 111 does 
not mention Graves, the proximity in time and the similarity of 
issues between Graves and Section 111 led the Supreme Court in 
Davis to conclude that Section 111 incorporates the 
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as embodied in Graves. 
It follows, the Davis Court reasoned, that Congress intended the 
nondiscrimination clause of Section 111 to be elevated to and 
coextensive with the nondiscrimination component of the 
constitutional intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.17 
This connection between Section 111 and the 
intergovernmental tax immunity clause was determined for the 
first time in Davis and was neither dictated nor foreshadowed by 
prior precedent. The Court itself in Davis uses no stronger 
language than to say that "it is reasonable to conclude that 
contract with the government, a tax on the income of the employee 
constitutes a tax on the government itself. 
17
 The Court apparently did not find it problematical that 
the discrimination standard which the Court inferred Congress 
intended to be applied, i.e., the "significant difference" standard 
set forth in Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist., 361 
U.S. 376 (1960), was not established at the time of the enactment 
of Section 111. 
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Congress drew upon the constitutional doctrine in defining the 
scope of the immunity retained in § 111." Davis, 489 U.S. at 
813, 
c) The holding that whether the state tax 
statute discriminates against federal 
retirees is determined by a "significant 
difference" standard was a new rule of law* 
The holding that Section 111 is coextensive with the 
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine was a necessary 
preliminary holding to the rejection of the rational basis test. 
The holding did not suggest, let alone mandate, the application 
of the "significant difference" standard. The surprising ruling 
that the significant difference standard should apply to the 
facts presented in Davis was a new rule of law.18 
Neither Graves nor the legislative history of Section 
111 dictated the discrimination test applied in Davis. Graves 
indicated only that a state tax on federal employees would not 
violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine if the tax 
did not create such a burden on the national government as to 
The "significant difference" standard applied by the 
majority in Davis requires that "[t]he imposition of a heavier tax 
burden on [those who deal with one sovereign] than is imposed on 
[those who deal with the other] must be justified by significant 
differences between the two classes.*' Davis, 489 U.S. 815-16 
(citing Phillips, 361 U.S. at 383). The Court held that Michigan 
failed to establish that there were significant differences between 
a class composed of federal retirees and one composed of state 
retirees. The Court did not consider that the two classes 
established under Michigan's statute were (1) state retirees and 
(2) all other retirees, federal and private. 
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constitute that state's interference in the national government's 
performance of its functions,19 
The legislative history of Section 111 merely indicates 
that a state tax on federal employees does not discriminate if it 
is not aimed at and does not threaten the operation of the 
federal government. Thus, the Committee Report states: 
To protect the Federal Government against the 
unlikely possibility of State and local 
taxation of compensation of Federal officers 
and employees which is aimed at, or threatens 
the efficient operation of, the Federal 
Government, the consent [to taxation set 
forth in § 111] is expressly confined to 
taxation which does not discriminate against 
such officers or employees because of the 
source of their compensation, 
(Emphasis added, ) 2 0 
This statement leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
the type of discrimination proscribed by Section 111 is that 
19
 The issue presented in Graves was whether the tax 
violated the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, not 
whether the tax discriminated. The Court held that the imposition 
by New York of an income tax on the salary of a federal employee 
did not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine because 
the economic burden of the tax was not "passed on so as to impose 
a burden on the national government tantamount to an interference 
by one government with the other in the performance of its 
functions." Id.. Graves, 306 U,S. at 480-81, While the Court in 
Graves describes the tax as non-discriminatory in that it is "laid 
on the income of all members of the community," as opposed to the 
tax in McCulloch which was imposed solely on the Bank of the United 
States, the Court does not discuss discrimination or suggest the 
proper standard for determining whether a tax is discriminatory. 
Id, at 483-84, 
20
 See S, Rep, No. 112, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R, 
Rep, No. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). 
-58-
aimed at or threatening the operation of the federal government. 
Under the aimed at or threatening standard, as under the 
traditional and established rational basis standard,21 the tax 
invalidated in Davis clearly would have been upheld. When the 
Supreme Court in Davis decided to repudiate both of these tests 
in this context, it created a new and much stricter rule of law. 
There was no precedent indicating that the "significant 
difference" test should apply across the board in 
intergovernmental tax immunity cases. In fact, in the most 
recent Supreme Court decision considering the constitutionality 
of a state tax under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, 
the discriminatory state tax was upheld. See United States v. 
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977).22 
21
 Under this standard, a class of similarly situated 
taxpayers may be established. This class may be treated 
differently if the different treatment bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state goal. See Carmichael, 301 U.S. 
495, 509. The Court's application of a similarly situated-rational 
basis standard would have resulted in upholding the exemption from 
taxation for state and local retirement benefits. See Allied 
Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (statute which favors 
a certain class is not arbitrary if the discrimination is founded 
upon a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy); 
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958) (proper 
standard is whether class defined is "an arbitrary or invidiously 
discriminatory one"). 
22
 The Court in County of Fresno noted that the tax was not 
imposed solely on federal employees but also on "other similarly 
situated constituents of the State." 2d., at 462 (emphasis added). 
This level of scrutiny differs greatly from the "significant 
difference" standard applied in Davis. 
While the tax at issue in County of Fresno was imposed on the 
income of private users of both state and federally owned tax 
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The decision in County of Fresno is in accord with the 
legislative history of Section 111: so long as the tax is not 
aimed at or threatening to the federal government, it does not 
violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. Before 
Davis, a state would have been justified in relying on County of 
Fresno as a statement of the law on differential treatment in the 
area of state taxation of federal employees. Davis created new 
law in this area. 
In light of the Court's changed interpretation in these 
three aspects of federal law, it is indisputable that Davis was 
not clearly foreshadowed, much less dictated. The first prong of 
the Chevron test, therefore, is satisfied. 
ii. Prospective Only Application of Davis Will 
Not Retard the Operation of the Rule in 
Question, 
Under the second Chevron factor, the Court must 
consider the purpose and effect of the newly announced rule in 
order to determine whether prospective only application will 
retard its operation. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107. The rule 
exempt property, this fact was not the basis for the Supreme 
Court's decision. Rather, the basis for the decision was that the 
tax did not single out federal employees but was imposed on the 
majority of the state's cirizens and that it did not threaten the 
operation of the federal government, Icl. at 462, 464. As Justice 
Stevens noted in his reliance on County of Fresno in his dissent in 
Davis, "[wjhen the tax burden is shared equally by federal agents 
and the vast majority of a State's citizens, . . . the 
nondiscrimination principle [of intergovernmental tax immunity] is 
not applicable and constitutional protection is not necessary." 
Davis, 489 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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announced in Davis was that a state may not tax federal 
retirement benefits if it exempts state retirement benefits, 
unless the state can establish a significant difference between 
state and federal retirees- By amending its statute, Utah has 
furthered the rule in question- No additional action by the 
State is needed to accomplish the purpose of the rule. 
Moreover, retroactive application clearly is not needed 
to discourage the legislature from enacting future statutes that 
discriminate against federal employees. Federal employees are a 
significant political force in Utah, fully represented in the 
legislature. There is also no suggestion that the legislature 
acted in bad faith more than forty years ago in adopting the 
exemption, and its good faith is clearly evidenced by its prompt 
repeal of the exemption following the Davis decision. This was 
echoed by the District Court: "I don't think I would indicate to 
you that I have any belief that the state acted in bad faith." 
(R. 1156 tr. 40.) 
Equal treatment is achieved with prospective 
application of Davis. Granting tax refunds does not advance that 
interest whatsoever. Retroactive application of Davis, rather 
than advancing the rule there announced, would be "more in the 
nature of a punitive award for misconstruing the 
constitutionality of the . . . tax." National Can Corp., 749 
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P.2d 1286, 1292 (Wash. 1988).23 No punitive award can be 
justified by the facts of this case. 
iii. Retroactive Application of the Davis Decision 
Would Result in Inequity, Injustice, and 
Hardship. 
The third Chevron factor requires the Court to consider 
the inequity, injustice and hardship imposed by retroactive 
application. JA. at 107. This step in the Chevron analysis 
requires a court to balance and weigh various factors, including 
the state's justifiable reliance on the constitutionality of the 
statute, the relative benefit and harm to result from retroactive 
application, and the injustice in providing the benefit to the 
litigant. 
Defendants justifiably relied on the constitutionality 
of the forty plus year old exemption, a variation of which was in 
effect in at least twenty-three other states. See note 11, 
supra. Prior to Davis, Utah simply had no reason to doubt the 
validity of the exemption. 
This justifiable reliance on the exemption clearly was 
a sound basis for the State's reliance on the revenues collected 
under the tax system in operation at the time of the Davis 
decision. Those revenues have been budgeted and spent;: any 
refunds would come from current or future revenues. This Court 
23
 This would be particularly true with those persons 
receiving military pension benefits since such persons are members 
of a class not under the rule in Davis. See supra p. 10. 
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should balance the relative benefit to any individual plaintiff 
of an award for refunds against the relative harm to the State 
and all her citizens resulting from a decision of retroactive 
application of Davis. 
The most serious ramification of the retroactive 
application of Davis is the obligation to provide refunds to all 
federal retirees for the relevant statutory periods at a cost of 
nearly $104 million including interest. (R. 725.) A liability 
of this magnitude would create a financial hardship on the State. 
(R. 730.) 
Moreover, the hardship attributable to this potential 
tax refund liability is compounded by the current fiscal problems 
confronting the State. (R. 700, 706, 730.) 
The State's options for dealing with a resource demand 
of this magnitude are limited. (See R. 702, 707, 730.) If the 
Court were to require refunds, the magnitude of increased revenue 
needs would be staggering. Such a financial burden most likely 
would force reductions across all areas of state government, 
including education, aid to needy individuals, aid to localities, 
and other essential government services. 
Prospectivity is particularly appropriate in the case 
now before this Court for additional equitable reasons as well. 
Utah's purpose in exempting state and local retirement income was 
legitimate — to enhance state and local retirement benefits, and 
thus, to attract employees and to reward state and local civil 
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servants, without spending additional state revenues. The 
exemption violated no constitutional restraint of which the 
legislature should have been cognizant- The statutes did not 
single out federal retirees for taxation but taxed them as it did 
all other non-state retirees- Any discriminatory effect of the 
exemption was unintended, indirect and benign. No state could 
have reasonably predicted that its effort to reward its employees 
would be seen as discrimination against former federal employees. 
Moreover, from the perspective of equity, Plaintiffs 
here are not in a special position. They are no more or less 
economically disadvantaged than thousands of other Utah citizens 
who received pension income from private employers and also paid 
their Utah individual income taxes. 
In sum, Utah can clearly satisfy the third prong of 
Chevron. The State's finances would suffer excessive disruption 
from an award of tax refunds. Such refunds would have to be paid 
out of current revenues, such as revenues specifically dedicated 
to education, law enforcement or social programs. The current 
state taxpayers -- private, state, and federal retirees — would 
wind up footing the bill in the form of reduced services and/or 
higher taxes. All of the equities support the prospective only 
application of Davis. The State has acted in good faith and with 
justifiable reliance from the time it adopted the exemption. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, Davis should apply prospectively 
only. 
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3. Recent Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court Support 
Prospective Only Application of Davis: The ATA and 
Beam Cases. 
a. The American Trucking Association Decision 
The facts of American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S. 
Ct. 2323 (1990) (plurality opinion), are analogous to the facts 
in this case. At issue in ATA was a Highway Use Equalization Tax 
("HUE") that impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state 
truckers. Following denial of refund by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Court held the decision pending the outcome of 
a similar case, American Trucking Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 
(1987) ("Scheiner"). In Scheiner, decided June 23, 1987, the 
Supreme Court found the tax violated the Commerce Clause; ATA was 
remanded to the Arkansas Supreme Court for further consideration 
based on the Scheiner decision. Pending the outcome in ATA, 
Justice Blackmun on August 14, 1987, acting as Circuit Justice, 
ordered that all Arkansas HUE taxes should be placed in escrow 
prior to a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court invalidated the HUE tax based on the Scheiner 
decision, but refused to give any refunds for HUE taxes paid 
before Justice Blackmun's escrow order. The Arkansas Court 
applied the three-pronged test of Chevron, supra, to determine 
that Scheiner should not be applied retroactively. At issue in 
ATA was whether the Arkansas Supreme Court erred in its 
application of the Chevron test. The Court found that Chevron 
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mandated prospective only application except for taxes collected 
after the date that the Scheiner decision was handed down. 
First, the Court concluded that Scheiner established a 
new principle of law. Id.. ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2332. It found 
that where a precedent having direct application in a case rests 
on reasons rejected in another line of decisions, District Court 
should apply that decision until the Supreme Court overrules it. 
The Court in ATA found that lower courts should follow the case 
which directly controls, leaving to the Supreme Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Id. Thus, although 
the precedent which provided the underpinnings for the Scheiner 
decision had been called into question, it still retained its 
vitality as binding precedent.2A Second, the Court observed that 
retroactive application of Scheiner would not deter future 
violations of free trade. It found that there was not "strong 
parochial" incentive to commit further violations because the 
"HUE tax was entirely consistent with the Aero Mayflower line of 
cases and it is not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to prevent 
legitimate state taxation of interstate commerce." ATA, 110 S. 
Ct. at 2332 (citations omitted). 
u
 It is unclear how broadly or narrowly the current U.S. 
Supreme Court would interpret this first prong of Chevron. See 
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3204 (1990) (the court 
found that the decision applied retroactively in Ashland Oil, 
because it was not like other precedents "which arguably 
"overturned] a lengthy list of settled decision" and 
"revolutionize^] the law of state taxation."). 
-66-
Finally, after carefully considering the equities, the 
Court determined that Scheiner should not be applied 
retroactively, ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2333. In making this 
determination, the Court found: 
Where a State can easily foresee the 
invalidation of its tax statutes, its 
reliance interests may merit little concern, 
see McKesson, U.S., at , 110 S. Ct, at 
2254-2258, 2257. By contrast, because the 
State cannot be expected to foresee that a 
decision of this Court would overturn 
established precedents, the inequity of 
unsettling actions taken in reliance on those 
precedents is apparent. Although at this 
point the burden that the retroactive 
application of Scheiner would place on 
Arkansas cannot be precisely determined, it 
is clear that the invalidation of the State's 
HUE tax would have potentially disruptive 
consequences for the State and its citizens. 
A refund, if required by state or federal 
law, could deplete the state treasury, thus 
threatening the State's current operations 
and future plans. Presumably, under 
McKesson, the State would be required to 
calculate and refund that portion of the tax 
that would be found under Scheiner to 
discriminate against interstate commerce, 
with the attendant potentially significant 
administrative costs that would entail. 
ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2333. Thus, Scheiner was not applied 
retroactively. 
On the issue of whether a refund was due from the date 
of the Scheiner decision and not the date of Justice Blackmun's 
escrow order, the Court held: "[i]t is, of course a fundamental 
tenet of our retroactivity doctrine that the prospective 
application of a new principle of law begins on the date of the 
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decision announcing the principle. . . ." Id. at 2335 (emphasis 
added). The Court found that "the critical event for 
prospectivity is 'the occurrence of the underlying transaction, 
and not the payment of money therefor, . . .' [citation]." Id. 
at 2336. 
i. Application of ATA to this Case. 
ATA reiterated the application of the three-pronged 
Chevron test. As set forth in detail above, the three-pronged 
Chevron test dictates prospective only application of the Davis 
decision. The only remaining question is when does the Davis 
decision bind the State? As set forth in ATA, "the prospective 
application of a new principle of law begins on the date of the 
decision announcing the principle." J[d_. 110 U.S. 2335. Thus, 
the Davis decision should have prospective application beginning 
on March 28, 1989. This would bar all relief as sought by 
Plaintiffs for years 1985-1988. It is irrelevant that the 1988 
income tax filing date was April 17, 1989. As the Court made 
clear, it is "the occurrence of the underlying transaction, and 
not the payment of money therefor" that is the critical 
determination. Td. 110 U.S. at 2336. Hence, the closure of the 
tax year on December 31 of a given year is the governing date. 
b. The Beam Decision, 
i. Introduction. 
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court, in 
the area of retroactivity, was handed down on June 20, 1991. 
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James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). 
The origins of that case are from a 1984 Supreme Court decision. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court held in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diasf 
468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) ("Bacchus"), that a Hawaii tax statute 
that distinguished between imported and local alcohol products 
violated the Commerce Clause. Prior to its amendment in 19 85, 
Georgia state law imposed a similar tax. See Ga. Code Ann. § 3-
4-60 (1982). 
After the Bacchus decision, James B. Beam Distilling 
Co. filed suit in the Georgia trial court alleging that Georgia's 
law was likewise inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. It 
sought refunds of the amount paid for the years 1982, 1983 and 
1984. The trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court held that in 
light of Bacchus, the Georgia law was unconstitutional for the 
years in question. Using a Chevron analysis, however, the 
Georgia Supreme Court refused to apply its ruling retroactively 
and thus denied the refund request. James B. Beam Distilling Co. 
v. State, 382 S.E.2d 95 (1989). On review, the Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448. 
Five opinions were written in Beam, none of which 
commanded a majority of the Supreme Court.23 The lead opinion, 
25
 Three cases similar to the case now before the court were 
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the Beam 
decision. They were remanded back to state Courts. A remand and 
reconsideration order means precisely what it says: the court is to 
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written by Justice Souter, was joined by only one other Justice, 
Justice Stevens- Justice White wrote a separate concurrence. 
Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia — in two separate 
opinions, each joined by the three of them — also concurred 
separately. There was a dissent written by Justice 0'Conner, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. 
ii. Dissenting Opinion by Justice O'Connor, 
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy; Concurring Opinions of Justices 
Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia. 
An understanding of the Court's fractured vote is best 
understood by beginning with the dissent. Justice 0'Conner 
writing for the three dissenters supports the Chevron analysis: 
reconsider a decision in light of an intervening precedent which 
contains similar issues. The order does not compel the court to 
reach a different result. See R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, 
Supreme Court Practice 279-80 (6th ed. 1986) see also Bush v. 
Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1981), aff 'd, 462 U.S. 367 
(19 83) (reconsideration order means that Supreme Court has merely 
"flagged" case as one upon which intervening decision may have some 
bearing but which Court has not concluded has a material effect; 
judgment for defendant). See also Hellman, ''Granted, Vacated and 
Remanded": Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court 
Practice, 67 Judicature 389 (1984). In a study of 289 cases in 
which remand and reconsideration orders were issued, Professor 
Hellman found that the lower court affirmed its original ruling in 
a substantial number of cases and that few of these judgments were 
reversed on further appeal to the Supreme Court. Ld. at 394-95. 
(reaffirmed). In fact, had it been the Supreme Court's view that 
Beam was controlling in these cases the Supreme Court could have 
issued a per curiam opinion, as it did in two cases pending on 
petitions for certiorari at the time the Supreme Court decided ATA 
in 1990. See National Mines Corp. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3205 (1990) 
(per curiam), and Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202 
(1990) (per curiam) (state court judgments applying Armco Inc. v. 
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), prospectively-only reversed). 
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The equitable analysis of Chevron places 
limitations on the liability that may be 
imposed on unsuspecting parties after this 
Court changes the law. . • . To impose on 
Georgia and the other States that reasonably 
relied on this Court's established precedent 
such extraordinary retroactive liability, at 
a time when most States are struggling to 
fund even the most basic services, is the 
height of unfairness, 
111 S. Ct. at 2455. Because these justices would support 
prospectivity only, they without question would not apply Davis 
retroactively to this case. 
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia disagree with 
the analysis of Justice O'Connor on the choice of law issue. 
Their position, staked out in two separate Beam concurrences, is 
that the equities cannot be considered because the Supreme Court 
lacks the authority to apply its constitutional decisions 
prospectively only. Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia do 
not discuss retroactivity as a remedial issue in Beam. 
The resulting situation is that six Justices are 
equally divided on whether Chevron can be applied to determine if 
Davis is retroactive under the federal choice of law issue. The 
critical question on this issue, therefore, is how the other 
three Justices will vote when this question is presented to them. 
The answer to that question requires a close analysis of Justice 
Souter's and Justice White's opinions in Beam. 
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iii. Justice Souter's Opinion Announcing the 
Judgment of the Courtf Joined by Justice 
Stevens. 
It is important to note preliminarily that Justice 
Souter in Beam, like the four dissenting Justices in ATA,26 
distinguishes between retroactivity as a choice of law principle 
and retroactivity as a remedial principle, ATA, 111 S. Ct. at 
2446, Following his distinction between retroactivity as a 
choice of law principle and as a remedial principle, Justice 
Souter outlines three potential answers to the "choice of law" 
issue. First, the new decision can be purely prospective in 
effect, that is, it can apply only to facts arising after the 
decision is announced. Justice Souter cites Chevron as an 
example of pure prospectivity. Chevron served to announce a new 
rule of law, but the new rule applied neither to the party before 
the Court nor to others who could assert the same claim prior to 
the decision. Second, the new rule can be fully retroactive, 
applying to the parties before the Court and to all others who 
could assert the same claim. Third, the new rule can apply 
prospectively to some litigants and retroactively to others. 
This latter possibility is referred to as "modified, or 
selective, prospectivity." 
Justice Souter rejects the concept of selective 
prospectivity as a choice of law principle in the civil context. 
26
 Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun 
dissented in ATA. 
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Ill S. Ct. at 2446. He further concludes that Bacchus by 
"implication" applied its new rule to the litigants there before 
the Court. Given that conclusion, and the illegitimacy of 
selective prospectivity, it followed to Justice Souter that the 
Bacchus rule applied to the litigants in Beam. 
The important point to be made about Justice Souter's 
opinion is that in the end it addresses, in his own words, only a 
"narrow" point. What he concludes—and all he concludes—is that 
selective prospectivity is an illegitimate choice of law outcome. 
He does not decide when pure prospectivity might be appropriate. 
Nor does he address remedial issues. Justice Souter's own words 
best demonstrate the narrow reach of his opinion: 
The grounds for our decision today are 
narrow. They are confined entirely to an 
issue of choice of law: when the Court has 
applied a rule of law to the litigants in one 
case it must do so with respect to all others 
not barred by procedural requirements or res 
judicata. We do net speculate as to the 
bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity. 
Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may 
be appropriate in this case; remedial issues 
were neither considered below nor argued to 
this Court, save for an effort by petitioner 
to buttress its claim by reference to our 
decision last term in McKesson. As we have 
observed repeatedly, federal "issues of 
remedy ... may well be intertwined with, or 
their consideration obviated by, issues of 
state law." Bacchus, 468 U.S., at 277, 104 
S. Ct., at 3058. Nothing we say here 
deprives respondent of his opportunity to 
raise procedural bars to recovery under state 
law or demonstrate reliance interests 
entitled to consideration in determining the 
nature of the remedy that must be provided, a 
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matter with which McKesson did not deal. See 
Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S., at 296, 90 S. 
Ct.f at 1039 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. 
Lemon, 411 U.S., at 203, 93 S. Ct., at 1471. 
Ill S. Ct. at 2448. 
iv. Justice White's Opinion Concurring in the 
Result. 
Justice White in his concurrence agrees that Bacchus 
may be read as applying the benefit of the judgment to Bacchus 
Imports and agrees that it applies to other litigants whose cases 
were not final at the time of the Bacchus decision. Ill S. Ct. 
at 2448. But Justice White reaffirms his view, as expressed by 
Justice O'Connor for the plurality in ATA, that certain decisions 
of the Supreme Court will apply prospectively only under a 
Chevron analysis. _Id. at 2449. Justice White does not discuss 
retroactivity as a remedial issue. 
v. Conclusion: The Meaning of Beam. 
The net result of the fractured voting in Be aim is that 
only three Justices reject the application of a Chevron analysis 
to determine the choice of law in a case such as the one now 
before this Court. Four Justices clearly agree that in the 
proper case, based on a Chevron analysis, pure prospectivity is 
an appropriate way to reach an equitable resolution of a case 
before a court. Two Justices, while refusing to commit 
themselves in Beam, do not reject the application of Chevron. 
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None of the Justices reject prospectivity only in the remedial 
context,27 
vi. Retroactivity of Davis under Beam. 
In Beam, Justice Souter's opinion explained that 
Bacchus was "fairly read to hold as a choice of law that its rule 
should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the 
Court." Ill S. Ct. at 2445- This conclusion was based on the 
terms of the remand order in Bacchus. Specifically, Bacchus was 
remanded for consideration of a defense raised by the state in 
that case. There would have been no need to consider the 
defense, Justice Souter reasoned, if it had not already been 
implicitly decided that the new law announced by Bacchus applied 
to the claim stated by the plaintiffs in that case. Id. 
The Supreme Court made no similar ruling in Davis. The 
question of retroactivity was not at issue in Davis because 
Michigan had previously agreed to the payment of a refund to Mr. 
Davis if the tax violated federal law. Specifically, the Court 
said in Davis: 
For these reasons, we conclude that the 
Michigan Income Tax Act violates principles 
of intergovernmental tax immunity. . . . The 
State having conceded that a refund is 
appropriate in these circumstances, see Brief 
for Appellee 63, to the extent appellant has 
27
 Of the three Justices who reject the application of 
Chevron to determine the choice of law issue, one, Justice 
Marshall, is no longer on the Court. Moreover, of the two 
uncommitted Justices, Justice Stevens has changed his position 
since the ATA decision. 
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paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax 
scheme, he is entitled to a refund. 
489 U.S. at 817. 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Davis did not need to 
determine whether its decision was to have purely prospective or 
fully retroactive effect, Michigan had taken this issue out of 
the case by agreeing to pay refunds whatever the resolution of 
that issue, a decision the state was free to make. For, as 
stated by the Supreme Court in McKesson, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990), 
a state is free to pay refunds under state law even when federal 
law would not so require. JId. at 2240 (stare has power to give a 
decision remedial effect greater than that which a federal court 
would require cr provide). 
The same point can be made another way. Justice Souter 
stated the question in Beam as "whether it is error to refuse to 
apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case 
announcing the rule has already done so." Ill S. Ct. at 2446. 
That issue is not presented here. Davis, the case that announced 
the new rule sought to be applied here, has not "already" applied 
the new federal rule retroactively. There was not in Davis, as 
there was in Bacchus, an implicit decision on the retroactivity 
question.28 
28
 It is not clear, moreover, that the United States Supreme 
Court gave sufficient consideration to the prospective versus 
retroactive effect of its decision in Bacchus. See Beam, 111 S. 
Ct. at 2451-52 (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., Rehnquist, CJ., 
dissenting). 
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Because the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of 
retroactivity in Davis, this Court is free to determine the issue 
in this case. As has been demonstrated above, four Justices 
indicated in Beam that they favor the prospective only 
application of a Supreme Court decision in a proper case based on 
a Chevron analysis, and two leave cpen the possibility. Ill S. 
Ct. at 2448 (Souter and Stevens, JJ.) 111 S. Ct. at 2449 (White, 
J., concurring); 111 S. Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., 
Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). This Court should accept the 
invitation to apply Chevron by overturning the decision of the 
District Court. 
In Swanson, 407 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1991), the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina applied the Chevron test to hold that 
Davis was not retroactive. Since Davis satisfies all three 
prongs of Chevron,29 any other disposition would constitute a 
state court's overruling of Chevron, an action that the North 
Carolina court refused to take: 
ln Beam the Court had an opportunity to say 
that the rule of Chevron should no longer be 
applied in civil cases and declined to do so. 
We do not believe we should anticipate a 
change in the law by the United States 
29
 The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
only federal court to consider whether Davis constitutes a new rule 
of law, has recently ruled that prior to Davis a reasonable state 
official could not have known that such a tax system was 
unconstitutional. Swanson v. Powers, 937 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1991). 
As stated by the Circuit Court "a state official who examined North 
Carolina's tax system prior to Davis might easily have concluded 
that it worked no unconstitutional discrimination." Id. at 970. 
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Supreme Court, but should adhere to the 
opinions as they are now written- We believe 
we have done so. 
Swanson, 407 S.E.2d 791, 795 (N.C. 1991)- Hence, Beam supports a 
reversal of the District Court. The District Court erred in 
determining that pursuant to State law Plaintiffs are entitled to 
a refund. Under federal analysis, the Davis decision should be 
applied prospectively only. Therefore, the District Court 
decision should be reversed, and the case remanded with 
instructions that the Davis decision applies prospectively only. 
4. The District Court Erred In Striking Defendants' 
Affidavits Which Are Relevant Under The Federal 
Analysis. 
The District Court erred in signing an order granting 
Plaintiffs' motion to strike all Defendants' affidavits 
supporting cross motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1113-14.) 
The District Court granted "the . . . petitioner's motion to 
strike the affidavits of the defendant in relation to those of 
Mr. Knowlton, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Memmott." (R. 1156 tr. 5.) 
(emphasis added.) However, subsequent to the hearing, the 
District Court signed an order striking all of the affidavits 
supporting Defendants4" cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 
1114.) The District Court struck four of Defendants' 
-78-
affidavits30 without a hearing• Accordingly, that order should 
be stricken as contrary to the bench ruling of the Court, 
Defendants attached an additional four affidavits to 
their Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities.31 Those 
affidavits were never ordered stricken by the District Court and 
hence remain in support of Defendants' reply memorandum, (R. 
1048-1060, Exhibits A-D.) 
The affidavits that were stricken concerned the fiscal 
impact that retroactive application of Davis would have on the 
State of Utah and the State's reliance on Plaintiffs' past 
inaction. (R. 699-789, Exhibits A-l.) 
The District Court's rationale for granting Plaintiffs' 
motion was that the "scope of the affidavits was well beyond the 
factual basis upon whicn the court should be required to consider 
a basis for rendering this decision." (R. 1156 tr. 75.) The 
District Court improperly determined that the affidavits lacked 
relevance. 
In striking tne affidavits, the District Court 
completely ignored the third prong of the Supreme Court's 
30
 In addition to the affidavits of Mr. Know! ton, Mr. 
Christensen, and Mr. Memmott, the Tax Commission had attached the 
affidavits of R.H. Hansen, Jerry E. Larabee, Kevin Howard, and 
Douglas A. MacDonald. 
31
 Those affidavits attached to Defendants' Reply Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities are affidavit of Steven S. Nelsonf 
supplemental affidavit of Jerry E, Larabee, supplemental affidavit 
of R.H. Hansen, and affidavit, of Thomas Michael Williams, 
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retroactivity analysis. That prong provides that "where a 
decision of this court would produce substantial inequitable 
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our 
cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of 
nonretroactivity.M Chevron, 4 04 U.S. at 107 (1971) (quoting 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 702 (1969)). Defendants' 
affidavits went to the issue of potential hardship to the State 
if the Davis decision were to be applied retroactively. Hence, 
the affidavits are relevant under Utah R. Evid. 401. 
In arriving at its decision in ATA, the Supreme Court 
reasoned: 
In determining whether a decision should be 
applied retroactively, this Court has 
consistently given great weight to the 
reliance interests of all parties affected by 
changes in the law. . . . To the extent that 
retrospective application of a decision 
burdens a government's ability to plan or 
carry out its programs, the application 
injures all of the government's constituents. 
These concerns have long informed the Court's 
retroactivity decisions. . . . 
ATA, 111 S. Ct. at 2334-35 (emphasis added; citation omitted); 
see also Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). 
Finally, the affidavits that were stricken by the 
District Court should have been considered in crafting a remedy. 
Justice Souter, in his plurality decision in Beam found: 
'* [n]othing we say here deprives respondent of his opportunity to 
raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate 
reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the 
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nature of the remedy that must be provided, a matter with which 
McKesson did not deal." Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448. 
Hence, the fiscal impact on the State and its reliance 
interests are relevant both in determining the choice of law and 
remedy issues. The affidavits also demonstrate beyond question 
the Plaintiffs' lack of state or federal challenge to the Utah 
statute until after the Davis decision was announced. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REMEDY IS OVERBROAD AND 
OVERCLUSIVE. 
A. The McKesson Case - Minimum Due Process 
Requirements. 
The case before the Court requires a three step 
inquiry. First, this Court must determine whether litigants are 
procedurally barred by a statute of limitations or payment under 
protest requirement. Second, this Court must determine whether 
there has been a constitutional violation by applying the Davis 
decision retroactively using the three-pronged Chevron test. 
ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2333. Third, if a violation has occurred, the 
Court then crafts a remedy pursuant to state law that satisfies 
minimum federal Due Process requirements. 
The Supreme Court in McKesson, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990), 
set forth the minimum procedural standards that a state remedy 
must provide to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. At 
issue in McKesson was whether a refund was due under a Florida 
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liquor excise tax found unconstitutional- For several decades, 
Florida had given preferred tax treatment to Florida-grown citrus 
products used in liquor production- The Supreme Court 
invalidated a similar Hawaii tax scheme as violating the Commerce 
Clause- Following the Hawaii decision, the Florida Legislature 
amended its liquor excise tax- However, the Court found that 
these amendments to "[t]he Liquor Tax reflected only cosmetic 
changes from the prior version of the tax scheme that itself was 
virtually identical to the Hawaii scheme." 110 S. Ct- at 2255. 
Given these egregious facts, the Court found that a refund must 
be given. 
McKesson is important because it provides that "the 
root requirement of the Due Process Clause as being that an 
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 
deprived of any significant property interest." JEcl. at 2250. 
However, there is an exception to a predeprivation hearing for 
the payment of state taxes: 
[I]t is well established that a State need 
not provide predeprivation process for the 
exaction of taxes. Allowing taxpayers to 
litigate their tax liabilities prior to 
payment might threaten a government's 
financial security, both by creating 
unpredictable interim revenue shortfalls 
against which the State cannot easily 
prepare, and by making the ultimate 
collection of validly imposed taxes more 
difficult. 
Id. The Fourteenth Amendment concern arises because of the 
"coercive means" used to collect an illegal tax. Ici. at 2251-
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Accordingly, the Court ruled that a postdeprivation 
procedure which provided "an opportunity to contest the validity 
of the tax and a 'clear and certain remedy" designed to render 
the opportunity meaningful by preventing any permanent unlawful 
deprivation of property" would satisfy Due Process requirements. 
Id. at 2252. 
In McKesson, the Supreme Court gave the following 
examples of postdeprivation remedies that satisfy minimum federal 
Due Process requirements: 
1. Full refund of tax assessed over the amount 
competitors had been charged; 
2. Collection of back taxes from those parties 
benefiting from lower tax rates; and 
3. A combination of tax refunds to petitioners and 
retroactive taxation of those parties taxed at a lower rate. 
Id. at 2252. 
The Court also set forth procedural safeguards that 
could be employed by states to protect against the "disruptive 
effects" of an invalidated tax scheme: 
1) Refunds only to taxpayers paying under protest; and 
2) Short statutes of limitation. JEd. at 2257. 
Finally, the administrative costs -- separate from the 
refund cost — may also be weighed, J[d_. at 2258. 
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On the other hand, if there are predeprivation 
safeguards, no Due Process concern exists. This is because the 
requirements of Due Process have already been satisfied: 
If a State chooses not to secure payments 
under duress and instead offers a meaningful 
opportunity for taxpayers to withhold 
contested tax assessments and to challenge 
their validity in a predeprivation hearing, 
payments tendered may be deemed "voluntary," 
The availability of a predeprivation hearing 
constitutes a procedural safeguard against 
unlawful deprivations sufficient by itself to 
satisfy the Due Process Clause, and taxpayers 
cannot complain if they fail to avail 
themselves of this procedure* See 
Mississippi Tax Comm'n, supra, 412 U.S. at 
368, n. 11, 93 S. Ct., at 2187, n. 11 
"fWlhere voluntary payment Tof a taxi is 
knowingly made pursuant to an illegal demand, 
recovery of that payment may be denied". 
Id. at 2251, n.21 (emphasis added); See also Mammoth City v. 
Snow, 253 P. 680 (Utah 1926) (payment of an improper tax is non-
refundable ) . 
B. The Remedy Below Was Draconian Under the McKesson 
Standard. 
It is important to reemphasize that Davis did not 
mandate refunds for taxes paid by federal retirees; rather, Davis 
only required equal treatment of federal and state retirement 
income for state income tax purposes. Accordingly, the State of 
Utah complied with the Davis decision when it revised its income 
tax statute to provide for identical treatment for state and 
federal pensioners. Defendants below requested a remedial 
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hearing to submit evidence on the remedy issue, (R. 697.) This 
request was never entertained by the District Court, 
Utah has already satisfied the minimum Due Process 
requirements of McKesson, A federal retiree could have omitted 
that portion of his income tax that he felt violated 
intergovernmental tax immunity. In factf there is evidence in 
the record showing that this has been done. (R. 561.) Not until 
a determination of a deficiency would the taxes then be due under 
duress. At this time a predeprivation hearing would be available 
to the taxpayer. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-501 through 505. 
Hence, the minimum Due Process requirements have already been 
satisfied. Utah needs to do nothing more to satisfy federal Due 
Process requirements. 
If this Court determines that Plaintiffs are entitled 
to some form of retroactive relief, an equitable remedy should be 
crafted. The Court could require Defendants to refund the amount 
of money that state and local retirees received in tax benefits 
($8.3 million best estimate benefit), see Bohn v. Waddell, 807 
P.2d 1 (Ariz. Tax 1991) (opinion on rehearing), or it may require 
Defendants to grant tax credits against future tax liability. 
Even if Utah had not complied with Due Process by 
providing a predeprivation remedy, it has established the 
necessary procedural safeguards to protect against economic 
disruption. It has a payment under protest statute. See Utah 
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Code Ann, § 59-1-301,32 That statute allows the taxpayer who 
considers a tax to be unlawful to pay under protest. Moreover, 
this statute authorizes a taxpayer to bring an action in court, 
thus providing the opportunity to adjudicate the lawfulness of 
the tax and preclude permanent deprivation of the tax paid, Utah 
likewise has a six month statute of limitations that applies to 
these types of actions.33 Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-31 (1987)• 
The District Court failed to contemplate these statutes as it 
crafted its remedy. 
Both of these statutes provide more than sufficient 
protection to taxpayers against permanent deprivation without Due 
Process. Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion 
in ordering refunds to Plaintiffs for the years 1985-1988. Such 
a remedy is severe and is neither prescribed by the Coastitution 
nor state law. 
Finally, the District Court in fashioning its remedy 
failed to consider the well documented reliance interests of the 
state. Justice Souter in Beam opined: 
[N]othing we say here precludes consideration 
of individual equities when deciding remedial 
issues in particular. 
Nothing we say here deprives respondent of 
his opportunity to . , . demonstrate reliance 
32
 This statute is discussed in detail, supra at p. 2-7. 
33
 This statute is discussed in detail, supra at p. 7-9. 
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interests entitled to consideration in 
determining the nature of the remedy that 
must be provided, a matter with which 
McKesson did not deal. 
Id. at 2448- In these passages, Justice Souter has invited this 
Court to consider the equities and to determine that, in his 
words, the taxpayers prevailing under the new rule announced in 
Davis may not "obtain the same relief that would have been 
awarded if the rule had been an old one." Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 
2443. Accordingly, retroactivity as a remedial principle clearly 
recognizes the equitable and reliance interests of the parties. 
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448. This view is also supported by the 
opinion of the dissenting Justices in ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2347-56 
(dissent) . 
C. The Utah Supreme Court Approach to Prospective 
Only Application of a New Decision Should Be 
Applied to Any Remedy Crafted By It. 
Utah, like the Supreme Court, recognizes non-
retroactivity.3* The Utah test for non-retroactivity is well 
established: 
We may in our discretion, prohibit 
retroactive operation where the "overruled 
law has been justifiably relied upon or where 
retroactive operation creates a burden." 
Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265. For 
example, we have limited or prohibited 
Utah has not formally adopted the rule found in Chevron. 
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retroactive application of decisions 
invalidating or reinterpreting certain 
statutes. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have recognized the immense burden that 
retroactive application of tax laws could place on government. 
This Court in Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984) considered the impact of a retroactive application of 
a ruling allowing refunds for state-assessed properties: 
[L]ocal governments operate on very precise 
and often strained budgets that are carefully 
tied to these levies. Since 1981, a number 
of owners of state-assessed properties have 
paid their taxes under protest or have filed 
formal complaints with the Tax Commission. 
Retroactive effect to a decision altering the 
relative tax burdens between locaJly assessed 
and state-assessed properties would require 
reopening the assessment process as to tax 
obligations not yet final. To the extent 
that this might result in refunds of taxes 
paid on state-assessed properties, it would 
impose indebtedness for future repayments 
from locally assessed properties. Such 
indebtedness could be huge in counties that 
derive high proportions of their budgets from 
srate-assessed properties. 
Id. at 195; see also Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County 3d. 
of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982) (giving 
retroactive effecr. to the assessment of back taxes could result 
"in an unreasonable burden upon . . . governmental bodies 
associated with it."); Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983) (new law should not be given retroactive 
effect where it would require county government to make payments 
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for which it had not budgeted, and where its impact would fall 
heavily on taxpayers). 
If the new rule of law stated in Davis is to be applied 
retroactively under the Utah Supreme Court analysis, any remedy 
should be prospective only. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS THE 
PRESCRIBED TIME TO OBJECT TO THE PROPOSED FINAL ORDER 
AND BY MAKING FINDINGS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
Rule 4-504(2) of th^ CoHo <>* judicial Administration 
Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, 
and orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within 
five days after service, 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, the District Court did not allow 
Defendants the prescribed time to object to Plaintiffs' Amended 
Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs mailed to Defendants the Amended Proposed 
Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment on April 10, 
1991*. On April 15, the Court made a minute entry stating: " [t]he 
court has reviewed the Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions and 
Partial Summary Judgment as submitted. The same are approved to 
be the final order of the Court. The Defendant's objections 
thereto are thus denied." (R. 1110.) In fact, Defendants had 
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not yet filed objections to the amended order. The Court 
subsequently signed and entered the order on April 16, 1991. 
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
Computation. In computing any period of time 
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the 
local rules of any district court, by order 
of court, or by any applicable statute, the 
day of the act, event, or default from which 
the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless 
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
h o l i d a y , i n xv-Klcn e v e n t un^ ^ , „ ^ _ - i — ^ ^ ,,^4.^-j 
the end of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When 
the period of time prescribed or allowed is 
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation. 
Pursuant to Rule 6(a), the prescribed period in which 
to object to Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions 
and Partial Summary Judgment had not lapsed prior to it entry. 
Accordingly, by signing and entering the order, the Court 
deprived Defendants of their right to object under Rule 4-504(2) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Because Defendants 
were denied their right to object, the Amended Findings, 
Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment must be set aside. 
The District Court also erred in making findings of 
material facts in ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment that are completely unsupported by the record. Had 
-90-
Defendants been given the opportunity to raise objections, this 
may not have occurred. 
First, the District Court made a finding that the 
"Plaintiff class consists of approximately 34,000 individuals 
and/or estates, the majority of whom are of advanced age." (R. 
1121.) This finding is unsupported by the record. 
Second, the District Court made a finding that the 
"size of each class member's claim is small in relation to the 
high cost of pursuing a resolution of the claim." (R. 1121.) 
There is absolutely no evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs into 
the record supporting this assertion. 
Third, the District Court entered a finding that 
"[p]laintiffs will necessarily incur costs to prepare amended tax 
returns to be filed with the State Tax Commission as part of the 
refund process. The State Tax Commission has no mechanism to 
compute refunds for plaintiffs." (R. 1124.) Again there is 
absolutely no support for this finding in the record. 
Significantly, it is an illogical conclusion of the District 
Court that the Tax Commission is without the capacity to process 
refunds for the individual Plaintiffs. Particularly in light of 
its later order that it do exactly that. 
Finally, the District Court made a finding that 
" [attorney's fees have been incurred herein by Plaintiffs and by 
the Plaintiff class." (Rv 1121.) While this is possible, the 
Plaintiffs introduced no evidence into the record that would 
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provide the Court a basis for this finding. Accordingly, the 
District Court erred in making the formal finding. 
Each of the above findings was made by the District 
Court to support its granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The standard for summary judgment is provided in Rule 
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant portion 
of that rule provides: "[t]he [summary] judgment shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." It is significant that these issues of 
material fact remained unsupported when the Court entered Summary 
Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS' 
ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE AWARD AND 
IN GRANTING COURT COSTS AND REIMBURSEMENT TO PLAINTIFFS 
FOR THE COSTS OF PREPARING AMENDED TAX RETURNS. 
"Utah adheres to the well-established rule that 
attorney's fees generally cannot be recovered unless provided for 
by statute or by contract*" See Canyon Country Store/ 781 P.2d 
414, 419 (Utah 1989); see also Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982); Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct« App, 1989 )• There is no 
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contractual basis for an award of fees- The only relevant 
statutory provision is Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56(1)(Supp. 1991 
& 1987) which provides: 
In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
The threshold question is whether a party's action or 
defense was without merit and not brought in good faith. The 
Utah Court of Appeals recently stated that "in order to recover 
fees under § 78-27-56, a trial court must make findings that 1) 
the claim or claims were 'without merit', and 2) the party's 
conduct was lacking in good faith." Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The findings 
with reference to bad faith need not be written. See Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989). 
Nevertheless, there must be some basis in the record to support 
findings of lack of merit and bad faith. 
There is absolutely no basis in the present action, nor 
in the record, for findings of lack of merit or bad faith that 
would sustain an award of attorney fees. 
This Court has found that "not only must there be 
substantial evidence that the claim was lacking basis in either 
law or fact and therefore frivolous, but there must also be 
sufficient evidence that the unsuccessful party lacked at least 
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one of the good faith elements. . . . "35 Cady v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 1983), If the Court refused to find a lack 
of good faith in Cady, it can hardly be said that Defendants' 
onerous efforts to defend the present claim constitute bad faith 
on their part. 
In the instant action, there is neither a contractual 
nor a statutory basis for attorney fees. Absent a basis to 
support an award, the Court's actions in awarding fees was 
improper and must be reversed. 
The District Court granted reimbursement to Plaintiffs 
for tax return preparation and court costs. (R. 1141.) Rule 54 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: "Costs 
against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law. "' Costs are fees 
paid to the Court and witnesses. See Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) . 
There is no basis in Utah law to impose on Defendants 
the costs of preparing amended tax returns or court costs. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting them, and the 
award should be reversed. 
35
 The court defined good faith as: "(1) An honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, 
delay or defraud others. See Cady, 671 P.2d 149. 
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APPENDIX 1 
JACK t , liELGESEN, a 1451 
RICHARD W. JONES, 1*39 3 8 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALJ L ,'UJIL1. , . 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4768 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone- f ftM I 4 7r<» -1777 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIETPl'T "-"s^' 
SALT LW:E COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDE1J F EEUMLEY M « ""FIEF CERTIFYING CLASS 
Plaint if is , : 
UTAH TAX COMMISSION, et „l 
iivii No. 89-0903616 CV 
Defendants. : "ucge David S, Young 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class havinq bee:t filei 
by r - amtif i L * i t 1 i 1 ;*ory:vi ny i h .i memorandum, and Defendants 
havinq filed i memoianaum opposing liamtiit, n i M ,, 
O i r - ' rl6s? ari Plaintiffs' replyino thereto, ana tn« c:u] ' 
having reviewca ti.e di.. < ".,..! IJ i mrn >• r ,in v 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED; 
1 • ( fj i * t i -a 11 on Cl v i I art: on h Q-09 C ? 61 8 ?' sty] c d 
Wendell E. Brumley, et al. v. Utah Stale idA uOitimicsicn
 f eta, 
:s hereby certified as n i.lass action en behalf of t \e 
iiij..ijj"-i ~ 1 v ' f-i n i ti*f't, j.il persons and the estates .f 
deceased persons v;h . received icdeiai t 11 11 uut i M i> n I M ^ 
nnrii;::; ties and vhn haire paid Utdh state income tax en tnc. 
federal retirement Lt nt ? i < 1 " i 1 Q 6 D , ly^o, 1957 
ancn cr the 19b? tax years, 
2. "Icf?* cert if i rat i en ,: made pursuard :. * he 
prOVl.Sl.OnS Of halt ... I un I i i 
ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS 
Brumley et al. vs. Utah Tax Commin. et al. 
Page 2 
3. All prior orders of the court shall apply to 
members of the class. 
4. Class representatives? class counsel. Subject 
to further order of the court, Wendell E. Brumley and those 334 
additional individuals named as Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint are designated class representatives and Jack 
C. Helgesen and Richard W. Jones of the firm of Lyon, Helgesen, 
Waterfall & Jones are designated as counsel for the class. 
5. Notice. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall submit to 
the court a proposal to notify class members and to allow Class 
members to exclude themselves from the class by filing the 
appropriate notice in written form as directed by further order 
of the court. A 
DATED this day of /(4dU JL , 1990. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
00210 
ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS 
E r urn 1 ey e t a 1 \ • s 111 <, h Ta x CommI, n. e t a 1. 
Fage 3 
NOTICE 
Pursuant to Ru 11 4 - S i > 4 i ,„ 
Administration» the undersigned will submit the fcregcina 
^,:zei i.ei t . f ,';n i , J nr CM ir"T,;i airle David S, Ycunc fcr 
signature upcn the expiration ct riqht clays frcm the eiate 
this r r tice IF pail^ed tc you, unless written crjertic: . s 
r n e i p: i'i i t \. M M 1 \ i nie . 
EAIEI this fc2 day cf March, 1990. 
r 
^LX^^/ L ^ , ^ 7 ^ — 
RICHARD W. /JONES 
Attcrney f cr_^?laintiff s 
CErTIFICATE CF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a true and correct 
"::v ;..: trie ioregcing order certifying Class tc R. ?aul 'an 
La^, Attorney General T I Dever, Esq, P^ i-^ n r Tartar , 
J. " . Feed I L * i ; n ~:\%r , ,111. ! ^  ;:i» , Assistant Attcrney 
Generals, -e>, ', ]• jb i nvs,1- K--jicJti' n, I-1'' iau C.nri1''!, ' 
1 a>;e Cityr Utah 841J4 post a at r. repaid, this )/ j^' ca1, cf 
i - T - , 1 9 ? 0 . 
JL, _« -^rf -. *,, tL»^ • * ^  U ^ _ _ _ _ _ 
Secretary 
f • "I ! i I 
MI INh l fc .! 
JACK C . HELGESEN , * 1 '1 [> 1 
RICHARD W. JONES, #3938 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4768 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 479-4777 
IN THE TAX DIVISION, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al, 
PJ a i n t: J f f s 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 




i ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
i MC "0 D =S 
i Civ. 89-09L... 18 
i Judge David £.. Young 
Defendants' MDti.v t Dismiss ^di rrc"d bef:,rr. the 
E - - - - * ' • -
B r i a n ,.., * > \ *..t . u * *. u;_ * t. ^  . ,..., -tt trnc«:, t ^  , 
Ficha; . V. . - -.elgeser representing r l a i r . ^ f : 
5 ^ 
d o c u m e n t s f -.t-j - . . »~u ; - ^. < *j^:.c;.t* . .:.ht ,* . uby 
enters its order as follows: 
1 • D e f e ii d a i 1 t s " M o il: 1 o i : !:: • :: D i s ::n: i i s s i s d € • i :i i e 11 ri • I i: c 1 1! 
causes of action and al 1 tax years claimed in plaintiffs'" Amended 
Complaint except Count Five. 
) 
2. The denial of defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
based on the following grounds: 
A. The Tax Division of district court has 
jurisdiction for the tax years at issue. 
B. This court specifically finds under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-14, that plaintiffs need not exhaust 
administrative remedies because requiring the plaintiffs to 
exhaust administrative remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
C. In finding the administrative remedies to be 
disproportionate, this court has reviewed the pleadings, 
memoranda, documents filed by the parties, and arguments of 
counsel. 
D. Defendants concede that the Utah State Tax 
Commission has no administrative procedures to consider and 
process a class action that would preserve and protect the rights 
of and grant the relief the representative members of the class 
seek. 
E. In finding that the exhaustion of remedies 
will result in irreparable harm disproportionate to public 
benefit derived from requiring an exhaustion, this court has 
specifically considered the size of the proposed class, the older 
-2- /^  
age of many of the plaintiffs, and the relatively small amount of 
each claim for refund in relation to the cost to each taxpayer in 
pursuing a resolution of his or her claim through the State Tax 
Commission. The burden to each of the estimated 35,000 taxpayers 
in the described class is not justified by the incidental public 
benefit which might be gained by following the administrative 
remedies in the Tax Commission. This is especially true in light 
of indications that the Utah State Tax Commission has 
preliminarily decided that Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury; 
109 S.Ct. 1500 (1989) does not mandate refunds in Utah. 
The Court accepts the parties' stipulation that 
defendants need not answer Counts Three and Four, which are 
misrepresentation for the 1985 tax year and fraud or 
misrepresentation pertaining to the 1988 tax year, until 
defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement of those claims is 
resolved-
DATED this *^ Dt^ -ffay^ of February, 1990, 




BRIAN L. TARBET 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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M *-$9 0 
tW JACK C. HELGESEN, #1451 
RICHARD W. JONES, #3938 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4768 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 479-4777 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH TAX COMMISSION, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 89-0903618 CV 
Judge David S. Young 
On June 4, 1990, before the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Court Judge, "Plaintiffs' Motion to Enjoin State Tax 
Commission from Proceeding with Administrative Hearings 
Involving Members of the Class" was heard. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Richard W. Jones and Jack C. Helgesen. 
Defendants were represented by Brian L. Tarbet and L.A. Dever. 
Arguments were heard, the court file was reviewed and the Court 
made the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs1 motion is granted. Defendant Utah 
State Tax Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with 
administrative hearings involving members of the plaintiff 
class. Forty-five (45) days following the publication of the 
"Notice of Class Action," Defendants may proceed with 
administrative hearings for all federal retirees who paid taxes 
during the years in question and who elected to opt out of the 
plaintiff class. 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
T££^ 
District Court Judg 




IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, ET AL, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
-VS-
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
ET AL, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CIVIL NO. C-89-090-361S 
JUDGE'S RULING 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 4TH DAY 
OF MARCH, 1991, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:55 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
m rv7a 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: JACK C. HELGESEN, 
RICHARD W. JONES 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & 
JONES 
4 768 HARRISON BLVD. 
OGDEN, UTAH 84 4 03 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: BRIAN L. TARBET, 
L. A. DEVER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALS 
3 6 SOUTH STATE, 11TH FLOOR 
BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
I N D E X 
JUDGE'S RULING PAGE 3 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. niflfcn 
1
 E E O C E . E P . I N G S 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
3 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. 
4 MR. HELGESEN, I'LL ASK YOU TO PREPARE SOME FIND-
5 INGS AND JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RULING AND, 
6 ALSO, I SPECIFICALLY APPROVE YOUR FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE 
7 CONSISTENT WITH THE PLEADINS ON FILE BEFORE THE COURT 
8 WHETHER I STATE IT IN RELATION TO THAT RULING OR NOT. 
9 THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONING PLAINTIFFS 
10 ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM A TAX REFUND FOR THE YEARS 1985 
11 THROUGH 1988. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE 
12 ENTITLED TO A REFUND UNDER STATE LAW AND, THEREFORE, TKEY 
13 ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON THAT REFUND AT THE RATE OF 12 
14 PERCENT. 
15 THE COURT WILL INVITE COUNSEL TO SUBMIT APPROPRI-
16 ATE MEMORANDA AND AFFIDAVITS IN RELATION TO THE COSTS AND 
17 FEES ISSUED TO BE ORDERED. THE COURT FINDS, HOWEVER, THAT 
18 THE CLASS IS ENTITLED TO THE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL AND 
19 I WOULD SUGGEST TO EVERYONE THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A MECHA-
20 NISM ESTABLISHED TO MINIMIZE THE COSTS OF PREPARING RE-
21 TURNS. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT MIGHT BE BUT I THINK BETWEEN 
22 THE STATE'S ATTORNEYS AND MR. HELGESEN AND YOUR ASSOCIATES 
23 THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE SUGGESTED THERE TO MINIMIZE THE 
24 IMPACT OF THE COST IN FILING THESE AMENDED RETURNS. 
25 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT ALL OF THE 198 8 
PARTICIPANTS IN THIS ACTION, WHICH INCLUDES THE ENTIRE 
CLASS, SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE PAID "UNDER PROTEST" AND 
SHALL BE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS THAT THAT STATUS WOULD 
BRING. 
NOW, THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHALL BE, AND THE SAME IS 
HEREBY DENIED. 
THERE IS IN THE FILE A MOTION FROM THE PLAINTIFF 
AND FROM THE DEFENDANT TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS. I WOULD 
BE WILLING TO RULE ON THAT MOTION BUT I WOULD INVITE COUN-
SEL TO GIVE ME YOUR IMPRESSIONS AS TO WHETHER YOU WOULD 
DESIRE THE RULING ON THAT MOTION. LET ME SUGGEST TO YOU 
THAT FROM MY REVIEW OF THE AFFIDAVITS MUCH OF THE MATERIAL 
CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDAVITS IS IRRELEVANT TO THE BASIS OF 
THIS RULING AND, THEREFORE, A NEED TO STRIKE WOULD BE 
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT MIGHT BE NEEDED IN GRANTING SUMMA-
RY JUDGMENT. 
DO EITHER OF YOU HAVE A VIEW THAT MIGHT BE OTHER-
WISE ON THE MOTIONS TO STRIKE? 
MR. HELGESEN: OUR POINT, YOUR HONOR, WAS THAT IT 
WAS IRRELEVANT. IF WE CAN SIMPLY HAVE THAT FINDING THERE'S 
NO NEED TO DO ANYTHING ELSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. TARBET? 
MR. TARBET: YOUR HONOR, I'M NOT SURE SPECIFICAL-
LY WHAT AFFIDAVIT THE COURT IS SPEAKING TO. IN TERMS OF 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 4 
1 THE KNOWLTON, CHRISTENSEN, MEMMOTT AFFIDAVIT WE THINK IT'S 
2 HIGHLY RELEVANT TO CHEVRON. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: TO THE THIRD PRONG? 
4 MR. TARBET: CORRECT. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT GRANTS THE 
6 DEFENDANT'S—OR THE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
7 AFFIDAVITS OF THE DEFENDANT IN RELATION TO THOSE OF MR. 
8 KNOWLTON, MR. CHRISTENSEN AND MR. MEMMOTT. I BELIEVE THAT 
9 THE SCOPE OF THOSE AFFIDAVITS WAS WELL BEYOND THE FACTUAL 
10 BASIS UPON WHICH THE COURT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONSIDER A 
11 BASIS FOR RENDERING THIS DECISION. 
12 NOW, AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE. 
13 WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE IN RELATION TO THAT? EXCUSE KE, 
14 THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE. THAT GRANTS THE PLAINTI-
15 FF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT. I SAID THAT WITH THE 
16 WRONG PARTY. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE. 
17 MR. HELGESEN: YOU HAD A MOTION TO STRIKE ONE 
18 AFFIDAVIT FROM A GUY WHO CLAIMED TO PROTEST EARLY. THAT 
19 SHOULD BE GRANTED. WE NEVER ALLEGED WE PROTESTED BEFORE 
20 '88. 
21 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE 
22 I THAT GIVES RISE TO A CONCERN THAT WE HAVE AS A FACTUAL 
23 (BASIS FOR THIS RULING, IN ANY EVENT. 
24 MR. HELGESEN: NO, IT IS NOT. 
25 I JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 5 
1
 TO STRIKE IS LIKEWISE GRANTED. BOTH MOTIONS TO STRIKE ARE 
2 GRANTED. 
3
 NOW, MR. HELGESEN, DOES THIS PROVIDE YOU WITH 
4
 ADEQUATE INFORMATION UPON WHICH YOU MAY PREPARE FINDINGS 
5 AND A JUDGMENT? 
6
 MR. HELGESEN: IT DOES, YOUR HONOR. I'D ASK FOR 
7
 THE PREPARATION OF A COPY OF THE RULING, OF THE BENCH 
8 RULING. 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING FURTHER? 
10 MR. DEVER: JUST ONE QUESTION. YOU TALKED ABOUT 
11 J THE PARTIES SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO FORMULATE A METHOD OF 
12 I DOING AMENDED RETURNS. COURT DIDN'T MEAN THAT THE COST IS 
13 TO BE BORNE BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MATTER, DID IT? 
14 I JUDGE YOUNG: I HAVE A CONCERN ABOUT THAT BECAUSE 
15 I DON'T KNOW WHAT THOSE COSTS ARE AND I DO DESIRE TO MINI-
16 MIZE THOSE COSTS. I DO THINK THAT THE CLASS IS GOING TO BE 
17 ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR COUNSEL'S EFFORTS HERE BUT I 
18 DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT THOSE FEES WILL BE THAT WILL 
19 BE REQUESTED. PERHAPS THERE OUGHT TO BE MEMORANDA FILED 
20 SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO THE ISSUES OF FEES AND I OUGHT 
21 TO RULE ON THAT AS AN INDEPENDENT MATTER. 
22 MR. DEVER: YOUR HONOR, COULD WE HAVE MR. 
23 HELGESEN, SINCE HE IS THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF WHAT THE FEES 
24 ARE, SUBMIT HIS MEMORANDA AND WE HAVE THREE DAYS TO RESPOND 
25 I FROM THAT? 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 010S4 
* JUDGE YOUNG: MR. HELGESEN? 
2 MR. HELGESEN: IT SEEMS TO ME, YOUR HONOR, 
3 THERE'S NO HURRY, IN THAT, OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE GOING TO 
4
 APPEAL. WE HAVE A LOT MORE WORK TO DO BEFORE WE'RE THROUGH 
5 HERE SO WE'D ASK WE BE ABLE TO RESERVE THAT UNTIL SOME 
6 FINAL RESOLUTION AND THEN PRESENT THE COURT WITH WHAT WE 
1 HAVE DONE. THAT SEEMS MORE EFFICIENT. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT 
9 PROCEDURE. 
10 DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT? 
11 MR. DEVER: I GUESS THE ONLY QUESTION I HAVE IS 
12 IF THE COURT IS, IN ITS ORDER, IS SAYING THE DEFENDANTS ARE 
13 RESPONSIBLE, I THINK THAT NEEDS TO BE IN OR OUT. IF YOU 
14 ARE SAYING THAT SHOULD BE A MATTER LATER TO BE CONSIDERED 
15 | THEN I THINK THAT WAHT NEEDS TO BE— 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I'M WILLING TO PUT IN 
17 i THE ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FEES 
18 I AND THE AMOUNTS WILL HAVE TO BE DETERMINED LATER. THAT WAY 
19 WHEN THIS IS REVIEWED BY THE APPELLATE COURT THEY CAN 
20 DETERMINE THAT ISSUE AS WELL. THAT SEEMS TO BE EFFICIENT. 
21 ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THAT, MR. HELGESEN? 
22 MR. HELGESEN: NO. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING FURTHER? COURT'S IN 
24 RECESS. 
25 (WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
;O^M^ &<$£. 
EILEEN/M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1992 
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APPENDIX 5 
JACK C. HELGESEN, #1451 
RICHARD W. JONES, #3938 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4768 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 479-4777 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al., : FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND PARTIAL SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs, : JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
UTAH TAX COMMISSION, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
Civil No. 89-0903618 CV 
Judge David S. Young 
On March 4, 1991 before the Honorable David S. Young, Tax 
Division, Third District Court, a hearing was held en 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendants' 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Jack C. Helgesen and 
Richard W. Jones were present representing Plaintiffs. Brian 
L. Tarbet, L.A. Dever and John C. McCarrey were present 
representing Defendants. Arguments were heard and exhibits 
were reviewed. Prior to the hearing, the Court reviewed and 
considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the 
parties supporting and opposing the motions. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ruled granting 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Defendants' 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has not ruled on 
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a number of issues such as: notice to the class, deadlines for 
Plaintiffs to submit amended returns, amount of attorneys1 fees 
awarded class counsel, etc. Consequently, this ruling is a 
partial summary judgment which the Court is willing to certify 
for appeal purposes. 
In support of its ruling, the Court now enters its formal 
findings. Although some facts remain in dispute, the Court 
finds the disputed facts to be immaterial and finds the 
undisputed material facts to be dispositive of the issues as a 
matter of law. Specifically, the Court bases its decision on 
the following undisputed material facts. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff class 
received pay or compensation as a result of personal services 
rendered as officers or employees of the United States. 
2. 4 U.S.C. §111 reads in relevant part as follows: 
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or 
compensation for personal service as an officer or 
employee of the United States . . . by a duly 
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if 
the taxation does not discriminate against the 
officer or employee because of the source of the pay 
or compensation. 
3. The State of Utah taxed the income of Plaintiffs and 
members of the Plaintiff class and did not tax the income of 
retired state employees. 
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4. The Plaintiff class consists of all persons and the 
estates of deceased persons who received retirement pay, cr 
annuities from federal sources and who have paid Utah State 
income tax on such retirement income for the 1985, 1986, 1987, 
and/or the 1988 tax years, 
5. The Plaifttiff class consists of approximately 34,000 
individuals and/or estates, the majority of whom are cf 
advanced age. 
6. The size of each class member's claim is small in 
amount in relation to the high cost of pursuing a resolution of 
the claim. 
7. The Defendants became aware of the decision in Davis 
v. Michigan, when it was announced on March 28, 1989, and 
understood it to impact the Utah income tax scheme. 
8. 1988 Utah income tax returns were due April 17, 1959. 
9. Prior to April 17, 1989 Defendants received hundreds 
of phone calls from members of the Plaintiff class protesting 
the collection of 1988 Utah state income taxes on Plaintiffs1 
federal retirement compensation. 
10. In a press release on April 5, 1989, the Utah Tax 
Commission through commissioner Roger Tew instructed members cf 
the Plaintiff class who wished to protect "any legal rights for 
any year prior to 1989n to file amended returns. The Utah Tax 
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Commission received hundreds of such amended, returns on or 
before April 17, 1989. 
11. Representative Plaintiffs and more than 3,000 Utah 
members of the National Association of Retired Federal 
Employees (NARFE), protested for themselves and "all others 
similarly situated", the collection of state income tax on 
their federal retirement benefits by filing with Defendants on 
or before April 17, 1989 a "Notice of Claim", and "Class Claim 
for Refund", seeking a refund of all state income taxes paid on 
federal retirement benefits for the 1985 through 1988 tax 
years, specifically alleging the illegality of the state income 
tax under federal and state law. 
12. Many representative Plaintiffs and hundreds of 
members of the Plaintiff Class also protested payment of their 
1988 state income taxes by calling the Utah State Tax 
Commissioner, by filing written protests and by filing 1988 
amended returns prior to the 1988 due date, or by filing claims 
for protection of rights in the form and manner prescribed by 
the tax commission. 
13. Representative Plaintiffs for themselves and all 
others similarly situated, plus over 3,000 Utah members of the 
National Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) filed 
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timely class claims for refund with the Utah State Tax 
Commission for the years 1985 through 1988. 
Also, individual Class Members filed claims with the State 
Tax Commission for the years indicated below seeking a refund 
of state income taxes paid on federal retirement benefits. The 
number of such individual claims filed with the tax commission 





14. On March 30, 1990, Plaintiff class, by and through 
legal representatives, filed a "Protective Claim" with the 
State Tax Commission on a form prepared by the tax commission. 
15. The State Tax Commission instructed Plaintiffs in 
February 1990 to file protective claims by April 16, 1990 to 
protect their claims for refund for the 1985 and 1986 tax years 
within the three-year statute of limitations. 
16. The consistent practice of the Utah State Tax 
Commission has been to treat all claims for refund of income 
taxes as being timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529(7) 
if filed within three years of the due date of the return. In 
considering the timeliness of income tax refund claims, it has 
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not been the practice of the commission to distinguish between 
claims for refund by taxpayers who paid their tax before the 
due date from those who paid on the due date. 
17. The original deadline for filing claims for refund 
for 1985 taxes was April 17, 1989. The 1990 Utah State 
Legislature extended this deadline to April 16, 1990. 
18. Defendant Utah State Tax Commission has consistently 
and publicly taken the position since April 5, 1989 that 
refunds of state income taxes paid by federal retirees will not 
be paid. 
19. In denying Plaintiffs' claims for refund Defendants 
have not relied upon prior case law interpretations of 4 U.S.C. 
§111. 
20. Plaintiffs will necessarily incur costs to prepare 
amended tax returns to be filed with the State Tax Commission 
as part of the refund process. The State Tax Commission has no 
mechanism to compute refunds for Plaintiffs. 
21. Attorney's fees have been incurred herein by 
Plaintiffs and by the Plaintiff class. 
22. The Court makes no factual findings regarding 




This Court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs1 claim 
for recovery of taxes paid under protest for the 1988 tax year 
under Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301. 
This Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of 
Utah's tax scheme and to consider the remedy of tax refunds for 
all the tax years in question pursuant to the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-33-1 et seq. 
Plaintiffs claim tax refunds for the tax years 1985, 1986, 
1987 and 1988 on the basis of overpayments under Utah Code Ann. 
§59-10-529(7). Plaintiffs pray for 1) a declaratory order that 
Utah's taxation of federal retirees was unlawful for all tax 
years in dispute, and 2) an order compelling Defendants to 
recognize Plaintiffs' class claims for refund, and to compute 
and pay refunds. The District Court has jurisdiction to 
determine the validity of the tax, the availability of refunds, 
the propriety of the class claims for refund and to issue a 
declaratory order resolving those issues pursuant to the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 states: 
The district courts within their respective 
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relations, whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or 
proceedings shall be open to objection on the ground 
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. 
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The issues raised in Plaintiffs1 claims for a refund of 
1988 taxes paid under protest are similar to and in some 
instances identical to Plaintiffs' claims for a refund of 
overpayment of 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 taxes. Consequently, 
a declaratory order addressing the claims for a refund of taxes 
for all the tax years is in the interest of judicial economy. 
Jurisdiction in the District Court to compel action by an 
administrative agency through writ of mandamus is protected by 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution which provides 
the "district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs.11 This is 
recognized in Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 which gives district court 
judges "power to issue all extraordinary writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees." 
The Court also finds jurisdiction over Plaintiffs1 claims 
in its interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l, et seq. The clear legislative 
intent of this act is to allow taxpayers a full hearing and 
review. Due process requires as much. If the tax commission 
conducts the hearing, review will be in an appellate court, 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16. Cases which are not heard in the 
tax commission receive a full hearing in District Court. Utah 
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Code Ann. §63-4 6B-15. This is such a case. This Court by 
prior order relieved Plaintiffs of the necessity of exhausting 
administrative remedies before the tax commission. Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a plenary hearing before this Court with appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
II. 4 U.S.C. Sill 
Title 4, Section 111 of the United States Code reads in 
relevant part: 
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or 
compensation for personal service as an officer cr 
employee of the United States . . . by a duly 
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if 
the taxation does not discriminate against the 
officer or employee because of the source of the pay 
or compensation. 
Plaintiffs allege Utah's taxation of pay or compensation 
from federal retirement sources to be in violation of the plain 
meaning of 4 U.S.C. §111. The Court agrees and rules in favor 
of the Plaintiffs. 
The federal statute is directed at state taxation nof pay 
or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee 
of the United States11. Plaintiffs or their decedents were once 
employees or officers of the United States or received 
retirement pay from the federal government. Plaintiffs1 prior 
personal service to the United States is the sole reason they 
now receive retirement pay. Although retired, Plaintiffs 
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continue to receive compensation from that personal service, 
and retirement pay is best characterized as deferred 
compensation. 
This interpretation is consistent with the position taken 
by the Utah Tax Commission in Fitzpatrick v. Tax Commission, 
386 P.2d 896 (Utah 1963), wherein the Utah Supreme Court agreed 
the taxpayer's retirement benefits were deferred compensation 
from former employment. Defendants now attempt to distinguish 
the private sector employee in Fitzpatrick from federal 
retirees with the explanation that private retirement is a 
matter of contract but federal retirement is a statutory 
entitlement. In the Court's view, this is a distinction 
without a difference. That federal employees' pay or 
compensation may arise from a statutory enactment does not 
destroy the nexus between retirement pay and the employees1 
previous service with the federal government. Most federal 
retirees would be justifiably offended at the State's view of 
their retirement pay, earned over many years of faithful 
service to the United States government, as an unearned 
statutory entitlement. 
Under the plain reading of 4 U.S.C. §111, the State of 
Utah may tax Plaintiffs' retirement benefits only if the 
taxation does not discriminate against Plaintiffs "because of 
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the source of the pay or compensation". Until 1989, Utah's 
taxation of retirement benefits was based solely on the source 
of compensation; retirement pay from the State and its 
political subdivisions was exempt and retirement pay from the 
federal government was taxed. This is an unmistakable 
discrimination against federal retirees in violation of 4 U.S.C 
§111. 
This Court reads 4 U.S.C §111 to be a limited waiver of 
federal immunity: "The United States consents to the taxation 
. . . if the taxation does not discriminate". Because the 
State of Utah did not meet the statutory condition of 
nondiscriminatory taxation, the consent of the United States 
was not given. Therefore, the State's taxation of federal 
retirement pay was not only in violation of 4 U.S.C. §111, but 
was also a breach of the constitutional doctrine of federal 
sovereign immunity. 
III. Refunds of Tax Overpayments 
The Utah legislature has made a clear choice to grant 
refunds to taxpayers who are improperly taxed. 
Section 59-10-529 reads in relevant part as follows: 
(1) In cases where there has been an overpayment of any 
tax imposed by this chapter, the amount of overpayment is 
credited as follows: 
(7) (a) If a refund or credit is due because the amount 
of tax deducted and withheld from wages exceeds the actual 
- 11 -
tax due, no refund or credit may be made or allowed unless 
the taxpayer or his legal representative files with the 
commission a tax return claiming the refund or credit: 
(i) within three years from the due date of the 
return, plus the period of any extension of time for 
filing the return; or 
(ii) within two years from the date the tax was 
paid, whichever period is later. 
(b) In other instances where a refund or credit of 
tax which has* not been deducted and withheld from income 
is due, no credit or refund may be allowed or made after 
three years from the time the tax was paid, unless, before 
the expiration of the period, a claim is filed by the 
taxpayer or his legal representative. 
This statutory scheme demonstrates legislative intent to 
refund tax overpayments to taxpayers if the following 
conditions are met: 
1. An overpayment of income tax occurs; 
2. A claim is filed by the taxpayer or his legal 
representative before the expiration of a three year period. 
Utah incorporates the federal definition of "overpayment11 
by specific reference to federal tax laws. Utah Code Ann. §59-
10-103(2) reads: 
"Any term used in this chapter has the same meaning as 
when used in comparable context in the laws of the United 
States relating to federal income taxes unless a different 
meaning is clearly required." 
"Overpayment" in the federal tax laws has been defined to 
include the payment of a tax later declared to be unlawful. 
Jones v. Liberty Glass Company, 332 U.S. 524 (1948). 
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The federal definition of "overpayment11 is consistent with 
the meaning used by the Utah State Tax Commission, when, in its 
press release of April 5, 1989 the tax commission directed 
federal retirees who wished to preserve f,any legal rights11 to 
file claims in the form of amended tax returns. This direction 
was followed by many members of the class. The commission 
later provided to federal retirees a simplified form, called a 
"protective claim11, under which the taxpayer circled the tax 
year for which he or she claimed a tax refund and which 
contained a notice with this instruction to federal retirees in 
bold print: 
"To protect claims for 1985 or 1986, this form or 
amended return (s) must be mailed to the Tax-
Commission by April 16, 1990. You may file this 
form for 1987 and 1988 at a later date, but it must 
be done within the three-year deadline." 
The "three-year deadline" referred to by the Utah State 
Tax Commission refers to the three-year claim period for 
refunds of overpayments under Utah Code Ann. §59-10-529(7). 
Defendants' contention that a six-month statute of limitations 
bars Plaintiffs1 claims is without merit. 
Section 59-10-529, Utah Code Ann., provides for the refund 
of any overpayment of state income tax, including the refunding 
of taxes paid as a result of an error in law. "If there is no 
tax liability for a period in which the amount is paid as 
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income tax, the amount is an overpayment.11 Utah Code Ann. §59-
10-529(12). A "liability" is a legal obligation. See Blacks 
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev., at p. 1059. Having determined 
Utah's tax scheme of Plaintiffs1 retirement pay to have been 
unlawful and unconstitutional in the years 1985 through 1988, 
this Court finds the amounts collected unlawfully to be 
"overpayments" entitling Plaintiffs to refunds. 
To deny Plaintiffs the opportunity of taking advantage of 
the refund process which the Utah legislature has granted to 
them would compound one illegal act with another. The State of 
Utah has consented to the refund of illegally collected taxes 
by inviting Plaintiffs to file a claim for refund within the 
three-year statute of limitations. This Plaintiffs have done. 
It certainly would be a delusion to require a 
taxpayer to pay the tax, seek a review, and if he 
prevails, not allow him to get it back. The most 
elemental principles of justice dictate the 
implication that if he pays the tax and follows the 
procedure set out in the . . . Tax Act, and is 
sustained in this contention that the tax is 
unlawful, it must be refunded. (Emphasis added). 
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 316 P. 2 d 
549, 552 (Utah 1957). 
Plaintiffs are entitled to income tax refunds for years 
1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. 
Because Utah provides a clear statutory remedy of refunds, 
this Court has not reached the issue of whether refunds should 
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be ordered as a breach of implied contract. If, however, a 
clear statutory remedy were not available, an implied contract 
as found in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565 
P.2d 778 (Utah 1977) would also apply here. 
IV. Refund of 1988 Taxes Paid Under Protest 
Plaintiffs have invoked Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301 as an 
alternative remedy for the 1988 tax year. That provision 
allows a party to pay a tax under protest and then sue for a 
refund in District Court. Any action against the officer who 
collected the tax paid under protest must be commenced within 
six months. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31. 
No particular form of protest is required to challenge an 
unlawful tax, and the protest need not be in writing. Murdock 
v. Murdock. 113 P. 330, 332 (Utah 1911). The essence of a 
protest is notice to the tax collector that the taxpayer deems 
the tax unlawful. 
Following announcement of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Davis v. Michigan. 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500 
(1989) on March 23, 1989, the Utah Tax Commission received 
hundreds of phone calls and letters from retirees concerning 
the issue. The Tax Commission instructed federal retirees 
through an April 5, 1989 press release to file amended returns 
if they wished to protect ,!any legal rights for any tax year 
- 15 -
oiia 
prior to 1989." Consequently, hundreds of retirees did so-
others filed individual claims for refund, filed written 
protests or noted their protest on their checks. On April 17, 
1989, the last day for filing 1988 returns, the representative 
Plaintiffs were among more than 3,000 who filed, through class 
counsel, written notices of claim and claims for refund on 
behalf of themselves and "all others similarly situated11. This 
Court finds these actions to be a sufficient protest for the 
1988 tax year. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint herein on June 9, 1989. 
This met the six month statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-31, and the Court rules for Plaintiffs on this issue. 
Defendants ask the Court to bar recovery to those members 
of the Plaintiff class who did not personally pay their taxes 
under protest. Presumably, these are primarily those taxpayers 
who paid their taxes prior to the time of the Davis decision. 
The Court sees no rational basis for penalizing those taxpayers 
who filed early. To do so would also ignore the law and 
consistent practice of the tax commission under which all 
returns "filed before the last day prescribed by statute . . . 




This ruling will extend to all members of the Plaintiff 
class. 
V. Retroactivity of Davis v. Michigan 
Defendants do not dispute that Utah's taxing scheme 
violated 4 U.S.C. §111 during the years 1985 through 1988. 
Defendants1 principal defense is that the U.S. Supreme Court's 
ruling in Davis v. Michigan cannot be applied retroactively to 
any tax year prior to 1989. 
In raising this argument, Defendants mistakenly assume 
that prospective-only treatment of the Davis decision will 
prohibit this Court from making its own independent analysis of 
4 U.S.C. §111, a statute enacted in 1939. Defendants would 
give no meaning or effect to the statute for the first fifty 
years of its existence because no court during that time ruled 
on its application to federal retirement pay. This approach is 
flawed. Even without the Davis opinion, this Court would find 
the State's actions in taxing Plaintiffs unlawful and 
unconstitutional. 
The federal doctrine of retroactivity is best understood 
as a rule of stare decisis; a rule to determine when law 
changing precedent will not be applied to prior acts. American 
Trucking Association v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990). 
Therefore, making Davis prospective-only would strip the case 
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of any precedential value in judging earlier tax years, but it 
would not end our inquiry. Neither this Court nor the State of 
Utah needed Davis to reveal that federal retirement pay is "pay 
or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee 
of the United States11 under 4 U.S.C. §111. Neither did Utah 
have any just basis for believing in the years 1985 through 
1989 that 4 U.S.C. §111 would allow it to discriminate against 
federal retirees because of the source of their retirement pay. 
Giving prospective-only treatment to Davis would not relieve 
Utah of its duty in 1985 through 1989 to conform its taxing 
practice to federal law and would not deprive Plaintiffs of 
their statutory right to refunds. 
But, Davis cannot be applied prospective-only. When the 
rules of federal retroactivity are properly applied, Davis must 
be accorded full retroactive effect. 
Defendants do not claim to have relied to their detriment 
on any prior court interpretation of 4 U.S.C. §111. Neither do 
they claim to have relied on their own contrary reading of 
§111. Indeed, the real surprise to the State seems to have 
been the existence of §111, not its interpretation. Reliance 
on the practice of twenty-two other states, if indeed Utah did 
so rely, is not the type of reliance protected by the federal 
retroactivity doctrine. No person and no government can be 
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excused by ignorance of the law, even widespread ignorance. 
11
. . . [MJunicipalities, like private individuals, [are] 
responsible for anticipating developments in the lav;.11 
McKesson, 110 S.Ct. at 2334. 
The federal doctrine of non-retroactivity is a rarely used 
approach reserved for unforeseen law-changing decisions. 
American Trucking, 110 S.Ct. at 2341. The first part of the 
three-part federal test for retroactivity limits prospective 
decision making to those new decisions which 
establish a new principle of law, either by 
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants 
may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed. 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, (1971). 
This first test, commonly called the "first prong1', is a 
threshold test which, if not met, will be dispositive of the 
issue. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Carvl . 110 S.Ct. 3202 (1990), 
United States v. Johnson. 457 U.S. 537, 550 n.12 (1981). To 
qualify for prospective-only treatment, a new decision must be 
so clearly unforeshadowed, so unforeseeable, that its departure 
from existing law can be termed "revolutionary." Ashland Oil 
Co. v. Carvl. 110 S.Ct. 3202, 3205, (1990). 
Because the clear reading of 4 U.S.C. §111 foreshadowed 
the result in Davis v. Michigan, the Davis decision fails to 
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meet the first "prong" of the Chevron test and must be applied 
retroactively. 
In so ruling, this Court is aware that some state courts 
have called Davis a "new principle of law." Every case in 
which the United States Supreme Court accepts certiorari will 
have elements of novelty, of "first impression", or newness. 
This is not the test. The issue is whether the Davis opinion 
so departs from the plain meaning of 4 U.S.C. §111 that its 
result was clearly unforeshadowed. In resolving this issue, 
the best authority is the U.S. Supreme Court itself, which 
found its opinion in Davis to be dictated by the "plain 
language of the statute", noting that the "overall meaning of 
§111 is unmistakable", answering arguments identical to those 
raised by Utah in this case by observing that "all precedent is 
to the contrary" and refusing to depart "from this settled 
rule." Davis v. Michigan, 109 S.Ct. at 1504-1507. The final 
arbiter of the retroactivity of a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
is the U.S. Supreme Court. American Trucking, 110 S.Ct at 
2330. This Court is of the firm opinion that the U.S. Supreme 
Court would not view its decision in Davis as "unforeshadowed." 
Any doubt on that issue should have been dispelled when the 
Supreme Court refused to accept certiorari in the Missouri 
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case, upholding refunds. Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771 
S.W.2d 77 (Mo. banc 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 718 (1990). 
This Court has considered Utah's arguments that refunds in 
this case will place a great financial burden on the state 
treasury. A decision's impact on any litigant who comes before 
this Court is always a concern. But, the equities between the 
parties in this case, however they may lie, are not proper 
considerations in deciding whether to apply Davis 
retroactively. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said: 
Where a State can easily foresee the 
invalidation of its tax statutes, its reliance 
interests may merit little concern, see McKesson, 
U.S., at , , 110 S.Ct. 2238 at 2254-
2255, 2257. 
American Trucking Association 110 S.Ct. at 233 3. 
. . . the State's interest in financial stability-
does not justify a refusal to provide relief. 
McKesson, 110 S.Ct. at 2257. 
We reject respondent's intimation that the cost of 
any refund considered by the State might justify a 
decision to withhold it. . . . [A] State . 
cannot object to a refund here just because it has 
other ideas about how to spend the funds. 
Id. at 2257, n.35. 
Having found that the State acted unlawfully and 
unconstitutionally in taxing federal retirees, this Court is 
bound as a matter of federal due process to compel the State to 
issue refunds according to its plain statutory remedy. 
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In making this ruling, the Court does not find that the 
State of Utah acted in bad faith or intentional disregard of 
federal law when it exempted its own retirees from income tax. 
Indeed, the State seems to have simply overlooked the federal 
statute. But, this Court is of the opinion that the State has 
acted ignobly in refusing to pay refunds to retirees once the 
State's mistake was known. As an Arizona court has said, nNo 
honorable governmental would keep taxes to which it is not 
entitled, and the legislative scheme supports that result." 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal v. Dept. of Rev. . 776 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. 
1989). 
Partial Summary Judgment 
From the foregoing facts and conclusions, the Court: 
1. Declares Utah's taxing scheme contained in §§49-1-28, 
49-10-47, 49-1-608 during the years 1985 through 1988 to have 
been in violation of 4 U.S.C §111 and unconstitutional in that 
it discriminated against Plaintiffs and violated the 
constitutional doctrine of the sovereign immunity of the United 
States. 
2. Declares Utah Code Ann. §59-10-529 to be an 
appropriate remedy mandating refunds to Plaintiffs for the 1985 
through 1988 tax years and Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301 to be an 
additional remedy for the 1988 tax year. 
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3. Orders and compels the Utah State Tax Commission to 
issue refunds to all persons and estates of deceased persons 
who paid Utah State income tax on retirement income from 
federal sources in the years 1985, 1986, 1987 and/or 1988. 
4. Further orders the payment of interest on all 
refunds at 12% per annum in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §59-
10-538, 1987 as amended, with interest accruing ninety (90) 
days after the due date of each return, or the date each return 
was filed, whichever date is later, and continuing to a date 
not more than thirty (30) days preceding the issuance of refund 
checks to each member of the Plaintiff class. 
5. Further orders Defendants to pay Plaintiffs1 court 
costs and attorneys' fees in amounts to be determined later. 
6. Further orders the parties to design and implement a 
simplified procedure for the filing of individual returns, the 
computing of refunds owed and the paying of refunds, with costs 
to be paid by Defendants. 
7. Denies Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court specifically reserves for a final decision these 
issues: 
1. The timing and content of notice(s) to the Plaintiff 
class concerning class members' rights and the procedure to 
obtain refunds, and all matters relevant to this issue. 
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2. The amount of Plaintiffs' court costs and attorneys1 
fees to be paid by Defendants to the class and/or to be charged 
to the class, and all matters relevant to a proper 
determination of these issues. 
3. Approval of the parties1 simplified plan and 
procedure for filing individual returns, and the computing and 
paying of refunds, and all matters relevant to this issue. 
Because the Court's reservation of certain issues 
necessitates a partial summary judgment at this time, the Court 
specifically directs, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the entry of final judgment on all issues 
decided and not specifically reserved, there being no just 
reason for delay. 
DATED this /£^*day of AP£(C , 1991. 
BY: 
DAVID S . 
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Opinion of the Court **& U. **• 
The text of Kule Ike) contains no hint that a governmental 
violation of iU preacriutioiiii gives rise to a right not to Ktancl 
trial. To be sure, we held laat Term in Hank of Nova Scotia 
v. United State*, 487 U. S. 250. 2li3 (1U8H), that a district 
court has authority in certain circumstances to dismiss an in-
dictment for violations of Kule 6(e). Hut as just noted, that 
has nothing to do with a "right not to be tried" in the aenae 
relevant here. 
As for the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
that reads in relevant part as follows: "No |>ersoii shall be 
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U. S. 
Const., Amdt. 5. That does indeed confer a right not to lie 
tried (in the pertinent sense) when there is no grand jury in-
dictment. Undoubtedly the common-law protections tradi-
tionally associated with the grand jury attach to the grand 
jury required by this provision—including the requisite se-
crecy of grand jury proceedings. Hut that is far from saying 
that every violation of those protections, like the lack of a 
grand jury indictment itaelf, gives rise to a right not to be 
tried. We have held that even the grand jury's violation of 
the defendant's right against self incrimination does not trig-
ger the Grand Jury Clause's "right not to be tried." Uiwn v. 
United State*, 356 U. S. 339, 349 (1958). Only a defect so 
fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a 
grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment, 
gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried. An iso-
lated breach of the traditional secrecy requirements does not 
do so. 
• • • 
For these reasons, the Court of Ap|»eals was correct to 
grant the Government's motion to dismiss the appeal, and ita 
judgment is 
Ajfirmed. 
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In each of the yearti I97U through 1984, appellant, a Michigan resident and 
former federal employee, paid slate income tax on his federal retirement 
henetUa in accordance with the Michigan Income Tax Act, which ex-
eniplM from ta nation ail retirement benefit* |»aid by the State or Us |*ohti-
cal subdivisions, but taxes retirement benelUa paid by other employer*, 
including the Federal Government. After tlie Stale denied appellanl'a 
rv«|u*Hl for refund*, he tiled auil in the Michigan Court of Claima, alleg-
ing that the Stale's inconaiHleiil treatment of retirement beneftla vio-
lated t U S. C 111 I, which authorise a Slalea to tax "pay or conipensa-
lion for personal aervicea aa I a federal | officer or employee . . . . if Hie 
taxation doea not diacriminate against the . . . employee becauae of the 
aource of the pay or compensation " The Court of Claima denied relief, 
and the Michigan Court of Appeala affirmed, ruling that appellant la an 
"annuitant" under federal law rather than an "employee" within the 
meaning of 4 III, and that that aection therefore haa no application to 
him. The Court of Ap|>eala alao held that the doctrine of intergovern-
mental tax immunity did not rentier the Slale'a diacrimmatory tax 
at heme unconstitutional, since the diacrinuiialion waa justified under a 
rational hams teat: The State a intereat in at I railing and retaining quali-
fied employeea waa a legitimate objective which waa rationally achieved 
by a retirement plan offering econouuc mducemenla. 
Held 
I. Section 111 applies to federal retirees auch aa appellant. The 
State's contention that the section is limited to current federal employ-
eea la refuted by the plain language of the statute's first clause. Since 
the amount of civil service retirement benefits is baaed and computed 
upon an individual's salary and years of service, it representa deferred 
com|»enaatioii for service to the Government, and therefore conatitutes 
"pay or compenaalion . . . as |a federal| employee" within the meaning of 
that clause. Hie State's contention that, since this quoted language 
doea not occur in the statute's second, nondiscrimination clause, that 
clause applies only to current employees, ta hypertechmcal and fails to 
read the nondiscrimination clause in ita context within the overall atatu-
lory ache me. The reference to ~tk* pay or compensation" in the latter 
clause must, in context, mean the same "pay or compeiuiaUon'' denned in 
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the aection'a And clauae ami I HUB includeH retirement benehta. The 
State'a reading of the clause ia implauadde becauae it ia unlikely that 
Congreaa ronaented tu diacrimtuatory taxation of retired federal civil 
aervanta' pensions while refuamg to |*ermil auch taxation of current em 
ployeea, and there ia nothing in the atalutory language ur legislative lua-
lory tu auggenl auch a reaull. Pp 808-HIO 
2. Section l i lt* language, purpoae, and legudative history establish 
that the scope of I U nondiHcrinunation clause's grant or retention of lim-
ited tax immunity for federal employee** in coextensive with, and must be 
determined by reference to, the prohibition against discriminatory taxes 
embodied in the modem conatituUonai doctrine of intergovernmental lax 
immunity. I V 810-814. 
3. Michigan a tax scheme viola tea principles of intergovernmental tax 
immunity by favoring retired alate and local government employee** over 
retired federal employeea. Pp. 814-817. 
(a) The State'a contention that appellant ia not entitled to claim the 
protection of the immunity doctrine ia without merit. Although the doc-
trine ia baaed on the need to protect each aovereign'a government*! oper-
ation* from undue interference by another aovereign, thia Court's prece-
denta establish tlmt private entitiea or indivMluala who are subjected to 
diacriminatory taxation on account of their dealing!* with a aovereign can 
themaelvea receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine. See, 
for example, I'htlltps Clunmcal Co. v. Dumus Independent School Uiaf-, 
961 U. S 376, 387. Pp. 814-816. 
(b) In determining whether the State's inconaiatent tax treatment 
of federal and atale retiree a ia permissible, the relevant inquiry ia 
whether the inconsistency ia directly related to and juntitled by "sigmn-
cant differencea between the two classes." PAil/ip*. aupro. at 384-386. 
Tlie State'a claimed intereal in hiring qualified civil aervanta through the 
inducement of a tax exemption for retirement beneflta ia irrelevant to 
thia inquiry, ainee it merely demonalratea thai the State haa a rational 
reaaon for diacriimnating between two ainular groupa of retireea with-
out demonstrating any differencea between thoae groups them*elvea. 
Moreover, the State'a claim that ita retirement benHilu are significantly 
leaa mumflcent than federal beneflta in temia of vesting requirements, 
rate of accrual, and benefit computations ia inaufticient to juatify the 
type of blanket exemption at itmue here. A tax exemption truly in 
tended to account for differencea in beneflta would not diacrunmate on 
the baaia of like aource of thoae lieneftta, but would, rather, discriminate 
on the baaia of the amount of benellta received by individual retireea. 
Pp. 816-817. 
4. Hecauae the State concedes that a refund ia appropriate in theae 
circunialaiicea, appellant ia enUlled to a refund tu the extent he haa paid 
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taxes pursuant to the invalid Michigan acheme. However, hia additional 
tiuim for pros|iective relief from diacriminatory taxation ahould be de-
cided by the stale courts, whom- s|iecial expertise in state law pula them 
in 4 better |M>HIIIOII than this Court to fashion the remedy moat appropri-
ate to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal treatment. 
Pp 817-818. 
106 Mich. App. 1*8, 408 N. W. 2d 433, reveraed and remanded. 
KCNNCDY. J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KEHNQUIST. 
C J , and HKLNNAN, Wiin t , MAK.HIIALL, HLACKMUN, O'CONNOM, and 
SCAMA, JJ , joined. SrtvtNS, J., tiled a diaaenting opinion, post, p. 818 
Paul S. Davis, pro se, argued the cause and filed briefa fur 
appellant. 
Michael K Kellogg argued the cause for the United Statea 
an amicus curiae urging re vernal. With him on the brief 
were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General 
Hose, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Uaind English Car-
vuick, and Steven W. Parks. 
Thonuis L. Casey, Assistant Solicitor General of Michigan, 
argued the cause for ap|>ellee. With him on the brief were 
Frunk J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solici-
tor General, and Richard U Hoesch and Ross H. Bishop, As-
sistant Attorneys General. * 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The State of Michigan exempts from taxation ail retire-
ment benefits paid by the State or its political subdivisions, 
but levies an income tax on retirement benellta paid by all 
other employers, including the Federal Government. The 
question presented by this case ia whether Michigan's tax 
scheme violates federal law. 
I 
Appellant Paul S. Davis, a Michigan resident, ia a former 
employee of the United Statea Government. He receives re-
•Joteph H Scott and Michael J. KaUtr filed a brief for the National Aa-
aociation of Hetired Federal Employeea aa amicus curias urging reversal. 
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tirement benefits pursuant to the Civil Service Retirement 
Art, 5 U. S. C. §8331 rl neq In each of the years 1979 
through 1984, ap|»ellant paid Michigan .state income tax on Inn 
federal retirement benefits in accordance with Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §200.3(Kl)(f) (Supp. 1988).1 That statute defines 
taxable income in a manner that excludes all retirement 
benefits received from the State or its |>olitical subdivisions, 
but includes most other forms of retirement benefits* The 
effect of this definition is that the retirement benefits of re-
tired state employees are exempt from state taxation while 
the benefits received by retired federal employees are not. 
In 1984, ap|>cllant |»etitioned for refunds of state taxes paid 
on his federal retirement benefits between 1979 and 1983. 
After his request was denied, appellant filed suit in the Mich-
igan Court of Claims. Appellant's complaint, which was 
amended to include the 1984 tax year, averred that his fed-
eral retirement benefits were "not legally taxable under 
1
 Aa a reault of a aeriea of amendmenta, this auboection haa been van 
oualy detiiKnated aa (IMf), (IMg), MM! (1Kb) at tunea relevant to thia htiga-
tton. Tlua opinion will refer only to the current atatulory designation, 
|20ti30UXf) 
* In pertinent part, the atatute providea: 
"(I) 'Taxable income'. . . menu* adjuated groaa income aa denned in the 
internal revenue code aubject to the following aujuatmenU: 
"(f) Deduct to the eitent included in miiusled KTOHM income: 
M<il lietireinent or pentnon benefUa received from * |»uhlic retirement 
ayatem of or created by an act of thia atate or a political imbdiviaton of that 
•tale. 
"(iv) Ketirement or penaion benefit* from any other retirement or pen-
sion ayatem aa folioWB 
"(A) For a Hingle return, the aum of not more than I7.&00 00. 
"(H) For a joint return, the aum of not more than J 10,000 00." Mich. 
Comp. Lawa Ann. t a x i 30(1 Mf) (Supp. PJHM). 
Kubaection (f Hiv> of thia provimon enempta a portion of otherwiae taxable 
retirement benefit a from taxable income, but appellant'* retirement pay 
from all nonatate aourcen exceeded the applicable exemption amount in 
each of the tax yearn relevant to thia caae. 
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the Michigan Income Tax Law" and that the State's incon-
sistent treatment of state and federal retirement benefits din-
er immated against federal retirees in violation of 4 U. S. C. 
§111, which preserves federal employees' immunity from dis-
criminatory state taxation. See Public Salary Tax Act of 
1939, ch. 59, §4, 53 Stat. 575, codified, as amended, at 4 
II. S. C. § 111. The Court of Claims, however, denied relief. 
No. 84-9451 (Oct. 30, 11185), App. to Juris. Statement A10. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. 100 Mich. App. 
98, 408 N. W. 2d 4:i:i (1987). The court Ikrst rejected appel-
lant's claim that 4 U. S. C. § 111 invalidated the State's tax 
on appellant's federal benefits. Noting that 6111 applies 
only to federal "employees," the court determined that appel-
lant's status under federal law was that of an "annuitant" 
ntther than an employee. As a consequence, the court con-
cluded that §111 "has no application to | Davis |, since |he| 
cannot be considered an employee within the meaning of that 
act." Id., at 104. 408 N. W. 2d, at 435. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals next rejected ap|>ellant'a 
contention that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immu-
nity rendered the State's tax treatment of federal retirement 
benefits unconstitutional. Conceding that "a tax may be 
held invalid . . . if it o|*erates to discriminate against the fed-
eral government and those with whom it deals," id., at 104, 
408 N. W. 2d, at 430, the court examined the State's justifi-
cations for the discrimination under a rational-basis test. 
Ibid. The court determined that the State's interest in "at-
tracting and retaining . . . qualified employees" was a "legiti-
mate state objective which is rationally achieved by a retire-
ment plan offering economic inducements," and it upheld the 
statute. Id , at 105, 408 N. W. 2d, at 430. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan denied ap|>el-
lant's application for leave to appeal. 429 Mich. 854 (1987). 
We noted probable jurisdiction. 487 U. S. 1217 (1988). 
mm 
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II 
Appellant placea principal reliance on 4 U. S. C. § 111. In 
relevant part, that section provides: 
"The United States consent* to the taxation of pay or 
com|>ensation for |>ersonal service as an officer or em-
ployee of the United States . . . by a duly constituted 
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does 
not discriminate against the officer or employee because 
of the source of the pay or compensation." 
As a threshold matter, the State argues that § 111 applies 
only to current employees of the Federal Government, not to 
retirees such as ap|»ellant. In our view, however, the plain 
language of the statute dictates the opposite conclusion. 
Section HI by its terms applies to "the taxation of pay or 
compensation for perianal services on an officer or employee 
of the United States." (Emphasis added). While retire-
ment pay is not actually disbursed during the time an individ-
ual is working for the Government, the amount of benefits to 
be received in retirement is based and computed upon the in-
dividual's salary and years of service. 5 U. S. C. §833lKa). 
We have no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement 
benefits are deferred com|>ensation for past years of service 
rendered to the Government. See, e. y., Zucker v. United 
State*, 758 F. 2d 637, £i«J (CA Fed), cert, denied, 474 U. S. 
842 (1H85); Kuan v. Webtter, 227 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 339, 
707 F. 2d 624, Ki4», 0»83), cert, denied, 4<>4 U. S. 1042 (1984); 
Clar* v. United States, 6U1 F. 2d 837, 842 (CA7 l'J82). And 
because these benefits accrue to employees on account of 
their service to the Government, they fall squarely within the 
category of com|>enaatioii for services rendered "as an officer 
or employee of the United States." Appellant's federal re-
tirement benefits are deferred compensation earned "as" a 
federal employee, and so are subject to § 111.1 
•The S u t e •uggenU that the legittlative hinlory does not aupport thin 
interpretation of I 111, pointing to atntemenU in tine Committee KeporU 
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The Stale points out, however, that the reference to "com-
pensation for personal services a* an officer or employee" oc-
curs in the first part of § 111, which defines the extent of Con 
gress' consent to state taxation, and not in the latter part of 
the section, which provides that the consent does not extend 
to taxes that discriminate against federal employees. In-
stead, the nondiscrimination clause speaks only in terms of 
"discrimination| against the officer or employee because of 
the source of the pay or compensation." From this the State 
concludes that, whatever the scope of Congress' consent to 
taxation in the first |>ortion of $111, the nondiscrimination 
clau.se applies only to current federal employees. 
Although the State's hypertechiiical reading of the nondis-
crimination clause is not inconsistent with the language of 
that provision examined in isolation, statutory language can-
not be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of 
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be 
read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme. See United States v. Morton, 467 
U. S. 822, 828 (HI84). When the first part of § 111 is read 
together with the nondiscrimination clause, the operative 
words of the statute are as follows: "The United States con-
sents to the taxation of pay or compensation . . . if the tax-
ation (Ities not discriminate . . . because of the source of the 
pay or compensation." The reference to "the pay or com-
|M*nsalion" in the last clause of 8 111 must, iu context, mean 
the same "pay or conifieiisation" defined in the first part of 
the section. Since that "pay or coni|>ensation" includes re-
tirement benefits, the nondiscrimination clause must include 
them as well. 
that describe the ncope of 9 111 without uaing the phnute "nervice at* an offi-
cer or employee." The UuiguuKe of the Mtatute leaves no room for tfoubt on 
Hut* |HMIII, however, no ttie Stale'* Mttenipt to eulabhah a minor ineonaia-
temy with the legislative history need not detain UH f^gn»lmive hitttory 
iu irrelevant to the interpretation of tut uiutmhiguou* alalule. Untied Air 
Lu«: Inc. v. AfcAfunn, 434 U. S. ltt£, MKHIOT). 
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Any other interpretation of the nondiscrimination clause 
would be implausible at beat. It is difficult to imagine that 
Congress consented to discriminatory taxation of the |HII 
sions of retired federal civil servant* while refusing to permit 
such taxation of current employees, and nothing in the statu-
tory language or even in the legislative history suggests this 
result. While Congress could |>erhaps have used more pre-
cise language, the overall meaning of § 111 is unmistakable: it 
waives whatever immunity past and present federal employ-
ees would otherwise enjoy from state taxation of salaries, re-
tirement benefits, and other forma of com|>ensation paid on 
account of their employment with the Federal (government, 
except to the extent that such taxation discriminates on ac-
count of the source of the compensation. 
Ill 
Section 111 was enacted aa part of the Public Salary Tax 
Act of 1939, the primary purpose of which was to im|>ose 
federal income tax on the salaries of all state and local 
government employees. Prior to adoption of the Act, sala-
ries of most government employees, both state ami federal, 
generally were thought to be exempt from taxation by an-
other sovereign under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity. This doctrine had its genesis iu McCullttch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), which held that the State of 
Maryland could not impose a discriminatory tax on the Hank 
of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for 
the Court reasoned that the Bank was an instrumentality 
of the Federal Government used to carry into effect the 
Government's delegated powers, and taxation by the State 
would unconstitutionally interfere with the exercise of those 
powers. Id., at 42b-437. 
For a time, McCulloch was read broadly to bar most tax-
ation by one sovereign of the employees of another. See 
Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124-128 (1871) (invalidating 
federal income tax on salary of state judge); Dobbin* v. Com-
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mtssioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842) (invalidating 
state tax on federul officer). This rule "was based on the ra-
tionale that any tax on income a party received under a con-
tract with the government was a tax on the contract and thus 
a tax W the government because it burdened the govern-
ment's power to enter into the contract." South Carolina v. 
tiaker, 485 U. S. 605, 618 (1988). 
In subsequent cases, however, the Court began to turn 
away from its more expansive applications of the immunity 
doctrine. Thus, in llelveruuj v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 406 
(1938), the Court held that the Federal Government could 
levy nondiscriminatory taxes on the incomes of most state 
employees. The following year. Graves v. New York ex rel. 
O'Keefe, 306 II. S. 466, 486-487 (1939), overruled the Day-
LMtbbins line of cases that had exempted government employ-
ees from nondiscriminatory taxation. After Graven, there-
fore, intergovernmental tax immunity barred only those 
taxes that were iui|»oscd directly on one sovereign by the 
other or that discriminated against a sovereign or thoae with 
whom it dealt. 
It was in the midst of this judicial revision of the immunity 
doctrine that Congress decided to extend the federal income 
tax to state and local government employees. The Public 
Salary Tax Act was enacted after Helveruig v. Gerhardt, 
supra, had upheld the imposition of federal income taxes on 
state civil servants, and Congress relied on that decision aa 
support for its broad assertion of federal taxing authority. 
S. Hep. No. 112, 76th Cong., 1st Seas., 6-9 (1939); II. K. 
Kep. No. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1939). However, 
the Act waa drafted, considered in Committee, and pasaed by 
the House of Representatives before the announcement of 
the decision in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, supra, 
which for the first time permitted state taxation of federal 
employees. As a result, during most of the legislative proc-
ess leading to adoption of the Act it was unclear whether 
state taxation of federal employees was still barred by inter-
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governmental tax immunity despite the abrogation of utate 
employees' immunity from federal taxation. See H. It. Hep. 
No. 2ti, supra, at 2 ("There are certain indications in the ea.se 
of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 31b* (1819), . . . that 
. . . Federal officers and employeea may not, without the 
consent of the United Statea, be aubjected to income taxation 
under the authority of the varioua Statea"). 
Dissatisfied with thia uncertain atate of affairs, and con-
cerned that conaiderationa of faimeaa demanded equal tax 
treatment for atate and federal employeea, Congress decided 
to enaure that federal employeea would not remain immune 
from atate taxation at the aame time that atate government 
employeea were being required to pay federal income taxea. 
See S. Hep. No. 112, supra, at 4; H. It. Hep. No. 2fi, supra, 
at 2. Accordingly, §4 of the propoaed Act (now §111) 
expressly waived whatever immunity would have other-
wise shielded federal employeea from nondiscriminatory atate 
taxea. 
liy the time the statute waa enacted, of course, the decision 
in Graven had been announced, ao the constitutional immunity 
doctrine no longer proscribed nondiscriminatory atate tax-
ation of federal employeea. In effect, § 111 simply codified 
the result in Graven and forecloaed the possibility that subse-
quent judicial reconsideration of that caae might reestablish 
the broader interpretation of the immunity doctrine. 
Section 111 did not waive all as|>ects of intergovernmental 
tax immunity, however. The Anal clauae of the aection con-
tains an exception for state taxes that discriminate against 
federal employees on the baaia of the source of their com-
pensation. Thia nondiscrimination clause closely parallels 
the nondiscrimination component of the constitutional immu-
nity doctrine which has, from the time of McCulloch v. 
Maryland, barred taxea that "ope rati el HO aa to discriminate 
against the (Government or those with whom it deals." 
United Statea v. City oj Detroit, 365 U. S. 4M, 473 (I9JV8). 
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, at 436-437; Miller 
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v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 714-716 (1927); Helvering v. 
Gerhardt, supra, at 413; Phillips Chemical Co. v. Duma* In-
depetulent Schoul Ihst., 3bl U. S. 37<i, 386 (l%0); Memphis 
Hank *fc Trust Co. v. Garner, 469 U. S. 392, 397, and n. 7 
(1983). 
In view of the similarity of language and purpose between 
the constitutional principle of nondiacrinuiiation and the stat-
utory nondiscrimination clauae, and given that S i l l was con-
sciously drafted against the background of the Court's tax 
immunity cases, it ia reasonable to conclude that Congress 
drew upon the constitutional doctrine in defining the scope of 
the immunity retained in §111. When Congress codifies a 
judicially defined concept, it in presumed, absent an express 
statement to the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt 
the interpretation placed on that concept by the courts. See 
Mat tan tic National Hank v. New Jersey l)ept. of Environ-
mental l*rotectum, 474 U. S. 494, 601 (1986); MorissetU v. 
United States, 342 U. S. 24(i, 2G3 (1962). Hence, we con-
clude that the retention of immunity in §111 is coextensive 
with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in 
the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity. Cf. Memphis Hank & Trust, supra, at 396-397 
(construing 31 U. S. C. §742, which permits only **'nondis-
criminatory'" atate taxation of interest on federal obliga-
tions, as "principally a restatement of the constitutional 
rule"). 
On its face, § 111 purports to be nothing more than a partial 
congressional consent to nondiscriminatory atate taxation of 
federal employees. It can be argued, however, that by neg-
ative implication § 111 also constitutes an affirmative statu-
tory grant of immunity from discriminatory state taxation in 
addition to, and coextensive with, the pre-existing protec-
tion afforded by the constitutional doctrine. Hegardless of 
whether § 111 provides an iiule|»endent basis for finding im-
munity or merely preserves the traditional constitutional 
prohibition against discriminatory taxes, however, the in-
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<|iiiry IK the same. In either case, the sco|>e of the immu-
nity granted
 ( )r retained by the nondiscrimination clause is to 
lie determined by reference to the constitutional doctrine. 
Thus, the disfiosttive question in this case is whether the tax 
ini|>osed on appellant is barred by the doctrine of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity. 
IV 
It is undisputed that Michigan's tax system discriminates 
in favor of retired state employees and against retired federal 
employees. The State argues, however, that apfM'llant is 
not entitled to claim the protection of the immunity doctrine, 
and that in any event the State's inconsistent treatment of 
Federal and State Government retirees is justified by mean-
ingful differences between the two classes. 
A 
In support of its first contention, the State |»oints out that 
the purpose of the immunity doctrine is to protect govern-
ments and not private entities or individuals. As a result, so 
long as the challenged tax does not interfere with the Federal 
Government's ability to perform its governmental functions, 
the constitutional doctrine has not been violated. 
It is true that intergovernmental tax immunity is based on 
the need to protect each sovereign's governmental operations 
from undue interference by the other. Graves, 3(M* U. S., at 
481; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 435-4:M>. Hut it 
does not follow that private entities or individuals who are 
subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their deal-
ings with a sovereign cannot themselves receive the protec-
tion of the constitutional doctrine. Indeed, all precedent is 
to the contrary. In Phillips Chemical Co., supra, for exam-
ple, we considered a private corporation's claim that a state 
tax discriminated against private lessees of federal land. 
We concluded that the tax "discriminate!d| unconstitutionally 
against the United States and its leasee/' and accordingly 
held that the tax could not be exacted. 3ul U. S., at 387 
DAVIS v. MICHIGAN DEIT. OF TKKASUKY 816 
KOa Opinion of the Court 
(emphasis added). See also Memphis Bank & Trust, supra; 
Muxes iAike Monies, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U. S. 744 
(ItHil); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871); lk»blnns v. 
Commissioners of Erie County, Jti IVt. 435 (\H42). The 
State offers no reasons for departing from this settled rule, 
and we decline to do so.4 
B 
Under our precedents, M|t|he imposition of a heavier tax 
burden on (those who deal with one sovereign] than in un-
•The dissent argues that this tax in nondiscriminatory, and thus con-
atilulioiutl. becaune it "(IITIWB no distinction between the federal employ-
era or retirees ami the vast majority of voter* in the State." / W , at H£l. 
In PhUltp» Chtmual Co., however, we fared that precise aituation: an 
e«juai tax burden was imposed on lessees of private, tax-exempt property 
and lessee* of federal property, while lessees of state property paid a 
lesser tax, or in some circumstance* none mt all. Although we concluded 
that "|u|nder these circumstances, there appeara to he no discrimination 
hetweeu the Government's leasees and lessees of private property," 3tll 
II. S , at 381, we nonetheless invalidated the States tax. This result ta 
consistent with the underlying rationale for the doctrine of intergovern-
mental tax immunity. The danger that a State ia engaging in impermissi-
ble discrimination against the Federal Government i* greatest when the 
State acts to benefit itself and those in privily with it. As we observed ia 
/'AiMips Clurtmcul Co , "it does not seem loo much to require that the 
State treat those who deal with the Government aa well aa it treat* those 
with whom it deals itself.** id , at 3Mb. 
We also take issue with the dissent's assertion that **it is peculiarly inap-
propriate to focus solely on the treatment of state governmental employ-
ees" because **|t|he State may always compensate in pay or salary for what 
it assesses in taxes." Pott, at M24. In order to provide the same after-
tax benefits to all retired slate employees by means of increased salaries or 
benefit payments instead of a lax exemption, the State would have to in-
crease its outlays by more than the cost of the current tax exemption, since 
the increased payments to retirees would result in higher federal income 
tax payments in some circumstances This fact serves to illustrate the im-
pact on the Federal Government of the State's discriminatory tax exemp-
tion for state retirees. Taxes enacted to reduce the Stale's employment 
costs si the expense of the feileral treasury are the type of discriminatory 
legi.ilalion that the doctrine of intergovernmental lax immunity is intended 
to bar. 
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|>osed on | those who deal with the other| must be justified 
by significant differences between the two classes." /Vul-
hpH Clutmical Co. v. Dumas Independent Sellout l>ist.t 3t»| 
I). S., at 383. In determining whether this standard of jus-
tification has been met, it is inappropriate to rely solely on 
the mode of analysis developed in our equal protection cases. 
We have previously observed that Mour decisions in (the 
equal protection) field are not necessarily controlling where 
problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved," 
because "the Government'!) interests must be weighed in the 
balance." Id , at 386. Instead, the relevant inquiry is 
whether the inconsistent tax treatment is directly related to, 
and justified by, "significant differences between the two 
classes." Id., at 383-385. 
The State points to two allegedly significant differences 
between federal and state retirees. First, the State sug-
gests that its interest in hiring and retaining qualified civil 
servants through the inducement of a tax exemption for re-
tirement benefits is sufttcient to justify the preferential treat-
ment of its retired employees. This argument is wholly be-
side the point, however, for it does nothing to demonstrate 
that there are "significant differences between the two 
classes" themselves; rather, it merely demonstrates that the 
State has a rational reason for discriminating between two 
similar groups of retirees. The State's interest in adopting 
the discriminatory tax, no matter how substantial, is simply 
irrelevant to an inquiry into the nature of the two classes re-
ceiving inconsistent treatment. See id.\ at 384. 
Second, the State argues that its retirement benefits are 
significantly less munificent than those offered by the Fed-
eral Government, in terms of vesting requirements, rate of 
accrual, and computation of benefit amounts. The substan-
tial differences in the value of the retirement benefits paid 
the two classes should, in the State's view, justify the incon-
sistent tax treatment. 
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Fven assuming the State's estimate of the relative value of 
slate and federal retirement benefits is generally correct, we 
do not believe this difference suffices to justify the type of 
blanket exemption at issue in this case. While the average 
retired federal civil servant receives a larger pension than his 
state counterpart, there are undoubtedly many individual in-
stances in which the opposite holds true. A tax exemption 
truly intended to account for differences in retirement bene-
fits would not discriminate on the basis of the source of those 
benefits, as Michigan's statute does; rather, it would dis-
criminate on the basis of the amount of benefits received by 
individual retirees. Cf. I'hilhps Chemical Co., suyra, at 
384-385 (rejecting proffered rationale for State's unfavorable 
tax treatment of lessees of federal pro|ierty, because an 
evenhanded application of the rationale would have resulted 
in inclusion of some lessees of State property in the disfa-
vored class as well). 
V 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Michigan Income 
Tax Act violates principles of intergovernmental tax immu-
nity by favoring retired state and local government employ-
ees over retired federal employees. The State having con-
ceded that a refund is appropriate in these circumstances, see 
Brief for Appellee (J3, to the extent appellant has paid taxes 
pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is entitled to a refund. 
See Iowa De* Moines bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 247 
(1931). 
Ap|>ellant also seeks prospective relief from discriminatory 
taxation. With respect to this claim, however, we are not 
in the best position to ascertain the appropriate remedy. 
While invalidation of Michigan's income tax law in its entirety 
obviously would eliminate the constitutional violation, the 
Constitution does not require such a drastic solution. We 
have recognized, in cases involving invalid classifications in 
the distribution of government benefits, that the appropriate 
remedy "is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be 
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accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored 
class as well aa by extension of benefits to the excluded 
class." Heckler v. Mathews, 406 U. S. 728, 740 (1984). See 
lowa-Des Moines Hank, supra, at 247; nee also Welsh v. 
United Stale*, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in judgment). 
In this caae, appellant's claim could be resolved either by 
extending the tax exemption to retired federal employees (or 
to all retired employees), or by eliminating the exemption for 
retired state and local government employees. The latter 
approach, of course, could be construed as the direct imposi-
tion of a state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal 
court. See Moses Lake Home*, Inc. v. Grant County, 3<i6 
U. S., at 762 ("Federal courta may not assess or levy taxes"). 
The permissibility of either approach, moreover, depends in 
part on the aeverability of a portion of § 206.30(1 Kf) from the 
remainder of the Michigan Income Tax Act, a question of 
state law within the special expertise of the Michigan courta. 
See lAmi* K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 2SS U. S. 617, 640-641 
(19:13). It follows that the Michigan courts are in the best 
position to determine how to comply with the mandate of 
equal treatment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed, and the case ia remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with thia opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The States can tax federal employees or private parties 
who do business with the United States so long as the tax 
does not discriminate against the United States. South Car-
olina v. Haker, 486 U. S. 606, 523 (1988); United Stales v. 
County of Fresno, 429 U. S. 462, 462 (1977). The Court 
today strikes down a state tax that applies equally to the 
vast majority of Michigan residents, including federal em-
ployees, because it treats retired state employees differently 
from retired federal employees. The Court'a holding is not 
supported by the rationale for the intergovernmental iinmu-
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nity doctrine and is not compiled by our previoua decisions. 
1 cannot join the unjustified, court-imposed restriction on a 
State's power to administer its own affairs. 
The constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immu-
nity, Justice Frankfurter explained, 'Minds its explanation 
and justification . . . in avoiding the potentialities of friction 
and furthering the smooth operation of complicated govern-
mental machinery." City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 366 
U. S. 489, 604 (1968). To protect the smooth operation of 
dual governments in a federal system, it was at one time 
thought necessary to prohibit state taxation of the salaries 
of officers and employees of the United States, Dobbins v. 
Commissioners of tine County, 16 Pet. 436 (1842), aa well aa 
federal taxation of the salaries of state officials. Collector 
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871). The Court has since forsworn 
audi "wooden formalism." Washington v. United States, 
400 U. S. 630, 644 (1983). 
The nondiscrimination rule recognizes the fact that the Fed-
eral Government had no voice in the policy decisions made 
by the several States. The Federal Government's protection 
against state taxation that singles out federal agencies for 
s|»ccia! burdens is therefore provided by the Supremacy 
Clause of the Federal Constitution, the doctrine of inter-
governmental tax immunity, and statutes auch aa 4 U. S. C. 
§111/ When the tax burden is shared equally by federal 
agenta and the vast majority of a State's citizens, however, 
the nondiscrimination principle ia not applicable and constitu-
tional protection is not necessary. Aa the Court explained in 
United States v. County of Fresno: 
'The legislative hiatory of 4 U. S. C. f i l l correctly describe* the pur-
pooe of tl»e nondiscrimination principle aa "|t|o protect the Federal Gov-
ernment againat the unlikely pot*t*ibilily of Stale MM! local taxation of coin-
penaalion of Federal oftlcent and employe** which ia Aimed ml, or threaten* 
the efficient operation of, the Federal tiovenifnefit." II. It. Hep No. 2t», 
7<ith Cong., lat Seaa., 6 (1SU9); 3. Hep No. 112, 7oth Cong., lal Seaa., 12 
(1U39). 
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"The rule to be derived from the Court's more recent 
decisions, then, it* that the economic burden on a fed-
eral function of a state tax imposed on those who (leal 
with the Federal Government does not rentier the tax 
unconstitutional so long as the tax is im|»osed equally on 
the other similarly situated constituents of the State. 
This rule returns to the original intent of M'Cullock 
V. Maryland, The political check against abuse of the 
taxing power found lacking in MVulloch, where the tax 
was imposed solely on the liank of the United States, 
is present where the State imposes a nondiscriminatory 
tax only on its constituent* or their artificially owned 
entities; and M'Cullock foresaw the unfairness in forc-
ing a State to exempt private individuals with benefi-
cial interests in federal pro|>erty from taxes im|msed 
on similar interests held by others in private property. 
Accordingly, M'Culloch expressly excluded from its rule 
a tax on 'the interest which the citizens of Maryland may 
hold | in a federal instrumentality | in common with other 
property of the same description throughout the State.' 
4 Wheat., at 436." 429 U. S., at 462-464.« 




 A Uu on the income of federal employee*, or a tax on the poaaeaaory 
interest of federal employee* in lioventmeiil houaea, if imoobeti only on 
them, could be eacalated by a State ao aa to destroy the federal function 
performed by them either by making the Federal Government unable to 
hire anyone or by caumng the Federal Government to pay prohibitively 
high aalariea. Thia danger would never ariae, however, if the tax ia alao 
ini|»oaed on the income and property intereata of all other reauleiila and 
voter* of the State." 4&t U.S., at 463. 
The ()ourt ha* repeatedly emphaaized tliat the rationale of the nondiacrimi-
nation rule ia met when there ia a political check against exceanive taxation. 
See South ( aruhno v. Hukert 4Ho II. S 606, 62ti, n 16 <I!*8M) t'1T|he bent 
aafeguard agauiat exceaaive taxation (ami the moat judicially iitaiiagealtle) 
ia the requirement that the government tax in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 
For where a government impoaea a nondiacriminatory tax, judge* can term 
the tax exceaaive' only by aecond-gueaaing the extent to which the taxing 
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If Michigan were to tax the income of federal employees 
without mi|Mising a like tax on others, the tax would lie plainly 
unconstitutional. Cf. McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 
425-4.17 (1819). On the other hand, if the State taxes the in-
come of all its residents equally, federal employees must pay 
the tax. Graves v. New York ex ret. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 
( l & m See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U. S., at 
468 (STEVKNS, J., dissenting). The Michigan tax here ap-
plies to approximately 4'A million individual taxpayers in the 
State, including the 24,000 retired federal employees. It ex-
empts only the 130,000 reitred state employees. IV. of Oral 
Arg. 35-36. Once one understands the underlying reason for 
the McCuUoch holding, it is plain that this tax does not uncon-
stitutionally discriminate against federal employees. 
The Court reaches the opjiosite result only by examining 
whether the tax treatment of federal employees is equal to 
that of one discrete group of Michigan residents—retired 
state employees. It states: "It is undisputed that Michigan's 
tax system discriminates in favor of retired state employees 
and against retired federal employees." Ante, at 814. But 
it does not necessarily follow that such a tax "discrinunatejs) 
against the (federal) officer or employee because of the 
source of the pay or condensation." 4 U. S. C ft HI. The 
fact that a State may elect to grant a preference, or an ex-
emption, to a small |>ercentage of its residents does not make 
the tax discriminatory in any sense that is relevant to the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. The obligation 
of a federal judge to pay the same tax that ia imfx>sed on the 
government and ita people have taxed theinaelvea, and the threat of de-
atroyiug another government can lie realized only if the taxing government 
ia willing to iin|xmc laxen that will alao denlroy itaelf or ita conaliluenla"); 
Washington v Untied Stale*. 4«» U. S 63<i, MM 11*83) ("A 'political check' 
ia provided when a Htate tax fallu on a ttiginflcaiit group of male citizena 
who can be counted upon to uae their votea to keep the Stale front nuaiiig 
the tax exce.wively, and thuti placing an unfair burden ou the Federal Gov-
ernment- It haa been thought neceaaary becauae the United Slates duet 
not have a direct voice in the alale legialature*"). 
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income of similarly situated citizens in the State should not be 
affected by the fact that the State might choose to grant an 
exemption to a few of its taxpayers —whether they be state 
judges, other state employees, or perhaps a select group of 
private citizens. Such an exemption might be granted "in 
spite of" and not necessarily "because of" its adverse effect on 
federal employees. Cf. Personnel Administrator of Masta-
chusetU v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 2bu\ 279 (1979). Indeed, at 
least 14 other States grant special tax exemptions for retire-
ment income to state and local government employees that 
they do not grant to federal employees.* As long as a state 
•See A m . Rev. SUt. Ann. | |43-1022(3) and (4) (Supp. 19H8) (benefit*, 
annuities, and peneiona received from the ataie retirement aystem, the 
atate retirement plan, the judges' retirement fund, the puhlic safely per 
annuel retirement ayatem, or a county or city retirement plan exempt in 
their entirety; income received from the United Stales civil service retire-
ment ayatem exempt only up to $2600); Colo. Rev. Stat. I I39 22 104(4 Kf) 
and (g) (Supp. ttMJH) (amount* received aa penaiona or aiuiuitiea from any 
aource exempt up to $20,000, but amounta received from Federal Govern-
ment aa retirement pay by retired member of Armed Force* less than 66 
year* of age exempt only up to $2000); Ga. Code Ann 148-7 27UM4XA) 
(Supp. 19HH) (income from employee*' retirement ayatem exempt); La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. 1142 646, 47:44.1 (Weat Supp. IttHD) (annuitiea. retire-
ment allowances and benefit* paid under the atate employee retirement 
ayatem exempt from atate or municipal taxation in their entirety, but oilier 
annuities exempt only up to $61)00); Md. Tax-Gen. Code Ann. I l0-2O7(o) 
(19HH) (ftre, rescue, or ambulance personnel length of service award funded 
by any county or municipal corporation of State exempt); Mo. Rev. Slat. 
1169 687 (Supp. 1UHV) (retirement allowance, benehi, funds, property, or 
rights under public school retirement ayatem exempt); Mont Code Ann. 
II lD-30-lll(2McHf) (1987) (benefit* under teachers retirement law, pub-
be employees retirement ayatem, and highway patrol law exempt in thru-
entirety, beneftta under Federal Employees Retirement Act exempt only 
up to $3600), N Y Tax Law |6l24oMJ) (McKinney 1987) (pensions to oftt-
eera and employees of State, its subdivisions and agencies exempt), N. C. 
Gen. Stat | | 106-14KbK 13) and (14) (Supp. 1988) (amount* received from 
retirement and penaton funds established for Itremen and law enforcement 
officer* exempt in their entirety, but amounta received from federal 
employee-retirement program exempt only up to 14000), Ore. Rev. Stat. 
||3U».obOUXc) and (d) (1987) (payment* from Public rJmployea Retire-
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income tax draws no distinction between the federal employ-
ees or retirees and the vast majority of voters in the State, 
1 uee no reason for concern about the kind of "discrimina-
tion" that these provisions make. The intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine simply does not constitute a moat favored 
nation provision requiring the Statea to accord federal em-
ployees and federal contractors the greatest tax benefit* that 
they give any other group subject to their jurisdiction. 
To be sure, there is discrimination against federal employ-
ees—and all other Michigan taxpayers —if a small group of 
residents is granted an exemption. If the size of the exempt 
group remains the same—say, no more than 10% of the popu-
lace—the burden on federal interests also remains the same, 
regardless of how the exempt class is defined. Whether it 
includes schoolteachers, church employees, state judges, or 
perhaps handicap|ied persons, is a matter of indifference to 
the Federal Government as long as it can fairly be said that 
ment Fund exempt in their entirety, but paymenta under public retirement 
aystem established by United States exempt only up to $6000); S. C. ('ode 
II 12-7~40bta). (d), (e) (Supp. IU68) (amounta received from state retire-
ment systems and retirement pay received by police officers and firemen 
from municipal or county retirement plana exempt in their entirety; federal 
civil service retirement annuity exempt only up to $3000); Va. Code 
168.1-322(C)(3) (Supp. 1!W8) (pensions or retirement income to officer* or 
employees of Commonwealth, ita subdivisions and agenciea, or aurviving 
e|»ouaetf of such officers or employees paid by the Commonwealth or an 
agency or subdivision thereof exempt); W. Va. Code II II-2l-l2(cKb) and 
(t>) (Supp. 1D88) (annuities, retirement allowances, returaa of contributiona 
or any other benefit received under the public employeea retirement aya-
tem, the department of public safety death, disability, and retirement 
fund, the atate teachers' retirement aystem, pensions and annuitiea under 
any police or firemen's retirement system exempt); Wia. Stat. 171.06(1 Ma) 
(Supp. IttHH-lUtft) (payments received from the employees' retirement aya-
tem of city of Milwaukee, Milwaukee city employees' retirement ayatem, 
altertIT a retirement and benefit fund of Milwaukee, firefighters' annuity 
and benefit fund of Milwaukee, the public employee trust fund, and the 
atate teachers' retirement ayatem exempt). 
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federal employees are treated like other ordinary resident** of 
the State. 
Even if it were appropriate to determine the discrimina-
tory nature of a tax system by comparing the treatment of 
federal employees with the treatment of another discrete 
group of persona, it ia peculiarly inappropriate to focua aolely 
on the treatment of atate governmental employees. The 
State may always compensate in pay or aalary for what it 
aaaesses in taxes. Thus a apecial tax imposed only on fed-
eral and state employees nonetheless may reflect the type of 
disparate treatment that the intergovernmental tax immu-
nity forbids because of the ability of the State to adjust the 
compensation of its employees to avoid any special tax bur-
den on them. United State* v. County of Fresno, 429 U .S . , 
at 4G8-4GD (STEVENS, J , dissenting). It trivializes the Su-
premacy Clause to interpret it as prohibiting the States from 
providing through this limited tax exemption what the State 
has an unquestionable right to provide through increased re-
tirement benefits.4 
Arguably, the Court's holding today is merely a logical ex-
tension of our decisions in Phillips Chemical Co, v. l>uma* 
Independent School Out., 301 U. S. 376 (ItXiO), and Memphis 
Bank <fc Trust Co. v. Garner, 469 U. S. 392 (1983). Even if 
it were, 1 would disagree with it. Those caaea are, however, 
significantly different. 
•The Court aleo euggeeta that compensating state emidoyeea through 
tax exemption* rather than through increaaed peuaion benefit* dtacrimi-
natea againat federal taxpayere by reducing the penaion income uubject to 
federal taxation. See anUt at 816, n 4. But retired atate employee** are 
not alone in receiving a aubauly through a tax exemption. Michigan, like 
moat States, provide* tax exemption* to aelect indu*triett and group**. 
See, «. y , Mich. Comp Law* Ann. I&J6 64a(g) (We*t IUH6 and Supp. 
ItaJH) (industrial pruceaaing). and 1206 Maip) (l!*Hb) (|N>llutton control). 
Ttiet the State- chooaea to proceed by indirect aubaidy rather than direct 
aubatdy, however, ahould not render the tax invalid under the Supremacy 
Clauae. 
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Phillips involved a tax that applied only to lessees of fed-
eral property. Article 6248 of the Texas Code imposed a tax 
on lesaees of federal lands measured by the value of the fee 
held by the United States. Article 7173 of the Code, the 
only other provision that authorized a tax on lessees, either 
granted an exemption to lessees of other public lands or 
taxed them at a lower rate. Lessees of privately owned 
proiierty paid no tax at all/ The company argued that "be-
cause Article 6248 applies only to private users of federal 
property, it is invalid for that reason, without more." 361 
U. S., at 382. The Court rejected that argument, reasoning 
that it was "necessary to determine how other taxpayers sim-
ilarly situated are treated." Id., at 383. it then defined the 
relevant classes of "similarly situated" taxpayers as the fed-
eral lessees who were taxed under Article 6248 and the les-
sees of other public property taxed under Article 7173. 
Within that narrow focus, the Court rejected the school dis-
trict's argument that the discrimination between the two 
classes could be justified. Because the Court confined its 
analysis to the two state taxes that applied to lesaees of pub-
lic property, its reasoning would be controlling in the case be-
fore us today if Michigan's income tax applied only to public 
employees; on that hypothesis, if state employees were ex-
empted, the tax would obviously discriminate against federal 
employees. 
The troublesome aspect of the Court's opimon in Phillips is 
its failure to attach any significance to the fact that the tax on 
private landlords presumably imposed an indirect burden on 
• "Although Article 7173 ia, in term*, applicable to all leaaeea who hold 
tai-exempt property under a leaae for a term of three yearn or more, it 
appear* that only leasee* of public property fall within tin* claaa in Texaa. 
Tax exemption* for real property owned by private organization* — chari-
tiett, churrhea, and auiular entitle*—do not aurvive a leaae to a buetnee* 
leaaee. Hie full value of the leaned property become* taxable to the 
owner, and the leaaee* indirect burden coneequeiitly u» aa heavy aa the 
burden impueed directly on federal leaaeea by Article itZib." 361 U. S , at 
asO-381 (empheaut in original, footnote omitted). 
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their leasees that was aa heavy aa the direct burden on fed-
eral leaaeea imposed by Article 5248. The Court did note 
that M|u)nder theae circumatances, there appears to be no dis-
crimination between the Government's lessees and lessees of 
private property/' Id., at 381. But—possibly because of 
the School District's rather unwise reliance on an eo,ual pro-
tection analysis of the case*—the Court never even con-
sidered the question whether the political check provided by 
private property owners was suflicient to save that tax from 
the claim that it singled out federal leasees for an unconstitu-
tional tax burden.' 
In Memphis Bank <& Trust Co., the question presented 
was the lawfulness of a Tennessee tax on the net earnings of 
• T h e School Diatrict addreaaea thin problem, eaeentially, aa one of 
equal protection, and argue* that we moat uohold the claaaiflcation, though 
apparently diacriminatory, 'if any atate of facta reaaonabiy can be con-
ceived that would auaUun it.' Allied Stores v. Bower; 368 U. S. 622, 
628." /«*., at 383. 
1
 An interesting feature of the Pkillipe opinion ia ita reference to the 
fact thai the tax upheld in United State* v. City of Iklnnt, 366 U. S. 4u6 
(ItiuM), had actually included an exemption for achool-owned property —and 
therefore diacriminated "againat** federal property in the Maine way the tax 
involved in thia caae diacriminatee "againat" federal employeea. 
"This argument miaconceivea the acope of the Michigan deciaiona. In 
thoae caaea we did not decide —in fact, we were not aaked to decide — 
whether the exemption of achool-owned property rendered the atatute dia-
criminatory. Neither the Government nor ita leaaeea, to whom the atat-
ule waa applicable, claimed diacrimination of thia character." Phillips 
Chemical Co. v. Uumae Independent School Utst, 361 U. S , at 386. 
The Court'a deacription of the relevant claaa of property aubject to tax in 
the Detroit caae obvioualy would have provided the aame political check 
againat diacrimination regardleaa of how the achool property might have 
been claaained. In iMtnnt, Juatice Black deacribed that claaa aa followa: 
"But here the tax apphee to every private party who uaea exempt property 
in Michigan in connection with a bueineae conducted for private gain. 
Under Michigan law thia meane pereona who uae property owned by the 
Federal Government, the State, ita political aubdiviaiona, churchea, chari-
table orgamxationa and a great hoat of other entitle* The claaa denned ia 
not an arbitrary or invidioualy diacriminatory one." 366 U. S., at 473. 
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banks doing business in the State that defined net earnings to 
"include interest received by the bank on the obligations of 
the United States and its instrumentalities, as well as inter-
est on bonds and other obligations of States other than Ten-
nessee, but | to| exclude interest on obligations of Tennessee 
and its political subdivisions." 459 If. S , at 394. Although 
the federal obligations were part of a large class and the tax 
therefore did not discriminate only against the income de-
rived from a federal source, all other members of the dis-
favored class were also unrepresented in the Tennessee Leg-
islature. There wan, therefore, no political check to protect 
the out-of-state issuers, including the federal instrumental-
ities, from precisely the same kind of discrimination involved 
in McCulloch v. Maryland. Indeed, in the McCalloch case 
itself, the taxing statute did not, in terms, single out the 
National Bank for disfavored treatment; the tax was im|>osed 
on "all Hanks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, 
not clmrtered by Uie legislature" 4 Wheat., at 317-318. A 
tax that discriminates against a class of nonresidents, includ-
ing federal instrumentalities, clearly is not protected by the 
political check that saved the state taxes in cases like United 
States v. County of Fresno, 429 U. S. 462 (1977), and City of 
Uetnnt v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489 (1968). 
When the Court rejected the claim that a federal employ-
ee's income is immune from state taxation in Graves v. New 
York ex ret. OKeefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939), Justice Frank-
furter wrote separately to explain how a "seductive cliche" 
had infected the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, 
which had been "moving in the realm of what Lincoln called 
'pernicious abstractions."' He correctly noted that only a 
Mweb of unreality" could explain how the M|f lailure to ex-
empt public functionaries from the universal duties of citizen-
ship to pay for the costs of government was hypothetically 
transmuted into hostile action of one government against the 
other." Id., at 489-490. 
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SrtVKNS, J., dissenting 489 U. S. 
Today, it ia not the jjreat Chief Juatice'a dictum about how 
the power to tax include** the power to deatroy that obacurea 
the iaaue in a web of unreality; it ia the virtually automatic 
rejection of anything that can be labeled "discriminatory." 
The question in thia case deaervea more careful consideration 
than ia provided by the mere use of that label. It should be 
anawered by considering whether the ratio decidendi of our 
holding in McCutloch v. Maryland is applicable to this quite 
different caae. It ia not. I, therefore, respectfully diaaent. 
FKAZEE v EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPT. 829 
Syllabus 
FKAZEE u ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY ET AL. 
APPEAL FKOM THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD 
OlSTRItrr 
No 87-1946. Argued March 1, I UK*)-Decided March 29, 1989 
Appellant, who refused a temporary retail position because the job would 
have required him to work on Sunday in violation of hia peraoiial reli-
gious beliefs, applied for, and wan demed, unemployment compenaation 
benefits. The denial wan aflirined by an administrative review board, 
an lllinoia Circuit Court, and the State Appellate Court, which found 
that since ap|>ellant waa not a member of an established religious aect or 
church and did not claim that his refusal to work resulted from a tenet, 
belief, or teaching of an established religious body, hia peraonal pro-
fessed religious belief, although unquestionably sincere, waa not good 
cause for hia refusal to work on Sun*lay. 
Held The denial of unemployment compenaation benefits to appellant 
on the ground that his refusal to work waa not baaed on teneta or dogma 
of an established religious sect violated the Free E&erciae Clause of 
the First Amendment as applied to the Slates through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Sherbrrt v Writer, 374 U. S. 398. TAomoa v. Hevtew lid. 
oj I minimi Employment Security iMv , 460 U. S. 707, and HoMne v. Un-
employment Appeal* Comm'n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136, rested on the 
fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religion required 
him or her to refrain from the work in question, not on the consideration 
that each of them was a member of a |»articular religious aect or on any 
tenet of the sect forbidding such work. While membership in a aect 
would simplify the problem ol identifying sincerely held beliefs, the no-
tion that one must be responding to the commands of a particular reli-
gious organization to claim the protection of the Free Eiercise Clause ia 
rejected. Tlie sincerity or religious nature of appellant's belief waa not 
questioned by the courts below and was conceded by the State, which 
offered no justification for the burden that the denial of benefit* placed 
ou ap|»ellaiit a right to e&erciae his religion. The fact that Sunday work 
has Income a way of life does not constitute a slate interest sufficiently 
compiling to override a legitimate free-eterciae claim, aince there ia no 
evidence that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employ-
ment if appellant succeeda on his claim. Pp. 832-836. 
169 111 App. 3d 474, 612 N. E. 2d 789, reversed and remanded. 
APPENDIX 7 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989): 
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or 
other demands for public revenue which is 
deemed unlawful by the party whose property is 
taxed, or from whom the tax or license is 
demanded or enforced, that party may pay under 
protest the tax or license, or any part deemed 
unlawful, to the officers designated and 
authorized by law to collect the tax or 
license; and then the party so paying or a 
legal representative may bring an action in 
the tax division of the appropriate district 
court against the officer to whom the tax or 
license was paid, or against the state, 
county, municipality, or other taxing entity 
on whose behalf it was collected, to recover 
the tax or license or any portion of the tax 
or license paid under protest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 (1987): 
Within six months: 
an action against an officer, or an officer de facto: 
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise or other 
property seized by any such officer in his official 
capacity as tax collector, or to recover the price 
or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other 
personal property so seized, or for damages for the 
seizure, detention, sale of, or injury to, any 
goods, wares, merchandise or any other personal 
property seized, or for damages done to any person 
or property in making any such seizure. 
(2) for money paid to any such officer under 
protest, or seized by such officer in his 
official capacity, as a collector of 
taxes, and which, it is claimed, ought to 
be refunded. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(2): 
Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, 
and orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1): 
To whom awarded. Except when expressed provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in 
these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; 
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. 
Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by 
law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-704 (1987): 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Parts 5, 
6, and 7 of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 6, 7, 10, 
and 12 and the rules promulgated thereunder, 
no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax, penalty, 
or interest imposed under Chapter 1, 2, 6, 7, 
10, or 12 may be maintained in any court by 
any person, whether or not such person is the 
person against whom such tax was assessed. 
(2) No suit may be maintained in any court for 
the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of the amount of the state tax 
liability, of a transferee or of a fiduciary 
of property of a taxpayer. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56(1) (Supp. 1991 and 1987): 
In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith. 
4 U.S.C. § 111: 
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or 
compensation for personal service as an officer or 
employee of the United States . . . by a duly constituted 
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation 
does not discriminate against the officer or employee 
because of the source of the pay or compensation. 
